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Abstract 
This thesis provides an ethnographic exploration of lay and expert definition and 
experience of flooding in the UK. It examines how residents and officials in two 
different localities construct their experience two years after the severe national 
flooding of 2000. Findings are drawn from qualitative interviews with nineteen flood- 
affected residents and eight officials. 
Much of the flood research literature reveals a historical focus on material loss and 
damage to property. This thesis argues that residents' construction of their flood 
experience extends beyond inundation of water and damage to property and 
possessions. It is also argued that as a result of disruption to their everyday lives, and 
through the continued risk of flooding, residents are compelled to redefine their 
concept of 'home'. 
The thesis explores the status and negotiated nature of the knowledge held by 
residents, local councillors and flood professionals. It describes the actions and issues 
surrounding these groups' attempts to persuade others of their construction of the 
experience of flooding. It is suggested that although residents' and officials' theories 
of cause differed, the methods used in marshalling knowledge and supporting their 
theories were similar. 
Officials contested residents' theory of the causes of flooding, residents did not, 
however, overtly challenge officials' theories. This was in part explained by the 
consultative approach used by flood professionals in their dealings with residents. The 
thesis argues that the consultative approach stems from the demands of the 
professional role, which includes engineering issues, but also economic and political 
concems. 
The thesis carries policy implications for flood professionals that focus on reducing 
disruption and involving residents in flood-mitigation decisions. The value of a 
standardised public participatory approach to all flood situations is, however, 
questioned. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the reader to some of the key issues that are relevant to 
flooding in the UK and thus to this research. It describes recent flooding events in the 
UK and emphasises the importance of studying this environmental hazard. A brief 
background is given to the key body responsible for the management of flooding in 
England and Wales; the Environment Agency. The rationale for the research aims of 
the thesis is explained and an outline of the chapters is provided. 
1.1 Flooding and the context of this research 
In England and Wales around five million people, in two million properties, live in 
flood risk areas which accounts for just over 7% of the land area (Environment 
Agency, 2002). This indicates not only a significant number of at-risk members of the 
public but also a high concentration of the vulnerable population in a relatively small 
proportion of the total land area. In the last century the most notable flood events to 
affect the UK, resulting in damage on a national scale, were in the spring of 1947, the 
autumn of 1968, and Easter of 1998. The 1947 floods now form the benchmark for 
river levels in England and Wales. The flooding of Easter 1998 affected four thousand 
seven hundred homes and five hundred commercial properties with estimated losses 
of E350 million and the deaths of five people. 
This century the autumn 2000 floods affected just under ten thousand homes and 
businesses and disrupted national transport links and power supplies. In England and 
Wales just over half of the affected homes were in locations where there were no 
flood defences. Approximately two hundred and eighty thousand homes were saved 
from flooding by flood defences and thirty-seven thousand homes narrowly avoided 
flooding (Environment Agency, 2001). The total cost to insurers was fl. 3 billion 
(F, 860 million for domestic property and f, 440 million for commercial property), 
which included associated storm damage (Association of British Insurers, 2001). 
Media reports called it the most costly disaster to ever hit Britain and the Deputy 
Prime Minister, John Prescott, said at the time that the events should serve as a 'wake- 
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up call' (Association of British Insurers,, 2001: 2). 
1.1 
-1 Organisational changes andflooding events 
The Environment Agency (Agency) was formed in April 1996 adopting the 
responsibilities of the National Rivers Authority. One of the key roles of the Agency 
is in the management of flood mitigation in England and Wales. As a result of the 
Easter 1998 flooding the chairman and board of the Agency commissioned an 
independent assessment of the Agency's performance Bye and Homer (1998). 
Overall Bye and Homer (1998) recommended a review of the Agency's 
organisational, management and investment procedures with a view to improve 
'efficiency and effectiveness in the provision, operation and maintenance of flood 
warning and defence' (p. 2). The wide ranging recommendations of the report 
addressed the areas of monitoring flooding, flood warnings, co-ordination with the 
emergency services and supervision and control in flood defence. For each of these 
areas specific recommendations were made. It was suggested that there was a 
requirement to improve existing flood monitoring and the recording of the extent of 
flooding. A key failure in warnings was due to a lack of flood warning awareness 
among the public, inconsistent and inadequate procedures and systems providing a 
poor performance. They suggested that there had been a breakdown or there were 
inadequate communication links between relevant contacts and emergency groups. 
Finally there were insufficient resources available, or where there were resources, 
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there had been insufficient understanding of flooding characteristics to make best use 
of them. 
In response to these recommendations, the National Flood Warning Centre (NFWC) 
was established. The NFWC took a lead role in improving and managing the 
dissemination of flood warnings to those at risk in England and Wales. Scotland and 
Northern Ireland have separate agencies responsible for their areas. 
1.1.2 Official groups' responsibilities 
The Agency in England and Wales is split into eight geographic management regions. 
An Environment Agency Area Office in each of the regions monitors flood levels and 
issues flood warnings to relevant emergency organisations and to the at-risk public. 
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The Area Offices also co-ordinate flood mitigation schemes within their regions. The 
Agency exercises a general supervisory role on issues regarding flood defence and 
warning with regard to 'main' rivers. 'Main river maps' created by the Agency define 
'main' rivers. Responsibility for all other watercourses (rivers, ditches and drains), 
known as 'ordinary' watercourses, rest with the local authorities. The Agency 
undertakes its flood management operations through regional and local flood defence 
committees. These committees take advice from the Agency and raise funds mainly 
through local authorities. For large capital expenditure such as hard engineering 
schemes the Department for Envirom-nent, Food and Rural Affairs or DEFRA 
(previously the Ministry for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food or MAFF) grants aid 
either through the Agency or councils. DEFRA has responsibility for flood defence 
policy and legislation in England with respect to the work that needs to be carried out 
(Select Committee on Public Accounts, 2002). 
1.1.3 Environment Agency initiatives 
Since it was established the NFWC has redesigned and clarified the flood warning 
system, making it available on BBC weather forecasts. It has increased public 
awareness of flood risk via advertising, direct mail campaigns and provision of flood 
information packs to those at risk. A central telephone number has been established to 
provide information on the status of flooding in the regions and an automated voice 
messaging (AVM) service has been setup that calls via the phone at-risk individuals 
who have registered with the service. They have also created a dedicated web site 
page with real time flood warning status for areas within all the regions. 
As part of a five year plan to improve the flood warning service an annual programme 
of research is undertaken to monitor flood awareness, post-hoc research to monitor 
warning effectiveness and ad hoc projects on specific flood events or policy related 
issues. Such projects have included flooding issues related to warning vulnerable 
groups (Environment Agency, 2001b), the intangible health effects of flooding 
(Environment Agency, 2003) and issues surrounding public involvement in relation to 
flood management (DEFRA, 2003). Initiatives have been undertaken in the years 
following the 2000 flood to improve the involvement of flood-affected residents in 
flood mitigation decisions. The Enviromnent Agency supports a public body that 
promotes the interests of the flood-affected public, the National Flood Foram, and has 
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initiated activities within specific localities such as the river Cuckmere Flood Forum. 
1.1.4 The characterisation offlooding and its causes 
The description of a flood can arise from both its physical profile and proposed cause 
each involving a number of variables which can interrelate to form a large number of 
different scenarios. 
The physical profile of a flood can involve a description of its frequency, duration, 
speed of onset, spatial dispersion and temporal spacing (Burton et al., 1993). From 
these variables flooding can take on a variety of profiles each with potentially a 
different physical impact on localities and the people within them. At one level, in the 
UK, flooding can be physically caused by different scenarios which include: 
1. Coastal inundation due to storm surge and / or erosion of natural or man 
made coastal defences. 
2. River inundation due to rainwater running off the land and / or due to tidal 
variations combining with heavy rain. 
3. Surface runoff increasing the flow of water into watercourses due to the 
ground being saturated by rainwater and / or building development reducing 
rain water absorption and / or farming practices in the preparation of land. 
4. Failure of man made structures such as darns,, flood defences and drainage 
systems. 
The explanation for the national 2000 flooding given by the Agency was due to 'a wet 
spring and early summer, autumn 2000 was the wettest on record for 270 years. 
Repeated heavy rainfall in October and November caused significant and extensive 
flooding' (Environment Agency, 2001: 1). A combination of severe and unusual 
rainfall on land already saturated with water is described as a reason for the flooding. 
At another level the Agency and other related organisations argue that UK flooding is 
increasing due to more extreme weather patterns brought about by global warning 
(Environment Agency, 2002). This in turn affects the physical causes of flooding as 
outlined above. The Meteorological Office predict a very significant increase in the 
incidence of flooding over the next century as a result of climate change and in the 
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UK floods are now on average nearly twice as frequent as they were one hundred 
years ago (Foresight, 2002). As a counter-point, Smith (1992) suggests the frequency 
of natural events may not be changing so much as our ability to record and report 
them. Measures do show9 however, an increase in the effects of such events, which 
apart from climate change might be due to a number of social variables: 
1. Population growth: places pressure for new housing and industry to be built on 
at-risk land or land required for drainage. 
2. Land pressure: a larger population is concentrated into an area that can be 
affected. 
3. Economic growth: this can cause higher economic losses either industrial or 
personal e. g. luxury home goods. 
4. Technological innovation: encourages the movement of people and property 
into at-risk areas with dependence on that technology to protect them. 
5. Social expectations: in developed countries a social expectation of young 
adults to live independently of their families increases demands for cheap 
housing putting pressure on authorities and developers to build on at-risk land. 
Another expectation is that society is sufficiently advanced that the effects of 
flooding should not be experienced. 
6. Social interdependence: the effects of the actions of individuals, say building 
work, can have effects on other individuals and communities. The transience 
and independent attitudes of individuals in localities may result in the 
historical risks of flooding not being communicated to newer members of an 
area. 
Overall the combination of climatic and social issues may be contributing to the 
changes now reported with respect to the increased frequency, effects and risk of 
flooding in the UK. 
1.1.5 Flood mitigation and those at risk 
Flood mitigation schemes can take the form of flood and coastal defence measures 
that are 'hard' engineering solutions, such as dams, or 'soft' solutions that manage the 
flow of water into watercourses. An example of 'soft' mitigation would involve the 
creation of artificial wetlands to absorb excess rainwater. Other measures can include 
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improved flood forecasting and warning, planning and zoning controls for new 
development together with flood resilient engineering and building codes. Finally 
educational programmes can be undertaken to create awareness amongst the 
population of the risks and causes of flooding. 
Within a locality, flooding can clearly pose a risk to residents as well as to 
commercial and agricultural businesses. Authorities and their institutions such as 
hospitals and schools can be affected as well as non-residents of an affected locality 
who may use the area for travel or tourism. At a household and individual levet, 
dependent upon pre-existing socio-economic and psychological factors, various 
groups may be highlighted as particularly adversely affected by flooding. The effects 
of flooding on one group might have secondary and tertiary 'ripple' effects outside the 
locality on other groups (Kasperson et al., 1988). Commercial businesses affected by 
flooding are likely to affect the lives of people not themselves directly affected. 
People outside a flood-affected area may depend upon care given by residents of an 
affected area who become unable to fulfil their commitments. 
UK flooding is both a serious and widespread problem which is likely to increase in 
severity and frequency in the future. The type of flooding, its causes and the 
mitigation measures that can be adopted can all depend upon a large number of 
variables. In turn, the effects of flooding on the public must be considered in the light 
of the social profile and activities of the inhabitants and those who use an at-risk 
locality, which in turn can also be complex. 
1.2 Rationalefor this study and evolution in focus 
The description of flooding in the UK so far has suggested a significant environmental 
threat that is a complex combination of social and physical issues. Chapter 2 will 
reveal, through a review of the environmental risk literature, social research 
fragmented by disciplinary perspectives, while a limited number of research studies 
address specifically flood victims' and officials' perspectives of the flood experience. 
There exists a gap in this literature for an empirical study that consolidates a thorough 
understanding of underlying reasons for that experience and the perspectives adopted 
by different groups. A single study approach applying a sociological perspective aids 
an understanding of the issues contributing to the definition and experience of 
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flooding. There is an opportunity that the research both extends and tests natural 
hazard and flooding research. 
1.2.1 Evolution- in the original design 
The ESRC CASE funding for the research originally focused on lay constructions of 
the impact and risk of flooding. My previous research (McCarthy, 2000), the reading 
of research involving flood-affected residents in the UK (Tapsell et al., 1999), and 
meetings with the Agency, made it clear that residents and officials might have quite 
different constructions of flooding. This observation led to the decision to broaden the 
focus of the thesis to consider the perspectives of officials as well as those affected. 
1.2.3 Research aim 
The aim of the project is to explore lay and officials' definition and experience of 
flooding in the UK in order to enable the development of more effective responses to 
the problem. 
Specifically, the objectives set for this study are: 
1. To provide detailed information on the subjective experience of flooding. 
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2. To understand how living with the flood risk is experienced at an 'everyday' 
level and its relationship with perceptions of the local environment. ' 
3. To understand lay and official constructions of the causes and consequences of 
floods and how these relate to the ways in which they are responded to. 
4. To develop recommendations for better flood management on the basis of the 
data collected. 
To generate such an understanding the study adopts an exploratory approach. This is 
reflected in the weight of the thesis being concentrated in the empirical and discussion 
chapters. The relevance and value of certain areas of literature only became apparent 
with an understanding of residents' and officials' construction of the flooding. So the 
thesis reflecting the exploratory approach introduces new areas of literature into the 
discussion Chapters 7 and 8. 
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into a total of eight chapters including this one 
Chapter 2: explores the existing literature in relation to the different perspectives of 
disaster, hazard and risk research. It outlines the flooding research that has focused on 
social responses. The aim of the chapter is to provide insight into the breadth and 
history of research that has been conducted with regard to environmental risks. It also 
demonstrates that while a body of research attending to social issues regarding 
flooding and other environmental hazards has become established, it is fragmented by 
approach and focus on specific issues. 
Chgpter 3: Drovides an account of how the research was designed, interviews 
conducted and analysis undertaken. It highlights some of the practical issues and 
problems involved in the process. Within this chapter I provide a brief description of 
the epistemological approach that informed the interviewing approach, focus in 
analysis and discussion of the data. Together with indications of the criticisms and 
virtues of adopting this theoretical stance, it outlines how a social constructionist 
stance towards environmental problems has developed. 
Chgpter 4: the first of three chapters describing the empincal observations in support 
of the two final discussion Chapters 7 and 8. This chapter looks first at flood-affected 
residents and illustrates that from their perspective the disruption of flooding is both 
ongoing and more than the inundation of floodwater. A disruption to residents' 
everyday lives is suggested that is revealed through damage, loss and displacement in 
relation to their concept of 'home'. 
Chqpter 5: the second empirical chapter is split into two sections. The first provides 
insights into residents' theories of the causes and solutions to the flooding. The second 
section takes the same perspective but applied to the local councillors. For both 
residents and local councillors the importance of living locally is highlighted with 
respect to the status of their knowledge that supports their theories. While in both 
groups experience informs local observations in the attribution of the causes of the 
flooding, for local councillors the solution they support is also informed by their job 
responsibilities. 
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Chqpter 6: this final empirical chapter explores similar issues to the last but applied to 
the perspective of flood professionals in both the Environment Agency and the 
councils. Knowledge, infanned by their training and experience, leads to a different 
construction of the causes of the flooding to that of the residents. The basis of the 
status of their knowledge is examined and how they tactically engage with residents' 
knowledge and theories of cause in order to progress their own solutions. 
Ch. apter 7: this is the first of two discussion chapters. This chapter draws out key 
findings from the preceding empirical chapters and establishes their relationship and 
contribution to existing literature. Issues addressed include: the concept of 'home' and 
its redefinition with the disruption of flooding; the similar roles of knowledge and 
experience in lay and officials' attribution of cause; and residents' involvement in 
decisions in the context of a public participatory approach. 
Chqpter 8: this final chapter is split into two sections. The first section discusses and 
adopts a reflexive stance towards the actions of respondents and their responses in the 
interviews. Through this I support my representation of the social constructions of 
flooding in the two localities. The final section draws on the key findings and 
discussion to propose the main policy implications to which the research can be 
applied. 
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CHA-PTER 2 
2.0 Social research into 'natural' hazards and flooding 
This chapter is an introduction to the breadth and history of social research that has 
been conducted with regard to environmental risks with a specific focus upon 
flooding. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section introduces the 
field of disaster, hazard and risk research and provides an explanation for the different 
terms. In the second section, past flooding research is used to illustrate what is already 
known about social responses to natural hazards. Both of these sections demonstrate 
the diversity of social research knowledge in this field rather than attempting a 
comprehensive review of the entire body of literature. The third section addresses key 
issues of communication between the at-risk public and groups attempting to 
ameliorate risk. These first three sections focus on specific issues and serve to 
illustrate a field that is fragmented in approach. By way of contrast, the final section 
of the chapter concludes by supporting the research focus of this thesis. 
The exploratory character of this thesis means that some of this social flood literature 
will be drawn upon and discussed further in relation to the research findings (Chapters 
7 and 8). It also means that some aspects of related literature, for example the work 
dealing with the concept of 'home', have been omitted completely from this chapter 
since their importance becomes apparent only in relation to my later observations. 
2.1 The influences on and characteristics of social research in thisfield 
Research into environmentally disruptive events has been subject to a number of 
different disciplinary perspectives, with studies conducted within sociology, 
geography and psychology. The three distinct subfields, namely disaster research, 
natural hazard research and risk analysis, have evolved from varying degrees of 
influence of each of these disciplines (Mitchell, 1990). Principally, disaster research 
was strongly influenced by sociology, hazard research by geography and risk analysis 
by psychology. 
The following section will give a brief introduction to the historical background to 
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each school of thought, their approaches to research in this field, and the definitions 
associated with each that are used within this thesis. 
2.1.1 Disaster research: a focus on social response to events 
The roots of research into disasters involving 'natural' components lie in the late 
1940s to early 1950s. American military agencies sponsored studies to extrapolate 
civilian behaviour in disasters to their possible behaviour in wartime (nuclear attack) 
situations (Quarantelli, 1973; 1987a; 1994). Emphasis for the application of results 
from this research was concerned with 'control', or management, of the population. 
Here, the relationship between peacetime and wartime behaviour was attempted by 
way of sociological research of populations subjected to some type of sudden and 
widespread disruption e. g.: earthquakes; tornadoes; flooding etc. The studies were 
particular to the natural event under investigation and, to the benefit of disaster 
research, were not specifically focused on those aspects of the event which could be 
applied only to military interest (Quarantelli, 1987a). 
The major early work in 1952 took the form of a systematic population survey of 
residents in several towns and villages in Northeast Arkansas hit by tornadoes. The 
focus for the research was on organisational behaviour in terms of 'good disaster 
leadership' under stress conditions (Quarantelli, 1987a: 290). It includes studies by 
Fritz and Marks (1954) and Schatzman (1960), exploring aspects of group and 
community action as a result of a disaster. From such studies a large body of 
exploratory sociological research was established in this subfield with a particular 
focus on an organisational analysis and collective behaviour (Aguirre and Quarantelli 
1983). Both these two orientations proved useful in, or compatible with, the study of 
the emergency phase of a disaster (Laska, 1990). 
Disasters are viewed and researched as a phased process of pre event, the event and 
post-event. The period when immediate social action is required to ameliorate the 
direct effects of the condition is considered to represent the event. This phase is 
usually referred to as the 'emergency" or (response' phase as it requires immediate 
action characterised by the involvement of the emergency services. The post-event 
phase is described as the recovery period where efforts are made to return a 
population to 'normality' or the social state that existed before the event (the pre-event 
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phase). The definitions of the phases are vague; precisely where phases start and end 
often has to be stated in relation to the situation under investigation. 
By the early 1970's more than two hundred and fifty studies of the post-event 
response of groups or organisations had been conducted in the US (Quarantelll, 1973). 
With disaster research historically focusing on the response phase to an event rather 
than the cause, Kreps (1989: 219) reworks a popular definition of disaster by Fritz 
(1961) as: 
cnon-routine events in which societies or their larger subsystems (e. g. regions, 
communities) are socially disrupted and physically harmed. The key defining 
characteristics of such events are (1) length of forewarning, (2) magnitude of 
impact, (3) scope of impact, and (4) duration of impact. ' 
A different approach to the definition of disaster is taken by Dombrowsky (1995). He 
works from a definition of disasters by Carr (193 1) and suggests that they represent a 
'collapse of cultural protections and are thus principally man-made' (p. 241). 
Dombrowsky (1995) points out that disasters do not cause effects, rather the effects 
are themselves disasters. 
Disaster research can thus be viewed as a focus on the social aspects of the impact of 
an event but excludes investigation of the social processes contributing to the event. 
2.1.2 Hazard research: originsfrom a need to include socialprocesses 
Both natural hazards and disasters were historically defined as acts of God rather than 
of man. They were viewed as caused by an external influence that was independent of 
any social influence. Thus Burton and Kates (1964: 412) defined hazards as 'those 
elements of the physical environment harmful to Man and extraneous to him. ' Despite 
policies of heavy investment in physical science research and hard engineering 
protection programmes, flooding losses continued (Mitchell, 1990). Natural hazard 
research grew out of attempts by geographers in the 1960s to explain the failure of US 
flood control policies. Until that time, hard engineering and flood probabilities were 
viewed as the principal factors affecting a hazard and explanations that excluded 
attributes of human exposure and vulnerability. 
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In an attempt to respond to failing policy, Gilbert VAiite (1964) introduced previously 
excluded social factors as possible variables in flood mitigation. Thus the view of 
cause was no longer externalised but was seen, in part, as attributable to human action. 
His research focused on the perceptions associated with the risk bome by floodplains 
inhabitants in the US. It suggested the importance of experiential factors on behaviour 
in the face of a continued threat of flooding. Those residents with previous frequent 
experience of flooding perceived the threat of farther flooding to be less serious as 
time went on. Future threat was diminished by a combination of denial, ('lightning 
never strikes twice'), and a belief that a recurrence would not be as devastating as 
their previous experience. In other words, residents with little experience of previous 
floods perceived the threat to be greater than those residents who had experienced 
flooding (LMstedt and Frewer, 1998). It was hoped that by attending to such social 
issues through public and organisational preparation for a hazard, losses would be 
reduced. 
Research focusing on other types of natural and technological hazard events (notably 
work by Burton and Kates, (1964); Kates, (1971); White, (1974); Hewitt, (1983); 
Mitchell, (1989); Burton, Kates and White, (1993)) further advanced a geographical 
approach. These studies also investigated perceptions and interpretations of victims of 
an event rather than simply the physical aspects of the event itself. Building on 
previous research, Burton, Kates and White (1993) developed a model to describe 
societal coping with natural hazards. The model describes three types of future 
response that can ameliorate future negative hazard effects. These are: 'Biological' 
adaptation, which result from a natural selection process; 'Cultural' adaptation, which 
focuses on longer term changes in the social system; and 'Adjustments', which are 
more immediate and direct responses than cultural adaptation such as altering daily 
activities or relevant technology. 'Adjustments' can further be split into two aspects: 
'incidental' or unintended adjustments; or 'purposive', or conscious adjustments. 
Laska (1990) confirmed the usefulness of the model in relation to flooding and 
homeowner adaptation but suggests that although the model contributes important 
insights into the field of hazard exposure, it is not widely applied as a theoretical 
model. This is suggested to be due in part to its imprecise definitions of the levels of 
adaptive behaviour. 
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This body of work developed the principles of natural hazard research by not only 
focusing on the distribution of events across space and through time but also by 
including a consideration of social factors. These include: 
'social and individual vulnerability to the natural hazard, perceptions of risk on 
the part of potential victims and the behavioural responses to perceived or 
experienced hazard on the part of individuals and agencies' (Rodrigue, 1993: 
29). 
Here the term 'vulnerability' is introduced, which as a concept has multiple 
definitions (Cutter, 1996). From a hazard perspective, it is frequently considered in 
terms of loss of property or of life. Blaikie et al. (1994: 9) offer a relatively simple 
working definition of vulnerability: 
'By 'vulnerability' we mean the characteristics of a person or group in tenns 
of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the impact of 
a natural hazard. It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree 
to which someone's life and livelihood is put at risk by a discrete and 
identifiable event in nature'. 
Vulnerability is a concept that includes insufficient access to resources but is also 
affected by social and political decisions (Buckle et al., 2000). It involves public 
response, which it will be shown later can either be attenuated or tempered by the 
actions of various social, cultural and institutional processes. 
2.1.3 The definition of hazards 
In terms of defining what is meant by the term natural hazard, Smith (1992) 
differentiates between natural events and natural hazards (or resources) within an 
ecological framework. If, for example, flooding occurs in a remote region unused and 
uninhabited by humans then it will be looked upon as an event rather than a hazard. 
Burton et al. (1993: 25) suggest a simple definition of the flooding hazard as 'the risk 
encountered in occupying a place subject to flooding'. The occupation of a natural 
floodplain does not in itself turn a flood into a hazard (Mitchell, 1990). An individual 
may occupy a region that suffers from flooding yet for some reason, the topography of 
the land for example, that individual may not be affected. Human agency must also be 
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taken into account, with deliberate or inadvertent changes to flood regimes and 
floodplain geometry also defining the risk. Thus social factors have a central role 
with the possibility of natural hazards developing from an interface between 
geophysical processes (natural event system) and human activities (human system). 
Smith (1992: 16) created a broad working definition of environmental hazards to 
include both natural and technological events as: 
'Extreme geophysical events and major technological accidents, characterised 
by concentrated releases of energy or materials, which pose unexpected threat 
to human life and can cause significant damage to goods and the envirom-nent5. 
Smith, by taking a geographic perspective, omits psychological impact and any 
consideration of the social impact, apart from a threat to life. Mitchell (1990: 132) 
deflnes the degree of hazard as a function of risk, exposure, vulnerability and 
response. Although he offers vague definitions of these four individual variables, 
Mitchell incorporates aspects of social impact (in the form of the potential for 
experiencing loss). Mitchell defines 'risk' as the probability of a damaging event or 
circurnstance, and 'response' as the degree to which society acts to reduce, avoid or 
prevent loss. 
Hazard research has more recently started to recognise that issues related to the hazard 
in question can be more spatially and temporally remote than may be immediately 
apparent (Wisner, 1986; White, 1987; Mitchell, 1990). White (1987) gives an example 
of domestic water shortage in Egyptian villages; his study includes considerations of 
public health as well as the more remote issue of empowering women to make 
decisions regarding their safety and the welfare of their children. Thus it can be seen 
that hazard research now incorporates social processes, contributing to our 
understanding of what was initially viewed as a purely physical event. 
2.1.4 Risk analysis: close relationship with hazards 
Risk analysis is both the youngest and the largest of the three subfields of social 
research into natural hazards (Mitchell, 1990). Early work utilised probability theory 
and fault tree analysis in order to establish the reliability of technologies and products. 
From a psychological perspective, hazard research usually focuses on attitudes and 
perceptions of the individual towards a possible event and individuals' psychological 
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Coping strategies post-event (e. g. Lazarus and Folkman, 1984, cognitive- 
phenomenological theory of stress). The psychological perspective is linked with the 
development of the 'risk analysis' approach, particularly in relation to more 
'technological' rather than 'natural' types of events. The term 'technological' applies 
to what are viewed as non-natural threats such as harmful radiation and toxic 
chemicals. Research investigates the interplay of technology and its accompanying 
hazards (Three Mile Island 1979, Bhopal 1984, Chernobyl 1986). 
Risk analysis has now incorporated social science perspectives and has developed a 
concern with the social nature of perception of risk. As opposed to the definition of 
risk given by Mitchell (1990), one that focuses solely on probability, Renn (1992) 
takes a sociological perspective of risk along two dimensions. The first dimension is 
the individualist versus the structural, which asks if risk is maintained by individual 
intentions or organisational arrangements. The second sets objective versus 
constructionist perception, or risks as 'real' observable events versus risks as the 
social artefacts of groups and institutions (Hannigan, 1995). This second dimension 
will be discussed further in Section 3.7.3 in relation to the epistemological approach 
adopted in this thesis. 
In the context of cultural theory Green (1997) states that risks are not purely external 
or objective dangers but are produced, negotiated and manipulated within social 
interaction. In this context, risk behaviour is not viewed, as in, say, psychological 
terms, as a pathological or irrational behaviour. The sociological perspective is of risk 
behaviour as rational in terms of the cultural system. Such a perspective focuses on 
social organisation that simultaneously creates, filters and distributes risks (Perrow 
1984; Clarke, 1989). 
According to Hilgartner (1992), risk includes three main conceptual elements: the 
'object' posing the risk; a putative 'harm'; and an alleged 'linkage' between the first 
two elements. What is interesting is that it is the linkage between the two that is often 
problematic. Risk can be attributed to multiple objects and the full extent of a risk 
may not be known for some time. This is further complicated by multiple conflicting 
layers of support for the existence of a particular risk in the form of legal, scientific 
and moral proofs. 
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For Tacke (2001), risk is based on social attribution, which depends on context. He 
outlines three dimensions. The first temporal dimension looks to what possible 
damages the future might hold. Luhmann (1993) highlights the fact that due to 
decisions taken in the present, risks become visible although consequences arise in the 
future that are uncertain. Risk then becomes associated with responsibilities rather 
than being socially externalised as a danger (Douglas, 1990). Second, a factual 
dimension refers to non-knowledge (Japp, 2000). This is not a lack of knowledge but 
a reference to how risk is constructed by various actors such as experts and lay public. 
It is here that the perceived status of knowledge held by different actors can affect 
perceptions of a risk. Finally, a social dimension explains how risk is communicated: 
when constructed by 'self, the perception of risk emanates from within oneself and a 
risk is seen to exist; however, when risk is constructed by an external source, it is 
communicated in terms of pure danger (Luhmann, 1993). 
A working definition of risk utilised in risk assessment and management is provided 
by The Royal Society (1992: 2): 
'a combination of the probability, or frequency, of occurrence of a defined hazard 
and the magnitude of the consequences of the occurrence. ' 
Here the consequences are left open to definition as material, social or psychological 
elements, or indeed as a combination of them all. As the early work in hazard research 
highlighted, different individuals will have distinct mental models of the risks 
associated according to the specific hazard (Fischhoff et al., 1981). An individual's 
assessment of the risk in turn affects their perception of that risk, influencing the 
adjustments they might make in response (Burton et al., 1993). Both the perception 
and communication of risk are viewed as deeply embedded in the structure of cultures 
and are in turn reflected in the risk coping institutional arrangements in different 
groups (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). 
Beck (1992) argues that society is becoming more risky, but Smith (1992) suggests 
that it may not be the frequency of events, a component of risk, that is changing so 
much as our ability to record and report them. There is also an increasing focus on 
more complex macrohazard systems that might involve elusive hazards, for example 
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Global Warming (the elusive hazard) associated with flooding (the macrohazard). 
Elusive hazards are not immediate but subtle and long term. They are more difficult to 
detect as they are cumulative, diffuse and slow-acting. The association of flooding 
with Global Warming means that although flooding might be distinctly defined 
temporally and spatially, the associated causes are not easily defined and are hard to 
detect. Mitchell (1990) also talks about megahazards which result from the interaction 
of different types of risks. He gives an example of hunger as a megahazard, a product 
of drought, failures of food conversion and storage technologies, and disadvantaged 
access to resources. 
2.1.5.1h summary 
Broadly, both the term disaster and the related field of research have focused on the 
response phase of an event. This has largely excluded any interpretation of the 
processes of decision and interaction leading to the event. These social processes 
could involve societal adjustments which might reduce or prevent future disasters 
(Laska, 1990). Drabek (1986) suggests that disaster research has only recently 
extended into areas of recovery processes and mitigation. Mitchell (1990), however, 
attributes this to an increase in collaboration and convergence with hazard research 
and risk analysis rather than an extension of disaster research. Hazard research is 
interrelated with risk and places a greater emphasis on the causes of an event. The 
involvement of risk includes issues of perception and its variability within a 
population, dependent upon the complex interaction of a number of factors including 
experiential knowledge. With a focus on social processes, this thesis has the potential 
to inform the 'experience' of flooding for different groups and so sits more 
comfortably in the sub-fields of hazard and risk research. 
2.2 Social responses toflooding and other natural hazards 
The following section will draw on past flooding and environmental social research in 
order to illustrate what is known about social responses to natural hazards. It 
addresses issues concerning how hazards are perceived, their social effects and the 
coping strategies employed by individuals, communities and organisations. 
2.2.1 The perception of hazards 
The first step in hazard perception is awareness of the hazard. Tunstall et al. (1997) 
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conducted one of the few studies wholly based in the UK to investigate public 
perceptions of flood risk. The research suggests that flood hazard awareness varies by 
location. This is dependent on the social dynamics of residents within a locality to 
maintain a 'community memory' of past flooding. The authors illustrate this with the 
example that few residents in the London catchment areas were aware that past 
flooding had occurred in their locality. This was attributed to the transient nature of 
the residential profile in this locality inhibiting the maintenance of a shared 
community memory or knowledge of past floods. Research by Kingsbury (2000) on 
warning and awareness regarding flash floods in New Zealand suggests a solution. He 
found that signage showing the historic flood extent and depth was a very powerful 
public awareness tool in at-risk areas, particularly among tourists. 
Thus, it can be seen that understanding people's perception of hazard plays a key role 
informing possible ways of communicating a hazard to particular groups. In relation 
to communicating a hazard following the Easter 1998 floods, the Environment 
Agency, conducted a review of flood warning research and communication. The 
review (Environment Agency, 1998; BMRB, 1999; 2000; 2001) looked in particular 
at the clarity and content of flood warning messages, flood warning dissemination, 
and factors that might affect response. 
The perception of the magnitude of a risk partly depends on the interplay of 
contextual factors such as perceived controllability, catastrophic potential and dread 
or concern of risk (Fischoff, 1995; Renn, 1998; Slovic, 1987). Slovic (1987) tackles 
aspects of communication, hazard perception and associated risk. Past experience of a 
hazard will essentially colour the degree of control the individual feels they have with 
regard to the hazard. Experience can be direct, or absorbed indirectly via other 
communication routes such as the media. Perceived control will in turn either limit or 
increase an individual's choice of the adjustment, be it physical or emotional, that 
needs to be made. In terms of perceived controllability, research by Lave and Lave 
(1991) into US flooding suggests that the public seeks someone to blame, viewing 
floods as man-made or controllable events. This is confirmed by Rochford and 
Blocker (1991) in relation to US flooding and by McCarthy (2000) in relation to UK 
events. Lave and Lave go further, suggesting that the public do not consider 
flood 
control as a shared responsibility with govenu-nent. Their research also shows that the 
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public displays more knowledge and concern about floods that were experienced 
personally and focuses upon the largest and most destructive event rather than the 
most recent. 
The perception of risk can vary according to a number of variables, including the 
lifestage and the physical ability of individuals. This might have implications for the 
perceived degree of vulnerability of different groups within society i. e.: families with 
children, elderly or disabled groups (Kingsbury, 2000). In addition, the ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds of groups can play an important role in hazard perception. 
Schmuck (2000) illustrates this with research into religious explanations as a survival 
strategy for floods in Bangladesh. Viewed by aid agencies in the region as hampering 
their efforts, the mostly Muslim population hesitates to take flood precautions and 
evacuate affected areas. Even with the experience of frequent flooding, they regard 
the hazard as an act of Allah: 'Through the events he is showing His will and power 
against which they can not and should not do anything' (p. 85). Although not 
appropriate in terms of preparedness, Schmuck proposes that this is a healthy reaction 
following the flood and a positive self-help strategy for the population: 'As Allah has 
given the floods, He will also give believers the strength to survive them' (p. 85). 
Schmuck proposes that this allows quick recovery in comparison with the Western 
non-Muslim trauma of questioning why the disaster happened to them, a response that 
is both inefficient and negative. 
2.2.2 The social effects of hazards 
Social factors create differentials in perceptions of the flood hazard within a 
population. The same factors can mediate different experiences of the effects of 
flooding. Enarson and Fordham (2001) illustrate how a possible traditional gendered 
division of labour between home and work might result in a differential experience of 
the flood. They suggest that flooding often causes disruption to female daily living but 
less to male routines, as men are more likely to work away from the affected area. 
Vulnerable groups such as the elderly or disabled may depend on the support of 
affected individuals. Although not directly affected by the flooding themselves, these 
groups are affected by the disruption in the support they receive, which is frequently 
female. 
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Work by Buckle and Fleming (2001) on flood insurance in Australia suggests that 
insurance companies are not managed for the benefit of the community, yet the 
benefit they provide to the community is massive. Interestingly, the UK is unusual in 
that it is one of the few developed nations where insurance companies offer 
comprehensive flood insurance. In other countries the public rely on government aid 
in times of disaster. Work by Fordham and Ketteridge (1995) suggests that flood 
victims lacking insurance for reasons of poverty are viewed by society as being 
irresponsible. Enarson and Fordham (2001) illustrate how recovery funds can become 
the focus of division in the community. This was also illustrated by Skertchly and 
Skertchly (2000) in relation to evacuation behaviour by the public in Australia. They 
suggest that drug and alcohol dependencies resulted in social tensions at the 
evacuation centres and at later stages of the flood recovery period. This was as a result 
of open-ended money distribution from government bodies being used by a few 
people for alcohol and gambling binges. The few affected the many, with families 
fleeing these areas. The situation was resolved by providing goods rather than money. 
Even the process of evacuation from flooding can leave a traumatic mark on those 
involved. Ketteridge and Fordham (1998), investigating flood evacuation in two 
communities in Scotland in 1993 and 1994, found that particularly the elderly, 
children, and women experienced greater suffering. Their paper gives both policy and 
practical recommendations for future flood evacuation. 
The effects of flooding on a community can be deep and long lasting. Research by 
Erikson (1976) into the 1972 Buffalo Creek coal-refuse dam collapse in West Virginia 
demonstrates this. The sudden disaster killed one hundred and twenty-five people and 
left four thousand homeless. His study showed that one and a half years after the 
disaster, 93% of those affected still suffered from identifiable emotional disturbance 
in the forms of confusion, despair and hopelessness. This, Erikson suggests, is 
informed by a number of issues. Almost everyone in the affected population who 
survived had a very close escape and experienced the 'relentless savagery of the 
water' (p. 153). He suggests that the symptoms are exacerbated by the power of the 
flood and the helpless state in which it left the population. Added to this is the 
destruction of houses, buildings which for that particular community are emblems of 
their rise out of poverty. The loss of personal possessions or mementos is suggested as 
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a loss of a link between the victims' past and their future. 
The flood victims are found to have lost faith in natural and social order and sensitised 
to, and preoccupied with, other potential hazards. Smith (1996) and Tobin and 
Ollenburger (1996) also attribute psychological effects to flooding. Erikson's (1976) 
case is perhaps, for developed countries, the most extreme scenario of flooding with 
the complete destruction of residents houses (they were washed away) and death. 
However, elements of the experience can be related to seemingly less severe flooding 
events. 
In the UK, the Flood Hazard Research Centre has conducted research investigating the 
possible health effects of flooding among residents (Tunstall et al., 1988; Tapsell et al. 
1999; Tapsell, 2000; Tapsell and Tunstall, 2001, Tapsell, et al. 2003). Tapsell's 
research is concerned with the Easter 1998 flooding and focuses on affected residents 
in two localities over a four-year period. Supported by the observations of Erikson 
(1976), the work suggests that the effects of flooding among residents are prolonged 
well beyond traditional concepts of the recovery period. Whereas Erikson (1976) 
suggests that residents' issues relate to the experience of the floodwater and the loss of 
their houses, Tapsell illustrates that flooding can be viewed as a 'multi-strike stressor'. 
The effects extend beyond the immediate impact of the flood event and include 'the 
disruption and problems of the recovery period; and from the worry or anxiety about 
the risk of reoccurrence of the event' (Tapsell et al. 1999: i). Her work broadens 
understanding of the social effects of flooding beyond the event itself and into issues 
of health and well-being. 
2.2.3 How individuals and communities cope 
The motivation and ability to assess risk also enables a perception of risk-management 
and thus might be viewed as a form of coping, Skertchly and Skertchly (2000: 47) 
describe an Australian flooding event: 
'People catapulted rapidly from certainties and routines of everyday life to 
experience the discontinuities, disruptions and discomforts of unanticipated 
natural flood trauma. ' 
Although aware of the flood threat, the population affected were largely unaware of 
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the extent of their vulnerability. Aboriginal Australians, however, did have tales of 
past extreme floods, but these were outside their direct experience or documentation. 
It is suggested that the historic nature of this knowledge lulled experts and those 
responsible for flood management into a false appreciation of its likelihood and their 
vulnerability. As the disaster developed, it was only when floodwater was seen rising 
into houses that many residents took evacuation advice seriously. 
Based on the study of a number of different hazards around the world, four categories 
of coping response have been devised by Burton et al. (1993: 121). The authors 
suggest that these can be applied to individuals, communities and organisations. Four 
titles that might be applied to the types of behaviour identified are: 
'Absorption': involves denial or failure to regard the hazard as a problem. 
'Acceptance': awareness that the hazard is significant but judge there is little that 
can be done. 
'Reduction': there are steps taken to reduce impact via warnings and anticipation. 
ID 1: 1 jL-,,, Iocation': there is an acceptance that at some stage drastic changes in location 
or livelihood might need to be taken. 
A limitation of this scheme is that there is no attempt to understand the relationship of 
behavioural and emotional coping nor the degree to which each of these issues is 
employed by the public. Webb et al. (2000) and Couch (2000) attend to how cultural 
context informs hazard perception, preparation and response to hazards. 
As already described, Schmuck (2000) suggests how religious belief can inforra 
community-coping with recovery following a flood. Both Enarson and Fordham 
(2001) and Hagen et al. (1999) investigate ways of coping and community expression 
after a disaster. Enarson and Fordham (2001) investigated gender and symbolism in 
the context of a major US flood. They suggest that women use grass roots popular 
culture to interpret disaster events. In the communities they studied, there is a history 
of quilts being made to mark significant events. The making of the quilts and the 
interpersonal networks and skills utilised in creating them are suggested to be forms of 
coping and community expression. Hagen et al. (1999) describe the US Red River 
valley flood of 1997 and the use of graffiti by residents in the affected community. 
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They conclude that the graffiti directly expressed residents' flood experience. They 
called it 'catastroffiti' and proposed that it is a community discourse of flood recovery 
reaffirming the ethos of that community. 
This section has illustrated that the effect of hazards is infonned by social processes. 
An understanding has been developed of how issues of awareness, perception and 
coping with a hazard arise. Such an understanding can in tum inforni official 
strategies to help reduce the risk of a hazard or the publics' vulnerability. 
2.3 Managing hazards and risks 
An understanding of the different stances taken by interested parties can inform the 
management of a hazard situation. The following section will describe some key 
hurdles that need to be overcome and possible issues that arise in hazard 
communication. The different strategies utilised by groups can inform decisions and 
action in the management of a risk but can also in themselves create problems. 
The section first addresses the issue of different stances that can be adopted. Central to 
the management of hazards are the processes of communication regarding the hazard, 
its associated risk, and the possible mitigation measures involved. Blumer (1971: 229) 
suggests: 
'The recognition by a society of its social problems is a highly selective process, 
with many harmful social conditions and arrangements not even making a bid for 
attention and with others falling by the wayside in what is frequently a fierce 
competitive struggle. ' 
The competitive struggle described takes place between the various interest groups 
involved. Leiss (1996) suggests that risk communication is the flow of risk 
evaluations and information between academic experts, regulatory practitioners, 
interest groups, and the general public. Each of these groups and organisations has 
different perceptions and goals regarding what can be achieved by such interaction 
(Wynne, 1993; Irwin, 1995; Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Wynne, 1996; Brown, 1997; 
Yearley, 2000; Fischer, 2000). 
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With regard to flooding, these differences in perception and preferred outcome are 
highlighted by Fordham. (1998) in a paper discussing the involvement of the public in 
decisions about flood mitigation in the UK. She refers to Kasperson (1986) who 
suggests that reasons underlying these differences are due to a mismatch between 
officials' and public perceptions of the role of public involvement. Kasperson 
suggests that the officials' perception can be characterised as a means to accomplish 
goals and, as a result, is viewed by them as necessary in order to: 
" correct misperception 
" educate the public 
" reduce conflict 
ease implementation 
secure the credibility of their stance. 
Conversely, the public's approach is ends- rather than means-focused and is 
characterised. by fundamental ethical issues: 
" What are appropriate or tolerable levels of risk? 
" Who decides such levels? 
Should the project go ahead at all? 
Who benefits from it? 
A strategy often employed by institutions in the communication of their particular 
stance regarding a risk, is one that focuses on correcting and educating the public. The 
public deficit model of communication informs this strategy. It describes the inability 
of experts to convey their ideas, the basis of their decisions, to the public. It is 
suggested that this inability is due to public ignorance of the officials' area of 
knowledge which usually has a scientific basis. When official risk-management 
strategies adopt this approach and fail, either the public or their own educational 
strategy is blamed. Fischhoff (1995: 140) identified eight developmental stages within 
institutions with regard to communication with the public. Each stage is dependent on 
the previous stage being accomplished but does not replace it: 
1 All we have to do is get the numbers right 
2 All we have to do is tell them the numbers 
3 All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers 
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4 All we have to do is show them that they have accepted similar risks in the 
past 
All we have to do is show them that it is a good deal for them 
6 All we have to do is treat them nice 
7 All we have to do is make them partners 
All of the above 
Not all groups and organisations are at the same stage of development and perhaps 
may be unaware that the learning has been undertaken by other groups (L6fstedt and 
Frewer, 1998). 
Kasperson (1986) illustrates how lay and officials' (or experts') stances can have 
completely different objectives for communicating with one another regarding a 
hazard. A public deficit stance means that a goals-orientated approach is often adopted 
by officials. From this basic positioning of public and officials, various problems can 
arise in communication between the groups. 
2.3.1 Hurdles andpossible solutions to hazard communication 
In relation to involving different parties in flood mitigation dialogue, Fordhani (1998) 
focuses on the organised institutional structures of the UK, Portugal and US. This 
study includes observations of the Environment Agency. She suggests that 'a 
preponderance of top-down, expert, masculine models of decision making' (p. 27) in 
the organisations contributes to the exclusion of the public from involvement in flood 
management decisions. She admits that this is changing very slowly within the 
organisations. She suggests, however, that there are still barriers to the relinquishing 
of control and the acknowledgement of different voices and values in decisions taken. 
To support a more inclusive decision-making process she argues that even the most 
technically competent proposals do not win public support. This is, she suggests, 
because social and cultural dimensions are excluded (or included too late) by 
organisations. Fordham argues in favour of greater public involvement by 
organisations in flood management decision-making on the basis that it includes 
insiders' and outsiders' views. It is suggested that officials mainly adopt a 
consultatory process rather than a participatory involvement with the public. A 
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Participatory process would involve greater discussion of the issues and allow the 
public to have an influence over the decisions taken. Her paper will be discussed 
further in relation to my findings in Chapter 7. 
Throughout the natural hazard research literature, there are examples to show that 
even when dialogue with the public is achieved and an organisation's knowledge is 
communicated this does not guarantee that the public will respond in way deemed to 
reduce their risk. For example, Sims and Baumann (1983) investigate educational 
programmes for natural hazards. They suggest that the evidence is weak. for a 
relationship between awareness or knowledge and the subsequent adoption of damage 
mitigation measures. Other social issues might compete with the mitigation being 
promoted and need to be understood. Tunstall et al. (1997) suggest that while public 
recognition of flood risk is necessary, on its own it is not sufficient for public support 
of flood alleviation schemes. Such issues include the impact of such schemes on the 
residents' environment. This can inforrn public decisions even in cases where there is 
a sense of urgency due to a recent experience of flooding. There is often an 
underestimation by officials of residents' attachment or concern for their local areas. 
Even with the threat of a hazard such as flooding, the possibility of large engineering 
works to defend residents may be viewed as an additional threat. 
Within risk communication scenarios, Keeney and Winterfeldt (1986) view risk 
communication as sometimes becoming a risk problem itself This usually involves 
the erosion of trust between the parties involved. A well-documented and unresolved 
case is given by Flynn et al. (1993) in relation to the siting of the first high-level 
nuclear waste repository in the US in Nevada. They studied the American Nuclear 
Energy Council's (ANEC) actions with respect to communicating with the public. In 
retrospect, it is suggested that ANEC had made a risky communications decision. In 
the guise of trying to educate the public regarding the safety of the industry, they 
attempted to sway the opinions of administrators in favour of their decision to site a 
repository in their locality. A media campaign was conducted, the main objective of 
which was to influence administrative aspects of the plant's introduction; however, 
the document setting out this strategy was leaked to the public. In combination with 
other communication errors, ANEC's position as credible and trusted experts was 
undermined. The whole project was equally undermined with ANEC's application 
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refused. A high price was paid not only for that project but also for the credibility of 
the whole nuclear industry since, in the public's perception, that project was 
associated with it. 
Experts can also misinterpret a hazard situation if the views of the local public 
regarding that hazard are not only sought but understood and included in the decision- 
making process. This is illustrated by Wynne (1996) in his case study of Cumbrian 
sheep fanners and the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear accident. He suggests that the experts 
repeatedly miscalculated radiation depletion data because they misunderstood the 
local sheep-farming practices. The advice of the experts, when it did not make sense 
in relation to how the fanners actually managed their sheep, also undennined their 
own credibility with the farmers. The expert view was particularly crucial in this case 
for the sheep farmers had no one else to turn to for guidance. The fariners were able to 
suggest the best course of action to avoid the hazard once the officials' information 
related to their farming practices. This is an example of official action not taken 
account of the local circumstances. 
When officials and experts are consulted they have to consider the form in which the 
risk is communicated. Experts have to address the full range of possible scenarios in 
relation to a risk while the public are frequently happier with a safe versus not safe 
scenario (Keeney and Winterfeldt, 1986). It is suggested that public unease with the 
uncertainty of risk data and their inability to correctly interpret the data results in a 
desire for a more straightforward answer. Keeney and Winterfeldt (1986) suggest the 
public education communication route where the public should be educated to 
appreciate that: 
There are no zero risk solutions 
Tradeoffs are necessary 
* Uncertainty cannot be avoided 
However, it might be suggested that this strategy may not be appropriate in all 
circumstances, for example when public health is at immediate risk. In these 
circumstances the level of public trust in the experts will inform public perception of 
the advice given and the sort of action taken. Beck (1994) suggests that the lay public 
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is losing their sense of trust in science and expertise as they feel betrayed by them. In 
other words experts are increasingly less able to depend on the status of their role to 
gain public acceptance of their advice and through this public action. In these cases 
where immediate action is required educating the public on its own may not overcome 
this hurdle. 
In preparation for such situations, strategies that build trust by opening dialogue 
between groups can be employed. Enarson and Fordharn (2001) in relation to flooding 
suggest better inter and intra organisational communication. Even between 
organisations a common goal or interest does not necessarily lead to unproblematic 
interaction. This interaction needs to be managed. Wachtendorf (2000) observered 
communication and co-operation when the Red River flooded crossing the boarder 
between the US and Canada. From this scenario she raises some general useful points 
that could be transposed to local interaction with the public. She suggests that there 
was good co-operation and co-ordination between the two countries as a result of. 
* Informal relationships being networked and established before the disaster. 
9 Interaction between the actors during routine periods provided the 
foundation for interaction during the disaster. 
9 Infonnal. relationships bolstered the trust they had in their counterparts and 
the infonnation they provided. 
In other words, trust gained through the building of relationships before a hazard 
strikes can facilitate better communication and action; however, it is indicated that this 
takes time and requires sustained dialogue between interested parties. 
2.4 In conclusion and support of the thesis 
This chapter has illustrated the importance of a perspective that involves 
understanding the social as well as the physical aspects of a hazard. This perspective 
is established within the field of natural hazard research. The different perspectives of 
the sub-fields of disaster., hazard and risk research fragment this field. 
Past research reveals how both perceptions and impact of hazards on individuals and 
groups (whether general or specific as in the case of flooding), are in part informed by 
29 
a variety of social issues. This in turn presents an opportunity to manage risk through 
communicating with the public. Issues associated with the different stances and 
approaches to hazard communication are highlighted. The literature suggests that 
officials currently tend to adopt a consultation and educational approach to 
communicating risk information to the public. This approach in isolation appears to be 
unsuccessful. As an alternative, research suggests an approach that encourages greater 
involvement with the public as a means of communicating risk and encouraging 
action. 
Past flooding research in the UK has addressed issues of residents' experience of 
flooding suggesting that it is prolonged beyond the event and ongoing. The experience 
involves not only material but also emotional, social and physiological disruption of 
residents' lives. Also in the UK, a separate study suggests the actions of officials are 
consultative in approach with regard to public involvement in flood management. 
This thesis draws together both residents, as well as officials', experiences of flooding 
and their attempts to resolve the risk. A single study approach presents an opportunity 
for a clearer understanding of the social aspects of flooding as a hazard. By tackling 
these issues in a single research design the underlying reasons for the actions and 
reactions of and between, the groups involved is made easier. The thesis adopts a 
particular sociological perspective that facilitates such an understanding but also 
reveals a new representation of the experience of flooding. A social constructionist 
stance was adopted in the thesis and is outlined in Section 3.7. Such an approach has 
not been rigorously applied to flooding research in the past. 
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CHAPTER 3 
3.0 Methods 
The following chapter is a description of the research process and the influences that 
informed my final research design and analysis. It aims to highlight how my personal 
flood research experience and the methodology itself informed this design. A 
theoretical stance is outlined that was adopted within the methodology and analysis of 
the data. The chapter will end with a reflection on the commitment I made to the 
residents of the research and my own experience of conducting it. 
3.1 Reflections on personal biography. 
I would first like to describe my own experience and knowledge in relation to 
flooding. I have no first-hand experience of flooding, neither have my relatives nor 
friends. An initial interest in the psychological aspects of risk in association with 
environmental hazards directed me towards flooding as a hazard. Since flooding 
constitutes the main envirom-nental hazard in the UK, this was an obvious choice. I 
had already conducted a study of psychological coping amongst flood-affected 
residents (McCarthy, 2000) as part of a Masters degree in Environmental Psychology. 
This involved fieldwork immediately prior to the October 2000 floods. 
My own research biography is given following the feminist tradition of research 
which makes clear the personal background and intentions of the researcher (Denzin 
and Lincoln,, 2000). 1 have related this biography to illustrate that, although I had no 
direct experience of flooding, I brought some knowledge about this hazard to the 
research. This related to not only an awareness of some of the issues that might 
concern flood-affected residents, but also my experiences of conducting research in 
relation to this group. In this way, my interest in flooding was principally an academic 
one: I had no flood-related, political or personal issues to address in relation to the 
hazard. Whilst my flood research experience informed decisions regarding 
methodology to some extent, it was methodological issues that imbued the thesis with 
a rhetorical emphasis. The rhetorical nature of the thesis as a whole will be discussed 
in Section 8.1. 
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3.2 Constraints, OPPortunities and a way ahead. 
It will be described in this section that the constraints for this study were set mainly by 
the funding body, in tenns of the aim of the research, funding and the time it had to be 
undertaken. However, the constraints imposed were balanced by opportunities 
presented by the funding body in terms of access. The following section will illustrate 
these issues through a description of the progress of my research. 
3.2.1 Constraints and Opportunities. 
Methodological constraints had already been set for this thesis within the CASE 
ESRC proposal. They were described as an ethnographic study to be conducted with 
flood-affected residents in the United Kingdom. Fortunately, for the purposes of the 
research, though not of course for the affected residents, there was a major flood event 
in October 2000 when the funding period began. A suitable source of flood-affected 
respondents was therefore readily available. An ethnographic approach suggested 
itself as a suitable design for conducting exploratory research. This aspect of the 
research design will be discussed later in this chapter. Thus, the funding proposal set 
certain parameters on a possible research design, whilst the temporal aspect offered 
opportunities for research. 
A review of the literature on flood research revealed a small, though significant,, body 
of work that focused upon residents' experience of flooding in this country (Section 
2.2.2. ). Despite the findings of this previous work, I felt that there were still uncharted 
areas that could serve to bring a ftesh perspective in reaching a fuller understanding of 
residents' flood experience. This could have involved variations in the sample design. 
Comparisons were considered between flood-affected and unaffected residents, and 
addressing temporal issues concerning when residents had experienced flooding. I 
found, however, that most putative designs were undermined by the recent major 
flood events that had affected so many of the UK at-risk areas and their inhabitants. 
3.2.2 Opportunities revealed. 
As a funding partner of this research, the Environment Agency (Agency) invited me 
to attend several induction days in order to familiarise myself with their work and 
responsibilities. This opportunity included a two-day visit to one of their Area Offices 
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in Cornwall. During the course of this visit, I was able to shadow a Flood Officer 
working from this Area Office. I was able to discuss his work, with particular 
reference to a village that had been flooded within his Region. As a result of this, and 
other contacts with Agency employees, I became aware that a completely different 
perspective of flooding existed, one that differed considerably from my previous 
experience with residents. This aroused my interest and, following conversation with 
my project supervisors, it was agreed that an additional Agency perspective (Agency 
Area officials) to that of residents would be of benefit to this doctoral research. A key 
consideration was that, with the Agency as co-sponsors, it presented an opportunity to 
access not only their information resources, but also their employees as research 
subjects. Without the Agency's agreement and assistance, it might have proved 
difficult to gain access to this valuable group. 
3.2.3 The way ahead. 
An ethnographic approach is more usually associated with a form of 'Immersed' 
observational research within the subject's own setting. For the researcher being 
immersed can be 'overtly or covertly, in people's daily lives' (Punch, 1998: 157). 
Whether overt or covert research ethnographic research shares common 
characteristics. Punch (1998) suggests that ethnographic studies research a group of 
people with shared cultural means that are related to the issues of the research. The 
researcher needs to be sensitive to the meanings of the setting and that research is in 
the natural setting. Ethnography compared to say quantitative research is an evolving 
process that is not pre-structured and the data collection techniques involved are not 
restricted. Finally he comments that the data collection is usually prolonged and 
repetitive. All of these characteristics will describe the research process I undertook. 
On reflection, I decided that there was a wealth of experience amongst those that had 
experienced flooding that could not be adequately tapped by observation alone. A 
more appropriate ethnographic approach for this research would be to apply 
interviewing techniques. By its very nature interviewing respondents constitutes overt 
research. It is the nature of ethnographic research that lent itself to the aim and 
objectives of an exploratory study. As Fielding (1993: 154) comments: 
'The concern to balance detailed documentation of events with insights into 
the meaning of those events is the enduring hallmark of ethnography. ' 
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Within an interview procedure, I could have undertaken interviews with groups of 
respondents (focus groups) or individual interviews (in-depth interviews). I was 
reticent about adopting the focus group route given my more limited experience of 
such qualitative methods. This was based on a belief that focus groups require 
considerable experience on the part of the facilitator to manage the interview 
successfully. My decision was, however, based on the aim of my research and 
particular issues I wanted to explore. 
From my previous flood research experience, I noted that residents' perspectives of 
flooding differed within an area - even between next-door neighbours. With a desire 
to explore this observation further, interviewing individuals rather than groups (i. e. 
focus groups) appeared to be the preferable option. In this way I was less likely to 
obtain a consensus opinion, an important factor given that residents' personal 
accounts were of greater interest to me. In-depth interviews were therefore chosen as 
the research tool. This interviewing technique was also better suited to the needs and 
constraints of interviewing Agency Area officials, something that was an important 
consideration. 
3.3 Proposed research design - Respondents 
The initial design was intended to reveal not only the experiences of flood-affected 
residents, but also the differences in perspective between these residents and Agency 
Area officials. My initial target groups for interview were: 
* Flood-affected residents 
Agency Area officials 
Representatives of relevant organisations 
This last category would, I hoped, offer another layer of official perceptions of 
residents' situations and of flooding itself. A provisional list of organisations included 
the National Flood Warning Centre, the Association of British Insurers, the National 
Flood Forum, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 
and the emergency services. 
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The main concerns when developing a research design is an understanding of how the 
sample will be defined. In other words a sample frame needs to be developed. In 
developing a sample frame Mason (2002) includes the methods and techniques that 
will best serve the sample sought, if a sample frame can be identified and how access 
to respondents can be negotiated. I have already discussed the method that was 
employed and later in the chapter I will more specifically address the interviews 
themselves. The sample frame and access were closely associated within the context 
of choosing specific localities for research. 
3.4 Proposed research design - Locationsfor study 
Following a case study methodology my decision regarding geographic location and 
number of sites for data collection was informed by constraints of time and cost. I 
decided, in consultation with my supervisors to limit the choice of location to two 
sites. I also decided that these localities would be chosen not for their differences but 
in order to test the consistency of responses between two similar sites. On this basis, I 
was searching for two fairly similar locations in terms of population profile and flood 
event. 
In my previous research there had been no funding partner to consider. On that 
occasion, I chose data collection sites that had been flooded without the need to take 
account of any constraints other than my own. On this occasion, however, with the 
Agency as a partner and gatekeeper to possible respondents, I felt that it was 
important to involve them in the choice of locations and in the research more 
generally. This was a form of acceptance that I needed to achieve and maintain in 
order to gain access to the research setting (May, 2001). 
The process of site choice was, in part, aided by a workshop arranged by the Agency 
in January 2002, the purpose of which was for me to present my research proposal to 
relevant Agency employees and to a DEFRA representative. The process of preparing 
for the workshop helped me to define not only the target groups for interview but also 
the characteristics of the localities in which the flood-affected residents' interviews 
were to take place. I decided that localities should be characterised by the following: 
e Residential houses flooded during 2000 
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" Unprotected by any substantial flood mitigation scheme 
" Ease of travel on public transport 
" No competing or concurrent research 
The decision to choose flood-affected residential localities that lacked any substantial 
flood protection would ensure that the risk of possible future flooding would remain a 
salient issue for residents. By substantial, I meant large engineering structures that 
may have failed in 2000 but that have since been upgraded. Ease of travel on public 
transport was important for budgetary reasons, in that I expected to have to make a 
number of visits to both interview sites. The requirement of sites where no other 
research was being conducted would facilitate recruitment of residents for interview 
purposes. 
At the workshop described above, a number of possible localities were suggested. 
Following subsequent discussions with the Agency, a provisional shortlist of eight 
was derived. One of the localities which I was encouraged to consider was Bourne 
near Cambridge. I decided to make a visit and contacted the local Area Office of the 
Agency. Involving Agency personnel in the local area ensured that they were aware 
of, and more likely to be sympathetic to, my research. As a result of introductions 
from the Agency in this area, I was met and shown around the village by a local 
Councillor. 
Bourne is a small village situated in a valley. The main cause of flooding appeared to 
emanate from a small stream and from water running off fields (surface run-off) on 
the sides of the valley. I spent an afternoon being shown around the village and was 
given information regarding the background to the flooding that had occurred there. 
On my departure, the Councillor informed me that he was in contact with the Agency 
but that the Agency did not have responsibility for the flooding in the village. This 
was because the stream was not a main watercourse and the Agency did not have 
responsibility for floodwater resulting from surface run-off. This made me aware that 
the fact that the Agency might be in some way involved with residents in a flood- 
affected area, did not necessarily mean that they had, nor had accepted, responsibility 
for the flood event. For these reasons, and because a part of my research would 
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involve the interviewing of Agency personnel in my two chosen areas, I decided to 
incorporate an additional characteristic as a research criterion for the locations. This 
was defined as follows: 
9 Agency should have responsibility for the possible source of flooding in 
the locality 
I later discovered that there was an Agency interest in researching areas where they 
did not currently have responsibility for watercourses. This had informed their 
decision to direct me to Bourne. I now became aware that I would have to balance my 
own research interests with those of the Agency. A positive outcome from my visit to 
Bourne was that it alerted me to the possibility of approaching local Councillors in 
their role of gatekeeper to local knowledge and to the residents of the locality. With 
Agency responsibility now highlighted as a new criterion for choosing localities, the 
shortlist was reduced to four possible places. Within the Agency, a new system had 
been developed to monitor and control research that was conducted across their 
Regions. This, the Agency hoped, would ensure that a particular Region or locality 
would not be over-researched, particularly where there were sensitive issues in the 
area. These might include disputes with the Agency, but could involve their other 
responsibilities for pollution and the environment. My locations were entered into this 
Agency procedure and I awaited approval. 
After a month with no response, I decided, nevertheless, to visit two of the locations 
on my list. During these visits, I made enquiries in relation to my research criteria at 
local libraries, shops and public houses. As a result of these enquiries, it became 
apparent that both localities were ideal for my research. They had, apparently, no 
major disputes with the Agency other than that linked to the previous flooding. In 
consultation with my Agency supervisor, it was decided that I could proceed with my 
research in these locations without awaiting official approval. This was on the basis 
that my research was not a wholly owned Agency project and the supervisor had got 
the agreement of the Area Office. 
3.5 Locations chosen 
The two locations chosen were Waltham Abbey in Essex (Agency Thames Region) 
and Robertsbridge in East Sussex (Agency Southern Region). 
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Waltham Abbey is a semi-urban town lying to the north of London adjacent to the 
M25. A number of areas within Waltham Abbey had been affected by the flood events 
of 2000. One such area lay half a mile from the tourist centre serving the Abbey. I 
was directed there by the Agency Area Office. A single watercourse, 'Cobbins Brook' 
runs through the flood-affected area. The brook has steep, two-metre banks and is 
close to flood-affected houses where the banks had been strengthened with concrete (a 
structure which I did not constitute as a major flood defence). For most of the year, 
only an inch or two of water flows down the brook and it thus appears benign. Houses 
affected by flooding were mainly terraced or semi-detached properties on two streets 
running parallel to the brook. This area of Waltham Abbey had experienced severe 
flooding not only in 2000 but also in 1987. In 2000, one hundred properties were 
affected in Waltham Abbey as a whole. 
Robertsbridge is a small, rural village noted for having the oldest post office in the 
country. Situated between a newly built bypass (A21) and the Darwell reservoir, the 
village is a mix of small shops and cafes on a High Street. New semi-detached and old 
terraced residential properties run up to the train station in one direction and into the 
countryside in the other. Snaking through the village are a number of steep-banked 
brooks and water channels fed by the River Rother and the River Darwell. As a result 
of the 2000 flooding, most properties on the High Street and those lying close to the 
brooks were flooded. In all, seventy-nine business and residential properties were 
affected. A group of houses on the edge of the village, close to the bypass, had 
experienced as many as seven floods in the three years leading up to the 2000 flood. 
In both localities, the flood waters rose to over a metre above the top of the 
watercourses. Similar levels inundated most of the flood-affected houses. In terms of 
socio-economic profile, both areas (as defined by their Wards) were very similar. 
Both were predominantly white. In Robertsbridge (Saleshurst Ward) with a population 
of 4,484, there was a 2% minority ethnic presence whereas in Waltham Abbey (Honey 
Lane Ward) with a population of 6,178 this was 4%. A notable difference between the 
two Wards was in the retired population: 22% in Robertsbridge and 10% in Waltham 
Abbey. In addition employment levels were higher for Robertsbridge (Saleshurst 
Ward) at 70% compared with 61% in Waltham Abbey (Honey Lane Ward) (Census 
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2001 Neighbourhood Statistics). 
3.6 Interviewing sequence informingfinal research design 
A great advantage of adopting a qualitative approach particularly in exploratory 
research is that it allows flexibility to respond to new developments that arise during 
the interview process. These new developments can include the discovery, through 
respondents' accounts, that certain groups and/or issues require attention. Both these 
cases were found in this research in particular in relation to the sequence of 
interviewing the groups. This informed the research design and was likely to affect the 
data collected. 
3.6.1 Informing research design 
As discussed, the three possible groups that were to be recruited for the research were 
residents, Agency Area officials and representatives of relevant organisations. I 
decided that I would interview residents first. This would allow a large number of 
interviews to be collected in a short space of time, thus enabling transcription and 
initial analysis to begin. Interviews with Agency Area officials were expected to be 
spread out over a longer period of time as these respondents were more likely to be 
constrained by their availability (and my ability to travel to interview them). It was 
also hoped that interviews with residents would furnish me with background 
information on flooding in the localities, as well as on their flood-related concerns; 
these would inform my interviews with Agency personnel. 
It was found that choosing this sequence of interviewing had a major effect on the 
final sample design. It resulted in two additional groups being defined and then 
included in the research. Through residents' accounts of their experiences, individuals 
within both local Councils and regional Councils were identified by name as being 
central in residents' experiences of flooding. Before the residents' interviews, I had 
not considered the inclusion of Council representatives. Subsequently, however, it 
became clear that they constituted an important group for my research. Other groups 
came to light when talking to residents about their flood experiences. These included 
Thames Water, specific insurance companies, building companies, and (in 
Robertsbridge), a religious group, the 'Bruderhof community'. These groups, 
however, were specific to situations described by certain residents whereas the groups 
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I chose to incorporate in my research (i. e. local and regional Council representatives) 
were cited as important by all residents in both localities. 
The final sample design for each of the two localities was as follows: 
* Flood affected residents 
9 Local Councillors 
" Flood Area officials working for the Agency 
" Flood Area officials working for the Regional Councils 
" Representatives of relevant organisations 
3.6.2 Informing data quality 
Adopting a phased approach to the fieldwork was not only more efficient in terms of 
gathering and managing the data, but also informed the direction of the research as a 
whole. I made the decision to conduct interviews with residents in two phases: one 
set in Waltham Abbey; and another set in Robertsbridge. For practical reasons, with 
both localities being some distance apart and away from my residence, this was a 
more efficient use of my time. I also wanted to spend a period of time staying in each 
place. This, I hoped, would give me an appreciation of the social dynamics of the 
localities. 
There were also important practical considerations within the interviews themselves. 
By staying in the localities and conducting interviews over a concentrated period, I 
became more aware of or 'tuned-in' to the issues and concerns of residents. This 
meant that I was more focused within the interviews with regard to questioning the 
residents and, because the localities were small, I became a familiar face, which 
facilitated recruitment. A concentrated interview approach could, however, work 
against conducting 'good' interviews. There was an issue of fatigue, not only in terms 
of conducting a number of lengthy interviews over a short period of time, but also 
maintaining a focus on the issues raised during the interviews themselves. Even with 
increasing familiarity of the residents' issues, I still had to maintain an interest while 
listening to very similar accounts on certain issues since they formed an integral part 
of the residents' stories. To interrupt and redirect the interview may have appeared 
counterproductive, breaking the respondents flow, train of thought and perhaps 
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offending the respondent. This could mean important new issues or nuances might be 
missed or not followed up. There was also emotional fatigue on my part, particularly 
in Waltham Abbey. As will be commented on in Chapter 4, the overall character that 
pervaded interviews with the residents was a sense of depressed hopelessness. I found 
that this affected me at the time and was sometimes difficult to repress when moving 
onto the next respondent interview. 
The issue of fatigue arose on the first day of interviewing, after conducting three 
interviews on one day. I quickly decided that I needed to pace the interviews 
throughout the period of my stay in the locality. I was able to spread interviews 
throughout my stay through recruitment and booking interviews ahead. For interviews 
with officials, similar issues arose but there was an additional requirement for greater 
preparation (Section 3.8.1). Preparation was also an issue in the residents' interviews 
in terms of reflecting on what would be of interest in subsequent interviews. By 
managing the time between interviews it also provided an opportunity after an 
interview to make notes of interest points raised by the interview. This may include 
the behaviour or gestures of respondents during interviews, or notes on the setting. 
Two examples of this were noting response to a storm during one interview, and 
recording residents' gestures while explaining their experiences. Both of these issues 
are later highlighted in relation to the residents' accounts in Chapter 4. For officials, 
notes included their use of maps and other documentary material in support of their 
accounts. These notes had the advantage of adding character to each interview. Later, 
this helped by prompting memories of the interviews in the analysis of their accounts. 
The notes also formed the basis of a research diary of the whole research process. 
Overall, the temporal aspects of the interviewing had major implications on the 
research design. Before continuing with an account of the interviews and analysis, I 
will first outline the theoretical perspective that I adopted. This has implications for 
the type of questions I asked in interviews and the analysis of accounts. 
3.7 Adopting a social constructionist approach. 
The following section, through an outline of the social constructionist approach, will 
illustrate why adopting this perspective gave particular insights that are relevant to the 
aim of this study. By example, the section will first illustrate how the approach is 
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an lied to environmental problems. Certain criticisms that are directed at this r-p 
particular theoretical stance will be outlined, and then I will show how the approach 
focused the questioning and analysis areas in this thesis. 
3.7.1 The social construction of environmental problems 
The social construction of environmental claims focus on why claims emerge during a 
particular time period and how they are organised and maintained (Spector and 
Kitsuse, 1987). It is argued by Spector and Kitsuse that a social problem is 'created' 
through claims-making activities by moral entrepreneurs. If these claims-makers 
successfully engage in persuasion about a problem, a collective definition of that 
problem emerges. This idea of the process of collective definition is the basis for a 
number of studies, such as that by Hilgartner and Bosk (1988). They argue that 
objective conditions alone are not enough to cause a social problem, and that this is 
not just a matter of some conditions being more 'marketable' than others. The 
question arises of why this happens? 
As Sandstrom et al. (2001: 223) explain, employing a social constmictionist 
perspective enables questions to be asked such as: 
'Why are some patterns of behavior defined as 'problematic' while others, 
equally threatening, are 'normalized'? Why do particular issues become 
regarded as social problems, while others are ignored? Who has the power to 
make their definitions stick? Why does social concern (for certain issues) ebb 
and flow across timeT 
With this approach, a number of issues arise concerning the claims-makers and key 
aspects influencing the process of claims-making. Some of these issues relevant to my 
study will now be described. 
3.7.1.1 Who creates claims? 
Claims-makers, and the claims they create, depend on their social role or the social 
interests, to which they are playing. The claims-maker might be affiliated to a specific 
organisation, interest group or profession. They might be representing their own 
interests or a third party. They might be experienced or novices in claims-making. As 
Stallings (1995) explains, claims-makers are usually in a public setting and they 
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describe the cause, rationale or solution to a condition in a process of doing something 
about it. The cast of claims-makers can be very diverse. For flooding, they can include 
government agencies, the government, pressure groups from affected businesses and 
residents, residents in a particular group of houses, local councils and national and 
regional media. 
3.7.1.2 How are claims framed? 
All interest groups will have different interests and goals in claims-making, and will 
ftame their claims taking into account the political rhetoric of their target audience. 
Environmental problems usually originate in the realm of science where experts or 
action groups such as Greenpeace, who interface with science and the public, create 
awareness of the problem. Hansen (1993) points out that Greenpeace's claims-making 
activity lies in selecting, ftaming and elaborating scientific interpretations, which may 
have gone unnoticed or were glossed over. In some cases it is not until a political, 
economic or geographic crisis occurs that claims become prominent. In relation to 
Greenpeace, Ufstedt and Renn (1998: 245) describe the Brent Spar controversy in 
1995 as 'aii environm ental 'non-issue' until. the abandoned oil-storage buoy was 
occuple y reenpeace activists'. 
3.7.1.3 The prominence and success of claims can depend on their delivery 
Once a claim is assembled, it needs to command attention and be legitimated - that is 
given status and credibility (Solesbury, 1976). In order to command attention in a 
highly competitive arena, the problem should be viewed as novel (new), important 
(relevant) and understandable. Successful accounts usually propose a causal 
explanation and identify the event as part of a pattern of events. Stalling's (1990) 
observes that both monocausal and multicausal explanations can be employed, but 
that the fon-ner is usually more successful. The means of claims delivery is important. 
Authorities involved with flooding might utilise a full range of communication tools 
from direct mail to at-risk individuals, to national TV advertising campaigns and the 
use of the Internet. Residents' groups operate primarily at their local level arranging 
meetings and petitions. 
3.7.1.4 How are claims supported? 
Support for a claim is established through rhetorical tactics or strategies (Best, 1987). 
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The credibility of claims can be made on moral, rational, profitable or lifestyle 
grounds. The claims-makers themselves can impart support to the claim through 
continued work in the area, such as action group leaders, or association with working 
in the public interest, such as Greenpeace. Even if a claim becomes credible in the 
eyes of the target audience, action does not necessarily follow. As Stallings (1995) 
suggests, in the case of government, the context of the current political environment 
has to be negotiated before any action is possible. To gain public action the practical 
implications of action, and associated barriers to action, have to be overcome or 
cleverly disarmed. An understanding of the public perceptions and associated level of 
risk in relation to the environmental problem can facilitate this. 
Exaggerated claims, if discovered, can sometimes undermine the credibility of the 
holder and the cause for which they stand. Anderson (1997) refers to the Brent Spar 
case where Greenpeace had to retract a claim about an estimate of the oil contained on 
the platform. This undermined public confidence in their actions and future actions. 
These sections have described how clai-Ins -making can, 
define an environmental 
problem. The status and credibility of claims is dependent on the origin, content and 
conveyance of the claim in public arenas. We now address the construction of risk 
claims. 
3.7.2 The construction of risk claims 
As already discussed in terms of the construction of claims relating to envirom-nental 
problems, risks are also constructed and exist in arenas. Hanningan (1995) suggests 
that the most important risk construction takes place in specialised professional arenas 
- scientists, engineers, lawyers, medical doctors, government officials, corporate 
managers, political operatives. Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) view these as 
'communities of operatives' acting in a symbolic fashion, feeding each other. They 
both generate work for one another and raise the prominence of the field as a whole. 
Clarke (1992) suggests the actual institutional assessment of risk, in itself, is a claims- 
making activity that generates definitions of acceptable risk. 
Six societal risk-evaluation roles populating these arenas are proposed by Palmlund 
(1992): 'Risk bearers', these are the victims of an event; 'Bearers associates', might 
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take the form of unions supporting the interests of the victims; 'Generators, ' viewed 
as creating the risk and might be utility or corporate organizations; 'Researchers', 
establish the parameters of the risk; and 'Arbiters', such as regulatory agencies 
mediate between groups. Finally there are 'Informers', such as the media. A social 
constructionist approach suggests that due to power differentials of arenas a dominant 
frame of risk becomes established and is superimposed over popular frames that might 
already exist. 
This section has described some of the issues and situations in which a social 
constructionist approach can describe how claims are created and maintained. We 
now turn to the key criticisms of this theoretical approach. 
3.7.3 Criticisms of the social constructionist approach 
The following section will outline the two key criticisms and counter arguments of the 
social constructionist approach in relation to this thesis: that the approach ignores the 
reality of nature and lacks practical application. 
3.7.3.1 Ignoring the reality of nature 
As already illustrated, a social constructionist approach is concerned with issues 
surrounding the characteristics, emergence, maintenance and reception of environmental 
claims. In this way, the focus of social constructionist studies is clearly concerned with 
social issues through the activities of claims makers. The interaction that is of concern in 
this thesis is not between society and nature (although nature itself may be viewed as 
socially constructed). 
Criticisms are made that social constructionists do not acknowledge the 'reality' and 
independent existence of nature, the environment or environmental problems. As 
I? unlap (1994: abstract) comments: 
'A staunchly constructivist approach to environmental sociology has 
significant shortcomings: (1) a reluctance to acknowledge the importance of 
objective conditions leads sociologists to avoid major issues e. g. human causes 
and consequences of global environmental change'. 
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This perspective of social constructionism depicts it as an 'over socialised' view of 
humanity and nature which Benton (2001: 45) describes: 
'Yield (s) a perspective in which the independent presence of the non-hwnan 
world in our lives is marginal to the point of disappearance' 
This critique is aimed at 'strong social construction ism' (Dickens, 1996: 74). 1 will 
argue, that this would be a difficult stance to take with regards to flooding. In fact, in 
most studies there is an acceptance of the reality and importance of environmental 
problems. Hannigan (1996: 3) comments: 
'I am not by any means attracted to an extreme constructionist position which 
insists that the global ensemble of problems is purely a creation of the media (or 
science or ecological activists) with little basis in objective conditions. On the 
contrary I fully recognise the mess which we have created in the atmosphere, the 
soil and the waterways' 
In other words the realist cn-ticisms of the approach are not grounded in actual 
application in the majority of studies that take a social constructionist perspective. In 
relation to the existence of nature an agnostic stance can be taken. Looking at the social 
construction of road noise, Burningharn (1998) supports agnosticism as a methodological 
strategy in her study. As a methodological strategy, the approach facilitates the 
emergence of insights that might otherwise remain hidden in the complexities of the 
problem. In this respect it does not have to deny reality. This is also supported by Best 
(1989: 249): 
'Constructionism remains most useful as an analytic tool. Constructionism is a 
stance, an orientation, a perspective we can apply to better understand the world 
around us' 
Similarly, in terms of the meaning of nature, social constructionism. is concerned with 
exploring what this reality 'is', what it means and how different versions of reality are 
used. It is not contesting the existence of external reality, but exploring social 
construction of it. 
To contest the objective nature of flooding is not a stance I am willing to take, and it 
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would be a difficult position to defend. Through physical damage and residents' 
accounts, the presence of water in people's houses that flooding has taken place is 
difficult to challenge. My interest is in what flooding means to the various groups 
involved and how they view it as a problem. 
3.7.3.2 Lacks practical application 
A further criticism of social constructionism, again, aimed at the more extreme 
versions, is that a purely theoretical approach does not have any practical application 
or value. This is linked to criticism of the position as ignoring the 'reality' of 
environmental problems. In this way, the approach is viewed as dangerous and 
morally or ethically wrong. As Benton (2001: 46) comments: 
'It is all the same ... whether we do, in fact, face ecological catastrophe or whether 
environmentalists have conjured this threat out of their fevered imaginations' 
'Nature' needs to be included in the sociological remit because environmental 
problems are too important to ignore. In this way sociologists have an important 
contribution to make to the management and pursuit of possible solutions. Social 
constructionist analysis is not exclusively theoretical, but addresses practical questions 
about factors: 
o which contribute to campaigning success 
which inform whether an issue receives media attention 
which influence public responses to media and expert claims 
which lead to some risks being emphasized while others are downplayed 
* and the relationship between scientific research and environmental policy. 
The argument that social constructionism lacks practical application can be viewed as 
adopting an overly simplistic notion of the relationship between research and 
policy/practice. 
3.7.4 Application of the social constructionist approach to this research 
The thesis has a strong practical orientation, being part-funded by the Environment 
Agency. The aim of the research is to deliver practical insights for the Agency as well 
as contributing to academic knowledge. 
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Methodologically, the questioning informed by the social constructionist approach 
within interviews, and the analytical approach employed is relevant to the aim of this 
research. Through this line of questioning and analysis different perspectives and 
stances taken by the groups will be revealed. With regard to residents, rather than 
specifically focusing on issues of the inundation of water, the damage to their houses 
and the loss of possessions, the approach questions what the underlying disruption of 
flooding is in their experience. The approach requires that a judgement is not made 
with regard to which stances adopted by the groups are right or wrong in relation to 
the flooding, but attempts to understand why and how the claims or theories that result 
are created and maintained. This is useful in that it extends current academic debate 
on environmental issues and the social constructionist approach. It also imparts 
practical insight to organisations with an interest in flood management and other 
issues involving the public. Due to their experience, knowledge, responsibilities and 
involvement in the situation the members of such organisations may not be able to 
adopt the perspective of flood-affected residents. The insights gained from a social 
constructionist approach can usefully be employed by an organisation to question 
aspects of their actions, communication initiatives and policy. This is with a view to 
enhancing their dealings with the public. 
This section has provided an outline of what social constructionist approach means in 
terms of this thesis. The thesis adopts a perspective of social constructionism that is 
contextual in terms of recognising the situation of floodwater inundation. The 
methodological approach remains agnostic with regards to claims made by the groups. 
This approach not only informs analysis, but also the focus of questioning in 
interviews directed at understanding the reasons why and how respondents' views are 
created and maintained. 
3.8 Generating the data. 
The theoretical approach adopted infonned the line of questioning within the 
interviews. The interviews, themselves, had a number of practical considerations. 
3.8.1 Pilot Study 
I had, so far, drawn a great deal on my experience from my previous research. It was 
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rp ap arent to me, however, that I had little experience of conducting long, in-depth 
interviews or managing qualitative data. Furthermore, my experience was based on 
interviewing residents rather than officials. An opportunity presented itself during 
November 2001 in the form of the flooding of several business premises in Guildford 
town centre beside the River Wey. These premises included a number of small 
businesses, two pubs and a church. Although businesses did not form part of my 
sample frame, I thought that interviews with these types of respondents may bear 
similarities to interviews that would be conducted with officials. 
The pilot study revealed interesting insights into the concerns of businesses with 
regard to flooding. This included issues of preparation and recovery time from 
flooding. This is not, however, a concern of this thesis although the findings are 
available on request. In all, five in-depth interviews lasting forty minutes were 
conducted. The data was analysed and synthesised into a report. This study revealed a 
number of issues that did have a bearing on my interviews with officials. In the 
management of the business interviews, respondents' time had to be booked in 
advance and the timing of the interviews tightly controlled. The business interviewees 
allocated a time slot which had to be adhered to. My experience of residents' 
interviews, on the other hand, was less time-constrained. The pilot study interviews 
gave me experience of using tape-recorders, which involved choosing the best type of 
microphone for obtaining a good quality recording (these were found to be flat-bed 
microphones). I intended to record all my interviews in the main study, as this allowed 
me to focus on the respondents and their responses rather than the need to take 
handwritten notes of their responses. It would provide me with far more detailed 
accounts than I would be able to achieve with pen and paper. 
The business respondents were far more concerned about the purpose of the research 
and issues of confidentiality than. I had found with my previous residents' research. 
For business respondents, I found that a letter on University headed notepaper 
explaining the research and its intended use put their concerns at rest. This letter 
contained my contact details and a statement of confidentiality for their responses. 
This method would later be adopted in the main study. I was also made aware of the 
complexities of managing just five interview transcripts during analysis. This included 
cross-referencing and retrieval of specific sections of respondents' accounts. From this 
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experience, I resolved as part of the project budget to purchase a qualitative data- 
management software package in order to facilitate the administrative process of the 
analysis. 
Even though the pilot study had not involved the type of respondents I would 
interview in the main study, it proved insightful in terms of managing the research 
process. It also gave me invaluable experience in conducting in-depth interviews 
before the main interview period. This was not only in terms of the practicalities of 
interviewing but also in the direction and questioning techniques that would be 
needed. The chosen format was a semi-structured interview that involved an 
introductory period of general discussion of the issues, a directed period focussing on 
the area of specific interest and a final section that included my summary of what had 
been discussed. The interview was closed with a question asking if respondents felt 
they had talked about everything related to the subject. More specifically, questioning 
was employed that avoided 'jargon', use of prejudicial language, ambiguity, 'leading 
the respondent' and 'double questions' (Gray, 2004: 225). In this way each interview 
was treated as a unique situation and responded to as such. 
3.8.2 Main Interviews 
I conducted fieldwork with all the groups over the period of June 2002 to February 
2003. This involved thirty-three in-depth interviews: 
9 nineteen flood affected residents across both localities 
9 four Local Councillors across both localities 
* two Flood Officials working for the Agency each with experience of a 
locality 
* two Flood Officials working for the Regional Councils each with 
experience of a locality 
* six representatives of relevant organisations. 
The six representatives interviews were achieved with the organisations and 
departments detailed in Appendix A. 
Fieldwork in the localities was conducted in June 2002 in Waltham Abbey and August 
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2002 when I stayed in Robertsbridge. I stayed for a period of a week in both localities 
at local bed and breakfast accommodation. During these periods, I also interviewed 
the local councillors in their associated localities. In Robertsbridge, the opportunity 
also arose to attend a presentation given to the residents by Thames Water. In this 
meeting Thames Water presented their interpretation of the national flooding and gave 
a limited reflection on the specific flooding situation on Robertsbridge. This provided 
invaluable background knowledge to the specific issues in that locality. 
3.8.2.1 Interviewing residents 
Several days before I stayed in both localities, I hand delivered introductory letters to 
target houses (Appendix: B). These letters detailed my research, my associations with 
the University and the Agency. Also, learning from my pilot test, a short description 
of what the interview would involve was included. This detailed the interview length 
and possible benefits of the research. The letters also contained contact details and a 
short statement of confidentiality. I will discuss what possible influences this letter 
may have had on the interviews in Section 8.1.2. 
Two approaches were adopted to identify possible houses to approach in the localities. 
In Robertsbridge, I had made contact with a local Councillor (Parish Councillor), 
through the Agency Area Office. The local councillor, who I later interviewed on a 
separate occasion, was able to provide me with a list of every address in the village 
that had been affected by the 2000 flooding. It was then a case of spreading my 
delivery of introductory letters so that I represented all parts of the village. 
Unfortunately, in Waltham Abbey no such list was offered for me to use. Luckily my 
bed and breakfast accommodation was in the locality and the landlady was able to 
direct me to several houses that she knew had been flooded. From these initial houses 
respondents were able to direct me to further houses that I could try. This is termed 
'snowball sampling' (Arber, 1993) and was a technique used throughout this research 
when a list of possible respondents was not provided. 
I had no specific interviews target for each locality, but ten interviews per locality was 
felt to be a sensible figure. Borrowing guidance from grounded theory research, I 
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employed a 'saturation' technique to judge when I had conducted enough interviews 
in each locality. 'Sample until theoretical saturation of each category is reached' 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 188). My final decision of when to stop interviewing in a 
locality was informed by my judgement that I would gain no new perspectives by 
continuing to interview residents. This was a difficult judgement to make and one or 
two additional interviews were conducted before I felt confident that it was time to 
stop. I also asked each respondent across all the groups if I could recontact them at a 
later time if there were issues in their accounts that I needed to clarify. 
At the start of the fieldwork I was optimistic that I would not be turned away by 
residents when I approached them to take part in interviews. This was again informed 
by my previous research experience and also compared with my experience in 
recruiting the general public for my previous career in market research. In the event, 
residents proved my optimism was correct with only three refusals across both 
localities. All three were in Waltham Abbey. One Waltham Abbey resident felt he 
had been interviewed enough, with a number of research surveys having been 
conducted in the locality in relation to flooding over past years. A second resident was 
ineligible, having only recently moved into the house and had no experience of 
flooding. The other felt it would not be appropriate (this resident was also conducting 
PhD social research in the locality and excluded herself as untypical of residents). The 
criteria I set for residents' involvement were: 
" Adults whose houses had been flooded in 2000 
" They lived for the majority of their time at that address 
* They owned their own house 
The first two criteria are self explanatory in the context of my research design. The 
final criterion was based on my assumption that residents would have greater 
attachment and control over their own houses rather than if they had been renting. 
This, I assumed, might be an additional perspective that probably warranted a separate 
study (to investigate that assumption) and so would not be given adequate attention if 
included in my research design. I restricted my research to adults and did not include 
children for similar reasons, being aware of not adequately representing their views 
within the scope of this project. I did, however, interview one teenager in Waltham 
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Abbey who was sixteen at the time of the flood. 
A decision was taken in recruitment that I would not restrict my sample on the basis 
of gender, age or socio-economic group. This was based on a lack of information 
relating specifically to the flood-affected residents in my chosen localities. Instead, I 
relied on spreading my recruitment over the day, early evening and throughout the 
week. This would, I hoped, improve my chances of recruiting as wide a spread of 
residents as possible. In this way, my sample would not be biased in relation to one 
particular group of residents in either locality. A profile of the achieved sample in 
each locality is appended (Appendix: Q. This shows that in both localities, the sample 
was mainly an older age range, with a mixture of flood experience. Across the two 
localities, a quarter of the respondents were male and a larger proportion in Waltham 
Abbey had lived in their homes for a long period of time. In relation to my research 
objectives, these issues will be highlighted when relevant to my empirical findings. 
Residents in Waltham Abbey required greater encouragement to participate than I had 
found in Robertsbridge. This was, in part, due to residents in the locality having been 
heavily researched over the years with regard to their experiences of flooding. It may 
also have been influenced by their feelings of abandonment by officials over two 
major flood events. In this respect, the individual who refused to be interviewed 
commented that he felt research surveys had not appeared to have helped their 
situation. The encouragement to take part in the interview took the form of assurances 
that the research would benefit them and their locality. It was explained that this might 
be achieved by their situation being promoted through reports and presentations to 
relevant organisations including the Agency. With these assurances I committed 
myself to a certain line of confidentiality that is discussed in Section 3.9. It also had 
implications in the form of rhetorical issues regarding residents' responses and the 
research as a whole that are discussed in Section 8.1.2. 
Interestingly, in both localities I did not have to refuse residents because they had just 
moved into the area. On inquiry, both within and outside the interviews, I was told of 
only one house in each locality where the previous residents had moved out following 
the flooding of their houses. 
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Residents' interviews were conducted in their homes. This benefited the research by 
putting the respondent at ease. In most interviews it also enabled respondents in their 
account of their experiences to orientate themselves in relation to the house and 
surrounding area. In some cases, by being in their houses, residents were able to refer 
to or show me printed material in support of their accounts. 
After the initial introductions most of the residents' interviews were relaxed and 
informal. My interview strategy was similar to that employed in the pilot study. For 
residents I merely had to ask them to tell me about their experience and very little 
further prompting was required. This is reflected in my interview guide in Appendix: 
D. which was rarely used in the interviews due to respondents more often covering the 
issues I was interested in on their own accord. Half the interviews in each locality 
were asked about their experiences generally while the other half were directed to talk 
more about their experiences with other official groups. One particular respondent did 
require a lot of prompting initially but once started was the longest and most detailed 
interview lasting close to two hours. On average, all the residents' interviews lasted 
just over an hour. This was felt to be adequate in relation to the detail of their accounts 
and taking into consideration interviewee and interviewer fatigue. All the interviews 
ran smoothly with only on one occasion my tape recorder being set on pause for the 
initial ten minutes. This was simply overcome by making notes directly after I had left 
the respondent in relation to what I could remember they said. 
One particular issue that was difficult to overcome was that on a few occasions other 
family members decided to sit in and contribute to the interview. This was even 
though they appreciated that I had wanted to interview just one member of the 
household. In these cases the technique of directing my questioning to that particular 
person I wanted to interview did not exclude the other person. In analysis I did not 
think this interaction between my respondent and other family members adversely 
influenced responses. Sometimes the additional respondent provided more details to 
supplement the main respondents' account. 
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3.8.2.2 Interviewing Officials 
The interviews with officials were mostly conducted during the period September 
2000 to February 2003. As already mentioned, local councilors were interviewed 
during the same period as the residents. 
A mixture of different methods was used in the recruitment of these groups. Contact 
telephone numbers and email addresses were gained from respondents or provided by 
the National Flood Warning Centre. In this way interviews generated further 
interviews using the previous contact as way of introduction. Within these samples I 
was recruiting the key individuals involved in relation to the flooding in the localities. 
Among the representatives of the organisations it was those concerned with issues of 
flooding. Thus getting a biased representation of respondents was not the same 
concern I had had with the residents' sample as so few Officials were directly 
involved. 
Where specific, named individuals could not be identified, as in the case of some of 
the representatives of organizations, direct calls were made or emails sent via their 
official websites in order to make initial contact and identify possible respondents. 
The only group that I was unable to arrange an interview with among this group 
within my fieldwork period was with DEFRA. Approaches were made but my efforts 
did not identify a specific individual to interview. This may have been due to a 
reorganisation occurring in DEFRA at the time. In the end I don't feel that the absence 
of this interview has affected the direction of my results. It will be explained (Section 
3.10.2) that the representative organisation interviews were used to inform my 
analysis rather than being central to it. 
All of the Officials I contacted in these groups agreed to be interviewed. The initial 
introductory details given to potential respondents, in conversation and by email, were 
the same as for the residents. But for Officials, my initial introduction emphasised the 
Agency involvement much earlier. For all these interviews I feel, and the respondents 
sometimes mentioned, that the association of the Agency with my research helped 
gain access and their agreement. 
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The interviews were usually conducted at the respondents' place of work. The 
exception to this was the local councillors in Robertsbridge that were conducted in 
their homes. Unlike Waltham Abbey, Robertsbridge did not have a town hall. Flood 
and Agency officials were interviewed at their district or county council offices and 
Agency Area Offices. The representatives' group was also interviewed at their head 
office or as in the case of the ACPO interview, at a police station. This again, I felt 
aided the interviews, as respondents were able to refer to material and all of the 
interviews were conducted in offices or a meeting room for privacy. The only group 
that appeared slightly nervous about the interview being conducted at their work was 
the Flood Officials who worked for the region councils. This will be discussed later. 
I made the decision to dress informally for these and the residents interviews. This I 
felt was an advantage in that it strengthened respondents' perception of me as 
associated with the University rather than an official organisation such as the Agency. 
In both the residents and officials' interviews this helped create an informal interview 
relationship between us. I was able to adopt the role of a listener to respondents 
concerns and -views rather than have vie -ws Mrid concerns directed more formally at 
me. Rhetorical issues surrounding the interviews themselves will form part of my 
discussion (Section 8.1.2). Although the interviews ran smoothly they required a 
greater direction to pick out specific issues. However, as with the residents' 
interviews, I tried to intervene as little as possible. This reflected the exploratory 
nature of the research and is apparent in the interview schedule for officials that 
included prompts if I required them (Appendix: E). 
Taking into account the findings of the pilot study, I made greater preparations for 
these interviews than I had for those with residents. In most cases, official interviews 
took place after the residents interviews were completed so I was able to establish the 
key concerns in relation to each locality. In the case of the representatives' interviews, 
I referred to any literature that was readily available in order to provide a background 
to issues relevant to their organisations and flooding. Again all of the interviews ran 
smoothly. 
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3.9 Sensitivity and confidentiality 
A key concern both in this and my previous research was the welfare of my 
respondents. By this, I mean the research and their participation would not adversely 
affect them in any way. 
For residents, it was important that by taking part in the interview, they were not 
unduly upset by either the relating of their experiences or the way in which the 
interview was managed. I attempted to guard against this by making the nature of the 
research as clear as possible in my introductory letter. In addition, I asked respondents 
in the introduction to the interview session if it they were happy to talk through their 
experiences. 
During the interview, I was mindful that I did not appear insensitive in either my 
questions or the attention I gave to residents' responses. For all of the residents' 
interviews, I believe that I left respondents in the same emotional condition as at the 
start of the interview. One resident said that she found the interview useful in that she 
had not voiced her feelings to others with regard to more recent issues in her 
experience. With respect to the Officials, there were similar issues regarding being 
mindful of my behaviour during interviews; in other words, taking care not to appear 
that my primary concern was my research rather than a genuine interest in their 
accounts. 
From the residents' perspective, confidentiality of response did not appear to be an 
issue. However, I felt that protecting their identity would protect them from any 
unforeseen issues that might arise. I could not think of any such issues, but made the 
decision to impose anonymity nonetheless. For officials and representatives, their 
main concern was the purpose of the research and the confidentiality of their 
responses. 
To attempt to counter any concerns about the interviews once each interview had been 
transcribed it was posted back to the respondent with a postage pre-paid envelope for 
any comments. This allowed respondents to review their comments and qualify them 
if they felt it was necessary. I received no comments regarding the interview 
transcript. Some respondents did send back additional information and updates on the 
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situation in their localities. 
The officials associated with the councils were particularly sensitive to the 
confidentiality of their comments. One requested that the tape of the interview was 
returned to him with assurances that no copies had been made. This group sometimes 
requested that the tape recorder was turned off at points during the interview or certain 
comments were not to be published. In terms of that promise of confidentiality I 
cannot give further details of these comments except that they also contributed to and 
informed my analysis. The reason for this groups' particular sensitivity is unclear. 
Perhaps their more political work environment fostered an attitude of suspicion. 
Through demonstrating their access to apparently sensitive infon-nation, it may have 
been felt by the officials that it gave an aura of credibility to other comments in their 
accounts. By this I mean, if they demonstrated they had access to sensitive issues their 
role and comments may have a certain gravitas within their organisation. 
For all of the groups, at the end of the interview a verbal explanation of confidentiality 
and a written explanation were provided in the form of a thank you letter (Appendix: 
F and G). All of the respondents verbally agreed with the anonymous use of their 
comments in publication. To maintain the confidentiality of respondents' accounts, all 
of the respondents are identified in the thesis by a unique code, for example R. Wa6. 
The composition of the code identifies in the following sequence: 
Respondent group: R= Residents, Lc = Local Councillors and 
Fp = Flood Professionals (Agency and Council Area Officials). 
Locality: Wa = Waltham Abbey and R= Robertsbridge. 
Unique Number: Refers to only that respondent. 
The representatives of organisations group is not used for quotation in this research 
and are therefore not given a code. However, their transcripts were identified by a 
number. The reason for their exclusion from direct quotation in the analysis will be 
explained in (Section 3.10.2). Linking the codes with the respondents was achieved by 
using the unique characteristics I had noted at the time of the interview set against the 
code. In this way I was the only person who could easily connect the interviews with 
their original address or organisation. 
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3.9.1 'Contract'with respondents 
A commitment was made to the residents of Waltham Abbey that the research would 
represent their situation. This precluded protecting the identity of the localities. The 
major issue that was apparent was that, although individual Officials identities were 
anonymous, there were very few of them. It would be apparent, particularly to Agency 
staff, who these individuals were. The Officials even recognised this when we 
discussed confidentiality in the interviews. Even with the identities of the localities 
hidden, the characteristics and issues of the localities would identify them to this 
group. Removing these characteristics from reporting the data would have been 
impossible without making the analysis ineffectual. On consultation with the Agency 
it was felt that, on balance, the types of issues revealed would not affect the integrity 
of individuals within the Agency as these issues were openly discussed and relevant 
across the Agency. Issues of confidentiality were political in their nature in relation to 
respondents working within organisations where open discussion could be detrimental 
to the individual involved (Punch, 1986). 
3.9.2 Protecting my integrity as a researcher 
I also adopted strategies in relation to protecting my own integrity as a researcher. 
One strategy was by making my research intentions clear to respondents in the use of 
their accounts. I feel I should have employed a written and signed confidentiality 
agreement with respondents, particularly the officials, but I felt accepting the written 
statement in the form of the thank you letter was enough. On reflection, this may not 
have been the case if someone wanted to take issue with being included as a 
quotation. 
All the tapes and transcripts were marked only with the codes to identify them in case 
they were lost or stolen. At each of the localities, I introduced myself to the local 
police station and provided them with details of the research I would be conducting in 
the area. This also proved useful in supporting my credibility when recruiting as the 
police put an official police stamp on my recruitment letter. Finally, my contact details 
were detailed as the University of Surrey rather than my personal address details. 
Although I did provide Officials with my personal mobile number in case they needed 
to change the time we had booked for an interview. 
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3.10 Analysis of accounts 
A grounded approach was applied. throughout the analysis. This means that the 
development of concepts was continually tested against my empirical data (Maxwell, 
1996). Analysis of the data was ongoing with the development of themes or concepts 
during the interviewing, transcription and even during writing which, in itself, forms 
part of the analytical process. 
With regards to the interview data collected, this was in an audio format and later 
transcribed into text. This allowed a detailed analysis of respondents' accounts. The 
one month period between residents' interviews in the two localities enabled me to 
start transcription and to undertake initial analysis. This informed my interviews for 
Waltham Abbey, highlighting any particular issues requiring ftirther clarification from 
residents. I was able to transcribe half of the interviews myself for each of the groups. 
The other half was transcribed by another person. I chose to do this because my typing 
skills were limited and it was therefore a more effective use of my time. A possible 
criticism of this approach is that the researcher may become distanced from the data; 
however, since every interview transcription had to be checked against the recording, 
I was reintroduced to the data. In some cases, this was necessary as the quality of the 
recording could lead to misinterpretation of a respondents' account by a third party. 
3.10.1 Analysis software 
Informed by my pilot test, I purchased a qualitative data management software 
package, MAXqda (2003, Version 2K3 R041103-E). This facilitated more efficient 
navigation between transcripts, the maintenance of a coding frame and retrieval of 
specific accounts and coded sections. This meant that if I wanted to retrieve and 
compare a particular group of respondents' responses for a specific code or emerging 
theme, this could easily be done. The software played an invaluable role in the 
management of my data. I am aware that there is debate about how much computer- 
aided methods influence the theoretical approach applied in the analysis (Keel, 1997). 
1 used the software, however, in its most basic application for storage and retrieval 
rather than the more complex analytical functions that were available. I already 
brought to the analysis through my interview questioning a particular theoretical 
emphasis. This, I feel, informed my coding frame without any constraints imposed by 
the software. 
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3.10.2 Exclusion of representatives accounts 
During analysis, it became apparent that the central concepts and themes that were 
developing depended heavily on respondents' being aware of the particular 
circumstances within localities. Because of this, the representatives of organisations 
group excluded itself from the presented analysis. However, this group was fully 
transcribed and could form the basis of analysis for an additional study. 
3.11 Keeping my commitment with residents 
Although the research did not set out to be became a rhetorical tool in support of 
residents' situation, either more generally, in representing the disruption to their lives 
due to flooding and so informing the management of the hazard; or by promoting their 
the situation in their localities. I am aware of the issues of 'participatory action 
research' (Denzin, 2000), however, in relation to this issue further inquiries would be 
required and reflection to give this issue justice. So I will just say here that I feel I did 
manage to keep my promise with residents by promoting their situation and locality to 
the Agency. Two workshops, in addition to the one already mentioned, in Section 3.4 
were held with Agency Area and head office staff and representatives of DEFRA with 
two presentations at the Agency: 
12/03/2003 'Flooding: Impact on house, 'home' and everyday life 
30/06/2003 'Expert and lay knowledge in the construction of flooding' 
Also a report will be created for the Agency outlining the key findings and policy 
implications in the near future. 
This chapter has outlined the key methodological and theoretical considerations in my 
research. It was highlighted how an ethnographic approach in an exploratory study 
provides flexibility. This flexibility was evident in the design and application through 
interviewing which was required to successfully represent the situation under study. 
Through the data supporting my interpretation of the flood experience, the approach 
will be demonstrated in the following chapters to have met the research aim and 
objectives. Of particular interest was how the research process self-generated the final 
research design. Not only did the research design and analysis evolve over this period 
but also my own appreciation and experience of applying an ethnographic approach. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0 Disruption to residents' house, 'home' and everyday lives 
The following chapter will demonstrate that flooding was not just a physical 
disruption, but also a social disruption in the localities. This will be illustrated through 
residents' accounts of a realisation of loss, displacement, and a continued threat of 
flooding. Residents to lesser and greater degrees aspired to re-establish not only their 
houses or property but with them their 'homes' and so their 'everyday lives'. The 
meanings associated with possessions and 'home' revealed through loss and 
displacement and their association with the everyday lives of residents will be 
illustrated. With the continued threat of flooding, it will be suggested that the 
meanings residents' associated with 'home' were transfon-ned whilst a longing for the 
'home' that residents felt they had before the flood remained. 
4AL Realisation of the extent andprolonged disruption of the experience 
The residents of both localities had experienced the inundation of floodwater into their 
houses almost two years before I interviewed them. In most cases, the flooding in 
2000 resulted in over a meter of floodwater in their houses. The following section will 
illustrate that residents had not imagined the prolonged disruption which flooding 
would cause in their lives. Their accounts of the experience were rich in detail and 
most residents still visibly expressed sadness, frustration and anger in the interviews. 
Residents' accounts focused on re-establishing their 'homes' and constructed their 
experience sign posted by the events of a sequential, physical process in order to be 
able to live in their houses again. 
Although a few positive aspects could be gleaned by residents from their experience, 
their reaction was overwhelmingly materially and emotionally negative. Residents' 
reaction to the whole experience was one of shock. The following two Robertsbridge 
residents' accounts illustrated the unexpected nature of this experience: 
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R: Horrifying really. Horrifying. When you look back on it it's just horrifying. 
One I wouldn't want to repeat. I'll be older and wiser if it happens again. 
[R. Rol2,71-72] 
R: And sort of more emotional and personal level it felt like, I mean the whole 
metaphor of the flood as if things were just like, as if you were swept off your 
feet and things washed out from under you and that's, you know, exactly how 
it felt, and sort of flailing about, bobbing about. [R. Ro20,104-105] 
The first resident with the use of the phrase 'older and wiser, suggested that the 
knowledge of what flooding meant only came with the experience. The second 
resident, a mother of two children, used aspects of the flood itself as a metaphor for 
the disorientation and sudden loss of control she felt. The expression of a sudden loss 
of control was common across those flooded, regardless of age, gender and prior 
experience of flooding. For example, a Waltham Abbey resident who was sixteen 
years old at the time of the flood used the metaphor of a bad dream or nightmare: 
R: If I was9 if I had to sum it up into one word it's like a nightmare, it's one of 
those, it's really surreal. You walk down the road and you're up to your waist 
in water and you think, is this real? It's like living in a dream almost. And then 
when you've been stable for so long and then all of a sudden everything's like 
this, that's like being in a dream. But it's like a dream that doesn't make sense 
because nothing matches up, and you can't, it doesn't go in a logical sequence, 
it's just random, everything's random. [R. Wa2,134] 
Again, there were aspects of disorientation and loss of control which were expressed 
with the use of a dream metaphor that explained the experience as surreal and illogical 
in construction. Her comments mirrored the feelings of all residents of a sudden 
transition from stability to instability. In the context of residents' previous relative 
stability, these three quotations illustrated an experience which was characterised by 
disorientation that was unexpected, overwhelming and difficult for them to 
comprehend. 
This is not to say that residents did not talk in detail about their experience on the day 
floodwater entered their houses. Some residents went into great detail about what 
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happened to them and their families on that day and it did form a prominent part of 
their accounts of the experience of flooding. In order to illustrate this I have included 
the account of one Robertsbridge resident in Appendix: H as an example of the 
dramatic and detailed accounts residents gave. While specific experiences of residents 
varied depending upon their situations at that time, their feelings of a transformation 
from security and control to insecurity and disorder were common in both localities. 
One of the strongest opinions that residents wanted to convey, was that the flooding 
experience extended over a long period of time. With this, they illustrated the variety 
of unexpected issues that they had to deal with over that period. I stress that they 
wanted to convey, because the residents often made a special effort in their accounts 
through emphasis and repetition to ensure that I understood this. It is this aspect of 
their experience that had surprised them (and myself) in comparison with their 
preconceived notions of flooding. To these residents it was not just the inundation of 
the floodwater into their houses, but also the period and issues that followed the water 
receding that constituted that experience. A Waltham Abbey resident who had been 
flooded twice explained: 
R: ... I mean I think people 
just think, oh you know, as my husband said, your 
furniture and that gets wet and you throw it out and you replace it, but it's not 
that. It's months of getting all the under the floorboards dry, the site dry, there's 
sanitary people come in, it has to be fum(igated). .- 
... wet rot, 
dry rot, and that absolutely stinks, you can't be in the property while 
they're doing that because they wear masks, err, and it's just the general 
upheaval. [R. Wa8,230-233] 
This resident attempted to counter how she felt that others, who had not been through 
the experience would view flooding as a simple, quick and easily solvable event. Her 
focus was not on the floodwater entering and leaving the house but on the period 
afterwards. As well as the loss of material possessions, she introduced the aspect of 
time in terms of months, a drying out period, contamination and the involvement of 
others entering their house. This was combined with the issue of having to move out 
of the house while the work was being undertaken. 
In all residents' accounts, the period after the floodwater had receded was explained 
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as a sequential physical process necessary to refurbish their houses. This involved the 
cleaning, drying out and the gutting and refurbishment of houses. Cleaning the house 
could take days depending on the help that residents received. Some residents still 
had possessions to clean when I interviewed them almost two years later. Drying the 
house often required stripping off wet plaster and removing floorboards and could 
take months. The completion of building work took even longer with, again, some 
work still unfinished when the residents were interviewed. This issue of time was 
illustrated below with the accounts of a Waltham Abbey resident followed by that of a 
Robertsbridge resident: 
R: Oh yeah, they (builders) did a really good job, I mean, as you can see it 
doesn't look as bad now, but it just, it was just time consuming, it just took an 
awfully long time for anything to actually get done, [R. Wa2,50] 
R: I mean quite honestly if I'd known that it would take a year before we got 
back into our house and what would happen in that year and that the amount of 
energy and you know, problems that that brought, I mean I don't think I would 
have been so, I mean we were all quite gung-ho, [R. Ro20,43-44] 
The process and the specific concerns of residents during each of the phases have 
been comprehensively identified in the flooding research of Tapsell et al. (1999), 
Tapsell (2000) and Tapsell and Tunstall (2001). This research supported the accounts 
of residents in both localities of my research who also explained in detail and at 
length, the individual phases of this process. I refer the reader to that research for 
detailed residents' descriptions of the practical problems residents faced in this 
process. While the process of re-establishing residents' houses was the course that 
residents had to navigate, this chapter will illustrate how residents' efforts centred on 
re-establishing their everyday lives and, with this, their concept of 'home'. When 
asked to talk about the experience of flooding, not all residents started with the flood 
or worked sequentially through the phases of recovering their houses. Some started 
with the most recent events they had experienced such as returning to their houses 
after the building work, or the most personally traumatic events. Once these issues had 
been described, residents invariably resorted to a chronological account of their whole 
experience and used these phases to sign-post their progression towards an aspired 
return to 'normality'. 
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4.2 Realisation of damage and loss with the invasion of 'home' 
Once the floodwater had receded, the initial feelings of residents were focused on 
their own houses rather than the flooded locality as a whole. Residents' accounts of 
their immediate feelings were situated in relation to what they felt they had lost. 
During this initial exposure to the after effects of the floodwater, residents' 
preconceptions of what flooding would be like were dispelled. For most, it was the 
damage or loss of the effort they had put into their houses and homes that was most 
significant, as illustrated by the accounts of these two residents: 
R: And when you walk into your home and you see everything and it's pretty 
devastated, it gets more devastating the more you see [R. Rol4,86] 
R: I've got to admit, when I first see it, I just broke down in tears and I 
thought, all that bloody hard work we've done, now its all gone, [R. Wa7,254- 
256] 
The first Robertsbridge resident explained that the damage was revealed to her as she 
walked through her house. It will be illustrated how the realisation of damage and loss 
continues throughout residents' experience of flooding. The Waltham Abbey resident 
in the second account quantified the damage in terrns of the work and effort the family 
had put into the house. With the realisation of damage came the realisation of the true 
character of the floodwater. A Robertsbridge resident, who had experienced multiple 
floods, explained and tried to counter what she thought was a misconception among 
those who had not experienced flooding: 
R: People in general don't understand what floodwater from the river is like. 
They think it's like a washing machine, in fact I have heard people say, "I had 
a washing machine burst a few weeks ago" and I say yes, they haven't got a 
clue what the river silt is like when its through your house it's mud it's not just 
clean water. So in fact that's the first shock and that's pretty horrendous hosing 
down and washing out and it goes on and on. [R. Rol4,42] 
The issue was not just water in the house but the nature of that water; it was not just 
clean water. There was an indication already in her final comment, 'It goes on and on' 
that the flooding of the house was only the start of a greater, more prolonged 
experience. The resident made a distinction between those who knew through 
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experience what flooding was like and those who had not had that experience. This 
apparent gap in knowledge brought with it a sense of isolation in affected residents' 
accounts. Residents were perhaps attempting to bridge, through their detailed and 
dramatic descriptions, that lack of knowledge rather than just imparting information. 
In both localities, residents felt that they were on their own when faced with the 
physical task ahead: 
R: we felt very much you're on your own here and you haven't got a clue what 
you're doing. [R. Ro 15,110] 
This Robertsbridge resident, for whom this was her family's first experience of 
flooding, explained that when faced with such destruction she didn't know how to 
deal with the situation, what to clean and what to throw away, and what to do next. 
The nature of the floodwater was revealed to residents through what was left behind in 
their houses. In addition to the silt and mud, residents in both localities were told that 
the water was probably contaminated with sewage and other waste materials such as 
oil and other chemicals: 
R: Filthy. We cleaned it. We come in, scrubbed the place down, cleaned it out. 
Disinfectant everywhere, antiseptic everywhere, and scrubbed. And just 
cleaned it all. [R. RolO, 34] 
R: Yes, and wear gloves, because of the sewage, and other contamination that 
they didn't specify, which was a bit worrying. [R. Ro 15,118] 
Not knowing what was in the water and mud in itself created further anxiety among 
the residents that added to their feelings of dealing with the unknown and, hence, a 
sense of loss of control. For some, this information on contamination came a bit to 
late: 
R: But what annoyed us even more was, we got a letter, about four, five days 
after we got flooded, telling us... 
... that 
if you'd been cleaning your house, which everybody was trying to do, 
clean the houses off, if you'd got any cuts, you must go to your local A and E, 
if you've got any cuts on your hands, 1 mean I've got the letter here 
somewhere, [R. Wa7,81-83] 
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For this Waltham Abbey resident, the dangers of infection from contamination were 
amplified by having been associated with the hospital accident and emergency 
department (AandE) reserved for serious injuries that required immediate attention. 
Their house had been transforined into a dangerous place by the floodwater. Their 
anxiety was compounded by the information arriving after they had undertaken most 
of the cleaning work. In both localities, advice on what to do came from a number of 
sources including the Envirom-nent Agency, Council, insurance assessors and from 
other affected residents. Advice was given to the residents in the form of letters and 
via word of mouth including attendance at local meetings and from representatives of 
official groups that visited their houses. With such information, the residents became 
aware that the flooding was not just a case of drying out their possessions as the 
following Robertsbridge resident explained: 
R: I had a hand made settee made in the Cotswolds and they wouldn't let you 
keep any of that because it was right through (17oodwater) and could've been 
the source of infection, I suppose, when it dried out. So all rugs and things, and 
carpets and things like that all went [R. Rol2,48] 
For this resident, officials' advice was expressed in terms of demands which had to be 
followed and so possessions which the resident thought could be saved were lost to 
the floodwater. There was a certain reticence in her account and the value of this item 
was emphasised through the use of the phrase 'hand made' with a particular place of 
manufacture. The meanings that residents associated with the loss of possessions will 
be illustrated in Section 4.1 
4.2.1 The devastation continued after thefloodwater receded 
It was apparent from residents' accounts that they felt the damage to their houses 
continued after the floodwater had receded. As well as the realisation that possessions 
would be permanently lost, residents explained how the building work required for 
refurbishment of their houses felt like further destruction: 
R: I had no idea they were going to do that, I was horrified, I thought God, 
they're wrecking the place, will it stand up to it? [R. Ro 12,72] 
R: And then when he was talking about the scale of what would have to be 
68 
done in the house was also a huge shock... 
... it is a horrible feeling, you feel like things are snowballing. It was a huge 
shock, very, very daunting. You sort of wonder whether it, you start to feel it 
will never, can't ever look the same again. And of course houses, when they, 
when you're back to just bricks, look horrible don't they. [R. Ro 15,13 39 16 1] 
These Robertsbridge residents were horrified and shocked by the work required. The 
continued destruction of their houses, even with a view to refurbishment exposed their 
emotional attachment to their property. One Robertsbridge resident who had 
experienced multiple floods tried to explain why he and his family decided to do the 
repairs themselves: 
R: when they come into your home and rip everything out and chuck it in the 
garden it must be very, very hard for people. I haven't experienced it because I 
haven't allowed it to happen. Neither my wife or I have wanted that to happen. 
I think we were aware of how we feel about that. But I have heard some pretty 
tough stories from people in the village [R. Ro 14,90] 
It is not just the gutting of the house, but also strangers entering and ripping 
everything out of the 'home'. To some residents it felt like an assault on, and invasion 
into, their homes. Aspects of privacy associated with their homes were challenged by 
the work as this Robertsbridge resident explained: 
R: a lot of things had been taken out of boxes, left on the floor, people had a 
good paw, you know what builders are like, they have to make sure you 
haven't got anything that they haven't got, [R. Rol2,34] 
Often residents had moved their belongings saved from the floodwater to the upper 
levels of their houses. If they decided to remain in the house during the renovation 
they expressed their concerns regarding the security of those belongings. Those who 
moved out to temporary accommodation often had to put the majority of their 
possessions into storage. The flood experience was, for residents, not only an 
invasion 
of floodwater, but also of strangers in the form of insurance assessors, cleaning and 
drying contractors, people who helped but were not friends and the builders. 
The 
builders remained in the houses for the longest period of time. 
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4.3 Loss ofpossessions and their meanings 
References to loss were made throughout residents' accounts of the flooding 
experience. This was portrayed as a realisation of loss with residents' gradual 
understanding of the extent and disruption of the experience. In both localities, the 
loss of possessions was constructed by residents in both financial and emotional 
terms. For those residents who had not experienced flooding before, their decisions 
regarding the value placed on personal possessions had to be made in the 'panic' of 
rising floodwater. This Robertsbridge resident explained how she tried to make 
decisions about which items to save as the floodwater approached: 
R: 1 honestly wasn't thinking about losing things, I guess because we've never 
been flooded before, I was definitely thinking along the lines of things that 
would be damaged if they got wet, it's a sort of subtle difference, I wasn't 
thinking about having to replace everything, and I was just thinking 'it won't 
do that any good if it gets wet. [R. Rol5,52] 
By choice, items usually saved first by residents were electrical such as video 
recorders, which were stored close to the floor. A high monetary value and association 
of damage when electrical equipment would get wet meant that residents often gave 
these items priority over others. The eventual permanent loss of items only became 
apparent later when residents received advice from other groups. Loss of possessions 
was not only confined to those kept in the house but extended to cars and garden 
plants. This Waltham Abbey resident explained the loss of items stored in a garage: 
R: It was quite a shock really, but I mean, the other thing was as well I mean 
we lost everything in the garage as well, because we've got a big garage and 
we stored a lot of stuff in the garage, because we came here from a much 
bigger house so we had lots of stuff [R. Wa6,38] 
Those residents who had experienced multiple flooding compared their losses with 
those of previous floods and all agreed that this was a very severe flood in the 
physical aspects of depth and flow. Even so, it was not necessarily the most severe in 
terms of personal losses, as this Robertsbridge resident explained: 
R: Since living here we have been flooded on Christmas day 1989 actually. 
The worst flood in fact although it was not very deep in here, it was up to the 
windowsill in the October (2000) flood, but this one was only a couple of 
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inches deep. We were not prepared and it destroyed a lot of things including a 
lot of business files, which we had in boxes laid out on the floor in here. It was 
a very destructive flood... 
... but subsequent floods were not as destructive. [R. Ro14,37-39] 
This resident ran a family business and so the damage of business files was a great 
loss. He went on to explain how his experience of the first flood resulted in him being 
better prepared and he therefore suffered fewer losses in subsequent deeper floods. 
For those who had experienced multiple flooding, some losses were set against the 
appropriateness of insurance claims. A Waltham Abbey resident explained: 
R: Mind you, I never got me furniture back what I had, I mean I had syn teak 
(synthetic teak) furniture in here and I had five pieces, I had a three seat settee 
and four armchairs, two ordinary wooden looking armchairs syn teak and two 
big ones, mind you I didn't want as much back this time, but it turned out quite 
well in the end for me [R. Wa9,57] 
This resident spoke at length before this quote about his 'syn teak furniture' and it was 
obvious that it had a special significance in his life. He balanced his loss and inability 
to replace that furniture with the financial gains in subsequent floods. Another 
Waltham Abbey resident suggested a similar positive outcome to the experience: 
R: but on the turn of a coin, our cottage would never be looking like this and 
we wouldn't have been in the situation that we're in now, cottage-wise, had it 
not been for the flood, see, so from that it's done us well. [R. Wa4,222] 
Such positive comments regarding the experience of flooding were rare. Emotionally, 
the loss of some items could be devastating because associated meanings and 
memories associated with them. For some residents, the prospect of losing possessions 
again was emotionally overwhelming. Although this resident had prepared for the 
next flood, he also commented at the proposition of another flood: 
R: I don't think I, I d_on't think I would live through another one like that 
anyway. I mean when they turn round and say, you know stress, that was 
stress, I felt like crying you know, at home I lost so much stuff, again [R. Wa9, 
133] 
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Items with emotional significance described as lost to the flood included a child's last 
school photo, children's toys kept by parents as mementos, a photo of a deceased 
daughter and a wedding album. While the emotional associations with these items 
might be apparent, emotional connections to other items described would have been 
apparent only to the residents. One elderly Robertsbridge resident expressed her 
emotional attachment to various pieces of furniture in her house by endowing them 
with personality: 
R: that thing there, poor little soul, lost its legs, all the glue had melted, 
because it's 1780, so all the glue melted, the stringing all came off, it was lying 
on the floor, the feet came off, and I had to jack it up with a couple of sodden 
library books! [R. Ro 12,46] 
For this elderly resident, saving items of furniture from the floodwater had proved 
impossible without the help of neighbours who were preoccupied with attempting to 
save their own possessions. The emotional loss of some possessions by one member 
of a family had far-reaching effects for other members of the family: 
R: My mother lost all our family photographs, and that really hurts because as 
you get older you, I was looking forward to inheriting that suitcase of black 
and white photos, all our childhood photos have gone, I feel very sad about 
that, [R. Ro 11,13 0] 
For this Robertsbridge resident, her mothers' losses had an emotional impact on her as 
well as she had also lived in the locality and was affected by the flooding. Other items 
had gained symbolic significance with connections to specific family events: 
R: We lost certain items of furniture, one that was particularly upsetting, 
which was my piano, which was a present from my husband when I had my 
daughter. It was too heavy to lift, too heavy to move so, that was a complete 
write-off, [R. RolO, 32] 
Even for residents who were not elderly, some items were just too large to save. The 
loss of this piano by a Robertsbridge resident might have been viewed as a significant 
material loss in itself, but it was the symbolic emotional connections, which made this 
loss far more poignant. These examples of the variety of items that could have 
emotional significance illustrated that it was not the type or financial value of items 
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that were lost which was important but their meanings for the individual. 
4.4 Loss ofpossessions and their association with meanings of 'home' 
The loss of items could relate to relatively inexpensive items that together signified a 
greater loss than the emotional attachments to those particular items. A Waltham 
Abbey resident who was 16 years old at the time of the flood illustrated this idea: 
R: Yeah. It's only a cd, or it's only this, it's only that, you've had a result 
because you could get a new pair of trainers, but I liked the pair of trainers I 
had, and I liked my house the way it was and yes I'm getting all this new stuff 
but it's not, it's not,... 
... nobody could relate to it because they all lived at the top of the hill for a start 
and it's never gonna happen to them [R. Wa2,152] 
It was not just the loss of certain possessions but the loss and changes in the 'home' 
itself. Once again, frustration was expressed at the lack of understanding of her 
friends'. which she attributed to their lack of experience of flooding. There appeared 
to be something more than the emotional loss that was associated with those particular 
possessions. Such items held a far wider emotional meaning for the residents. A 
Robertsbridge resident also expressed this loss: 
R: I can remember when you looked at kitchen units, and you wanted the same 
as you'd had, the colours all the same, everything is pretty much as it was, 
people outside looked on it as the ideal opportunity to have this fantastic new 
home, but all the people in there, what they wanted was what they'd had 
before, they wanted it back to nonnal. [R. Ro 15,3 01-3 02] 
The feeling of loss extends beyond the loss of the property, house or possessions that 
the residents once had. It also goes beyond their emotional attachment to individual 
items. What was lost was a 'normality' associated with the whole house or 'home'. I 
will now look at how residents' displacement from their houses uncovered further 
meanings of 'home' that underpinned what they wanted to recover after the flood. 
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4.5 Displacementfrom house revealing meanings of 'home' 
While the drying out process was underway, and during the subsequent refurbishment 
of the houses, the majority of residents in both localities opted to relocate to 
temporary accommodation. With the flood, the house became a hostile place 
contaminated with sewage water, a place the whole family wanted to leave. The house 
had turned into an unpleasant and dangerous place. Initially, even when residents had 
moved into temporary accommodation, the hostile nature of the house still remained: 
R: Well my first reaction, the first 6 weeks or so was I was never coming back 
here again and I hated it, I hated the house, hated the flooding [R. Ro20,8 1] 
For this Robertsbridge resident, the hatred of his or her house was associated with the 
flooding. Temporary accommodation often took the form of staying with relatives or 
renting holiday cottages. Residents expressed a preference for temporary 
accommodation that was as close to their houses as possible. Due to the number of 
households affected by the 2000 flooding both in the localities and surrounding 
affected areas, there was a high degree of competition for accommodation and so this 
was often not possible. Instead, families had to move away from the locality into 
unfamiliar areas. This sometimes meant that families were split up with one partner 
choosing to remain in or near to their house. There were a number of reasons why this 
happened: the main ones being in order to be being closer to work, to satisfy concerns 
about the security of possessions left in the house and/or a realisation that the 
renovation work required their management. This usually meant that the husband 
returned to the house or had to make frequent visits to it. All of these issues created a 
disruption to the routines residents had had before the flood. On the other hand a 
positive aspect to the move to temporary accommodation could sometimes be found: 
R: Um, he, we actually moved closer to his work place, so for him possibly his 
journey in the morning was shorter, both of us having been brought up in rural 
communities, he very much enjoyed moving back into a more rural 
community, into a more isolated place to live. [R. Rol 1,83] 
This Robertsbridge resident discussed a positive aspect for her husband rather than 
herself On the whole, residents felt that moving to temporary accommodation was a 
very disruptive experience. The length of stay in temporary accommodation varied 
among residents in both localities from a couple of days to between 5 to 15 months. 
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Residents' decisions to return to their houses depended upon whether they felt the 
disruption experienced by living in temporary accommodation outweighed the 
disruption they would have to endure by returning early. This, in part, was dictated by 
the extent of the work throughout their houses. Living in temporary accommodation 
emphasised different aspects of residents' daily lives which were no longer fulfilled 
by living away from their houses. Residents often mentioned the loss of a base for 
significant events. A Waltham Abbey resident related this loss of a base for two such 
events: 
R: Christmas was very strange. 
1: Why? 
R: Umh, didn't feel like doing anything really, you know it was very odd. 
Didn't want to celebrate to a certain extent because I suppose to a certain 
extent because you're not at home, you know everything is different, I mean 
we made an effort, (the husband) came back here and got the Christmas tree 
out the loft and whatever else, but it's not the same, you know it wasn't the 
same [R. Wa6,136-139] 
Even though the husband had made the effort to recreate aspects of the celebration, it 
was not viewed as the same as being at 'home'. The same resident also experienced 
illness while away, which accentuated feelings of not being at 'home': 
R: it was awful, absolutely awful and I think in some respects it was worse 
because you're not in your own home either and there's a lot of that to it as 
well, when you're living somewhere else, although you've got some of your 
own things around you, its still not home obviously, and being ill in bed in a 
strange house was something else, you know you don't feel completely 
comfortable. [R. Wa6,134-135] 
Although the resident had some of her possessions with her this was felt to be not 
enough to recreate feelings of familiarity she associated with being at 'home'. 
Often families were unable to stay at just one temporary house over this period and a 
few had to move two or three times before returning to their houses. Residents felt 
that searching for new accommodation was later made easier by the Foot and Mouth 
epidemic that hit Britain between February and November 2001, which released 
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holiday accommodation in the areas. Even so some residents pointed out that moving 
became increasingly difficult. With personal possessions in storage or inaccessible in 
their houses due to the building work residents had to purchase anything required over 
this long period, and as a result, new possessions accumulated with time contributing 
to the disruption: 
R: apart from not having access to my books, my belongings, resources that I 
would have used at school which were in storage, that, oh yes, that was quite a 
big thing - everything upstairs went into storage, we took with us what we 
wanted and then everything else was packed away, and so, I can't say you felt 
like a refugee because obviously we weren't that dispossessed, but what we 
went with was what we lived with for fifteen months and instead of going, so 
like whole, a whole summer wardrobe of clothes was in storage, so I just went 
out and replaced them. [R. Ro 11,79] 
For this resident, a schoolteacher in Robertsbridge, not only was there disruption to 
her personal life, but also her work. Aplogetically, she conveyed her feelings of 
dispossession by likening her experience to that of a refugee. Although her personal 1.1 
possessions could be replaced, the same resident explained how, on moving back to 
her house, there was a realisation of the importance these items held for her: 
R: after fifteen months we got a whole house load of belongings back again, 
and it's all the things that you've collected, you know, your whole lifetime, all 
your treasures, photographs, documents, suddenly that was great, because you 
met it all again out of these huge packing cases. [R. Ro 11,79] 
Possessions were described almost in t erms that one would use to describe friends. 
They were reunited and she met them all again. These items were not completely lost 
as those permanently lost to the floodwater but they had been removed or she had 
been displaced from them. These possessions were described as being collected for 
her 'whole lifetime' and so in a way represented and told the story of her life. Thus 
her reunion with them was emotionally significant. With the permanent loss of 
personal possessions, residents felt similar feelings of loss but they had to form new 
emotional attachments to replacement items. 
Residents expressed varying degrees of displacement that were dependent upon the 
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context of their situation and the associations they had with their house. One 
Robertsbridge resident associated and amplified her feelings of displacement with a 
feeling of displacement that she already experienced in another aspect of her life: 
R: I did feel enormously, what, what, I did feel a huge sense of loss, but not, 
what it did for me, was it triggered off other feelings of loss in my life before, 
it felt like a bereavement, losing our home, not the bricks and mortar and the 
things in it, but a base where we were as a family, which having moved around 
a lot and not had a base for quite a few years, that's what I felt most acutely 
was we've only been here a year, we've settled after like, you know, five, well 
it was four in fact, it must have been nearly four years of moving around, we're 
finally here and then we're not, and that I did find very, but it wasn't the actual 
bricks and mortar, what's happened to the house, it was displacement of us, 
[R. Ro20,5 1] 
Perhaps having already experienced feelings of loss and displacement meant that she 
now thought more deeply about that which she had lost while in the temporary 
accommodation. She, however, expressed that which has been alluded to in other 
residents' accounts: the loss of a 'home'. which was not 'the actual bricks and mortar'. 
'Home' as a concept was expressed through this account as a base where they were 'as 
a family' and associated with this, as already illustrated, as a place of security, 
familiarity and order. 
With time and improvements to the houses they had left behind, residents felt that 
they no longer represented the hostile places they once did. There was a realisation 
that the disruption of living in temporary accommodation together with the feelings of 
a loss of 'home' outweighed the disruption experienced in the temporary 
accommodation. The same Waltham Abbey resident, whose family initially wanted to 
leave their house, later recounted the family's longing to now return: 
1: Did he (brother) complain about that? 
R: Oh yeah. "I wanna go home", but then we both did, everybody did. 
Everybody wanted to go home. The dog wanted to go home. The dog was ill. 
He wanted to beat home. [R. Wa2,120-123] 
For this resident the whole family's desire to return home was expresse in 
the 
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apparent feelings of their pet dog and attributed to the dog's illness. In the context of 
her account it was a home that the family longed for and not just a return to their 
house. 
The time it took to renovate residents' houses added to their anxiety as expressed by 
this Robertsbridge resident: 
R: all the time you're away you're thinking I wish I could get back into my 
house, that's your one thought, I want to go back into my house, and you get 
depressed because nobody's doing anything, you see, the floors weren't done 
till May. That was seven months after we were flooded. [R. Ro12,58] 
Residents wanted to return to their houses but their aspirations of the time that it 
would take for their houses to be ready were not being met which resulted in 
frustration. 
Even for those residents who had decided to remain in their houses while the 
renovation was undertaken, there were feelings of disruption associated with a loss of 
'home'. These residents had decided that they would continue to live in their houses 
during the drying out and even the building work. This was in some cases only for a 
couple of weeks while they found temporary accommodation or because they felt 
insecure leaving their houses empty. The few residents that had experienced multiple 
flooding in the past, remained in order to supervise or undertake the renovation work 
themselves thereby retaining a sense of control over the situation. By remaining in the 
house residents had to endure very unpleasant conditions as the following Waltham 
Abbey residents explained: 
R: it's amazing, it just goes everywhere, everything feels damp, you know, 
even though you know it's not, it feels it and you sort of smell things and you 
think does that smell or don't it, you know. [R. Wa7,112] 
R: But the time before 1987 we had to live in, we had to stay in it, we had 18 
months of hell, the stink was awful. [R. Wa9,23] 
The experience of the smell of the floodwater was a common description in these 
residents' accounts and also that the smell apparently persisted even at the time of the 
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interviews. Memories of the sound of the floodwater persisted for flood-affected 
residents in Erikson's (1976) research and the intrusiveness of the smell of the 
floodwater was expressed by residents in Waltham Abbey after the 1987 flood 
(Tunstall and Bossman-Aggrey, 1988). Often residents had to live upstairs with most 
utilities on the ground floors of the houses out of action. With the flood occurring in 
October, residents' discomfort was sometimes exacerbated by the central heating 
system for the house having been a casualty of the flood. Residents had to improvise 
so that something approaching an everyday existence could be maintained: 
R: I had one of those electric rings you know... 
... that somebody leant me, and somebody else leant us a gas hob with a gas 
bottle. So I mean I was cooking on those sorts of things because obviously had 
no electric or anything you could use, I had no cooker or anything I could use 
because it was ruined and so as I say we lived here like, it was like camping in 
a field for 3 weeks. [R. Wa6,16-18] 
For this Waltham Abbey resident the disruption to 'home' was clearly indicated with 
her comment that the experience could have been liken to 'camping in a field'. Often 
bathrooms were turned into kitchens and residents' movements in the rest of the top 
floor of their houses were restricted by the storage of saved personal possessions. This 
was compounded by the smell of damp, noise and dust of building work and lack of 
heating in the winter. So, remaining in the house was not an easier option, but those 
residents who more often chose it over temporary accommodation were generally 
those who had been flooded before. Living in the property did not maintain feelings of 
'home'. A combination of the house not functioning as a base for everyday life and 
without the familiarity of all their personal possessions meant that these residents' 
lives were disrupted in similar ways to those in temporary accommodation. 'Home', 
as a base for everyday life, appeared to be a key aspect of the loss and disruption 
experienced by all the residents. The relationship between 'home' and everyday life 
will now be illustrated further. 
4.6 Disruption of 'home'and everyday life 
The following section illustrates the ways in which the disruption of 'home' was a 
disruption of everyday life, which the residents attempted to regain after the flooding. 
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For most residents, the flood and their attempts to re-establish their houses and their 
'homes' created additional pressures on top of those that they had been coping with in 
their lives before the flood occurred. Dealing with issues relating to the process of 
refurbishing their houses required constant attention. To illustrate this I will give two 
examples of the problems residents experienced which were common across the 
localities. Residents, however, also experienced additional problems that were specific 
to their circumstances. 
During the drying phase special machines called dehumidifiers had to be brought into 
the localities by specialist companies and used in the houses: 
R: the dehumidifiers had to be emptied twice a day; it was endless [R. Ro 18, 
67] 
R: it took six months for the house to dry out before they could even do 
anything, so the house was just empty with fans going. [R. Wa2,42] 
The focus of residents' attention was on the presence of these machines in their 
houses. Often residents had to travel some distance from their temporary 
accommodation to maintain them. One of the key concerns expressed by residents was 
the time it took to undertake the drying out process. This usually lasted between three 
and six months. With the flooding occurring on a national basis, there was 
competition for dehumidifiers with some residents being told that machines were 
being flown in from Sweden. For those residents who were affected by after-floods 
their priority shifted from saving personal possessions to protecting and keeping these 
machines from being damaged by further flooding as it was uncertain if they would 
be 
able to get replacement machines. For a few residents, the companies employed to 
dry 
au 
out their houses were later found, after some building work, to have not done the 
job 
properly. In these cases the whole process had to be repeated, adding to the time and 
residents' anxiety. 
In most cases, when the time came for the building work to be undertaken, the 
building contractors were appointed by insurance companies, but residents 
found that 
they still had to manage the process. For most residents, 
dealing with builders was a 
new experience and was not one that they had planned 
for or wanted to happen. 
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Residents often commented on their feelings of dealing with an unknown quantity. 
Also their concerns regarding the standard of work and the time it was taking were 
thought to have not been taken seriously by the insurance companies or the builders. 
A Robertsbridge resident explained her experience, which was typical of residents' 
experiences in both localities: 
R: And that really angered us because we actually ended up doing all the 
running around and were not taken seriously, I mean they did things like you 
know they damaged things, they smoked everywhere when I expressly asked 
them not to, I found the foreman asleep on the landing once, you know all 
sorts of things, you know he didn't turn up 'til midday, you know, totally just 
not right, so anyway, finally got rid of them in June. [R. Ro20,57] 
Residents had to manage the builders and when things were going wrong they had to 
argue their case with the insurance company or, as in the case of this resident, take 
matters into her own hands. Again, as was the case with the dehumidifiers, there was a 
lot of national competition for builders. Some companies were frequently rushed 
between jobs or did not have the skills to enable then- to do the work properly. For 
one Robertsbridge resident, (R. Rol6) the standard of building work was so poor that 
the house had to be evacuated, officially deemed unsafe, and the work had to be 
started all over again. 
The last resident quoted touched on an issue that reoccurred throughout residents' 
accounts of the experience, and will also be a central feature of Chapter 6, that of not 
having been taken seriously by officials. Some residents felt that having to support 
and justify what they had been through made the situation they were in additionally 
disruptive and stressful. A Robertsbridge resident explained in relation to cleaning the 
house: 
R: So we started to clean up, took a few photos didn't we. And do, you know, 
sort of talking to lots of other people and think rationally, you think well, this, 
welre not making this up, it's not as if we're going to say'well it came up here', 
it's pretty bloody obvious that we've lost carpets and stuff like that. [R. Rol5, 
110] 
To move away from their devastated houses, residents relied on financial support from 
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their insurance claims. Residents, in some cases, even had to justify this move to the 
insurance companies. This was observed by a Waltham Abbey resident who was 16 
years old at the time: 
R: they (insurance companies) didn't have any intentions of putting us 
anywhere, they were quite happy to let us stay here in this house that was 
flooded by sewage water, until my Dad phoned up and gave it some mouth. 
And then they put us in the hotel at the top of the road; we were there for a 
month. [R. Wa2,38] 
Residents had to justify what they had experienced to officials such as insurance 
representatives and rely on the competence of others such as the drying companies 
and the builders. Most residents felt that they had been let down by one, if not all of 
these groups. When this occurred, residents often had to take control of the situation, 
which was a further disruption to their everyday lives. As a consequence other aspects 
of residents' lives were often put 'on hold'. These included such activities as planning 
for the future, taking holidays, pursuing hobbies and spending valuable time with 
farnily members, relatives and firiends. As one Waltham Abbey resident attempted to 
explain: 
R: there was a big gap, and it's strange being back in the house now because I 
seem to have picked up where I left off, and it seems like the last two years of 
my life didn't actually happen, it's really weird, it's very strange, because I'm 
in the same situation now, more or less, that I was before we moved, but in 
between so many different things have happened. It's really strange. [R. Wa2, 
108] 
This was a sentiment, if not as explicitly expressed, that could be ascertained from 
residents' accounts. Residents focused on resolving the pressing problems of the flood 
therefore activities that might have signified advancement in mundane everyday living 
before, were no longer attended to. Such activities had to either be ignored or there 
was an inability for residents to attend to them. As a result, residents felt that there had 
not been any achievements in their lives during the period. It appeared that the flood 
experience was not considered by most residents to represent part of their everyday 
lives - it was an interruption. 
Although recreating a 'home' after the flood might have 
been viewed as an achievement in itself, residents probably viewed 
it as a necessity 
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rather than a progressive part of everyday lives. It was an experience not planned or 
asked for by the residents. For one Robertsbridge resident, however, this disruption 
was not felt to have impacted on her family to as great a degree as it could have: 
R: it upset our family life for fifteen months so there were many times along 
the way where you felt frustrated, but each one of us has a job or a school and 
friends and a life, and I think we just moved beyond that, and we coped. 
[R. Roll, 89] 
This resident expressed the importance of attempting to maintain key aspects of the 
family's everyday lives. In this case, everyday life was underpinned by the routines of 
work, school and relationships. For most residents, disruptions to everyday life were 
attributed to the flooding. They were commented on as having an impact on their 
family relationships, their own and others' health including their children and the 
broader social interaction within the localities. I will now illustrate each of these in 
turn. 
4.6.1 Family relationships 
Disruption of relationships was attributed to the additional time and pressures 
demanded by the flood experience. Two male Robertsbridge residents expressed the 
disruptions to their relationships with partners attributed to the flooding experience: 
R: It cost me my previous partner. 
1: Right? 
R: The stress of it and what have you, also got a new partner now. Yeah, very 
stressful, very stressful, but don't give up, keep going. [R. Rol7,150-152] 
R: I know I've been unlucky with all the building problems I've had, and to 
have that, if this was flooded again now, I don't know how I'd cope. I've been 
coping with it now for two years, and it's been pretty tough, not just from the 
exceptional circumstances, just from the problems that I was having with my 
wife at that time, it's been hard holding the rest of the family together as well. 
[R. Rol6,89] 
As these two quotations suggested, it was problematic for relationships with partners, 
but also for children, as illustrated by the first resident. The second resident goes on to 
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explain that there were already problems in his everyday life in relation to his partner: 
R: At the time, when we first had the flood that was the worst time. We've 
been married 23 years and my wife had been suffering from chronic 
depression, and just two weeks before the flood she had taken an overdose 
(pause) and then we had the flood (pause) it finished (pause). It ruined any 
chance of her sorting things out (pause) it put her back in such a state that she 
left the village. She's back living in the village now but at the time she couldn't 
face the prospect being anywhere near [R. Rol6,37] 
This illustrated that the disruption experienced by residents could depend on the 
emotional vulnerabilities of the individuals or families before the flood occurred. For 
this resident, the emotional vulnerability of his partner was thought to have been 
amplified and was attributed by him to the flood experience. 
Often, the additional responsibilities placed on individual members of a family by the 
flood experience resulted in a dislocation of that family and emotional isolation of 
those family members. A Robertsbridge mother expressed this: 
R: (Husband) was obviously really busy out there (with work) and didn't have 
any time to concentrate on the house, and that was hard on me, because I felt 
really (pause) pressured, I felt when we were at my sister's it was down to me 
to find us somewhere to live, and I couldn't moan to him about that or hassle 
him about that because he had enough to cope with out there. So I sort of 
appealed to (Son) and said 'I need you, when we move up there, I can't do it, I 
can't expect Dad to, he's going to be far too busy out there', so I said 'I'm going 
to need you', but he (son) wouldn't. Just wouldn't, wouldn't even come up 
there. So he stayed at my sister's. [R. Rol5,188] 
Family members attempted to reduce the strain on each other as this resident 
attempted to do with her husband. Although she sought help from her son, she 
continued with what needed to be done without that support. She also commented on 
keeping her feelings regarding their situation to herself, which was common in 
residents' accounts. With both the physical and emotional dislocation residents 
commented on feelings of being isolated from other family members. On reflection, 
the mother later explained that she felt that her son thought that if he had moved to 
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and helped in the temporary accommodation then the family would never return to 
their 'home'. Older children often chose to live closer to their original houses staying 
with friends and relatives in order to maintain both attendance of school and see 
friends. For some children, because of their age, they had to remain with their parents. 
Parents felt this experience affected their children, resulting in isolation from friends 
and loss of independence through not having some of the freedom they had before: 
R: I think friendships were more important than actually their schoolwork, I 
think they were unhappy and they actually said they were unhappy to be away 
ftom their friends, [R. Ro 11,8 1] 
R: (Son) took it badly, the eleven year old, took it badly because (Brother) 
wasn't there, they were separated. He probably suffered the most from being 
isolated because at eleven, or ten as he was then, he was old enough to go out 
in the village, go over the road and play. He couldn't do that from up there 
because it was far too dangerous, I couldn't let him walk down here, so 
anywhere he wanted to go, I had to take him. He found that quite hard, 
[R. Rol5,194-195] 
For these two Robertsbridge mothers, their children's everyday order and routines 
already established at their 'homes' were disrupted by the experience. This in turn 
strained the relationship between parents and children creating an additional pressure 
on parents. Both the age of the child and the location of the temporary accommodation 
in relation to where their friends lived informed loss of a child's independence. The 
Waltham Abbey resident interviewed who was sixteen years old at the time of the 
flood was asked if their school was sympathetic to the situation she was in: 
R: To an extent. Not as sympathetic as I would have liked them to have been, 
but it had an effect on our behaviour as well. We did milk it, we did, you 
know, take it for all it was worth. [R. Wa2,64-67] 
There was an indication that the children took advantage of the situation caused by the 
flooding. But as with adults and insurance claims, such behaviour would probably 
depend on the individual character of the child involved. It is likely that the overall 
negative aspects of loss of their freedoms and disruption to their family life probably 
outweighed any of these positive gains of the flooding. 
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4.6.2 Health and behaviour 
The disruption to everyday life of the flood experience could be constructed by 
residents through effects on their and others' health. These health effects were in turn 
attributed by residents to the flooding. A number of elderly residents reported high 
blood pressure after the flood when examined by their doctor: 
R: she (Doctor) said "Look up there" so I did, expecting to see something, and 
she said "That's where your blood pressure is! " and I said "Oh, 1 expect it will 
come down eventually! " and apparently this happened to most people, the 
stress of it put your blood pressure right up there. And it took a long time to 
come down, about three months eventually. [R. Ro 12,58] 
For this elderly Robertsbridge resident her high blood pressure was associated with 
the flooding not only because of the stress of her own experience but also as a result 
of having been aware of reports of it affecting other residents at that time. The health 
effects attributed to the flooding were usually commented on as observations of others 
in the locality as illustrated by the same Robertsbridge resident: 
R: he (shop owner) just, would used to watch us walking in through the door, 
with a smile on his face, a wicked smile, and say something funny, and 
everybody was laughing, and he's lost that. And I hope that it will come back, 
but he's really been through the mill. [R. Ro 12,80] 
She had observed a change in this person's behaviour after the flood compared with 
before the flood and so associates it with the flood experience. While for other 
residents a more sudden physiological effect, in the following case a heart attack, was 
attributed to the experience: 
R: His (Husband) Mum who runs a business with him had a heart attack, very 
very definitely stress and strain and it was just too much wasn't it, so that was 
something else sort of going on (Pause) she was okay, not for a while 
obviously. [R. Ro15,254-257] 
It was not just that a family member had suffered a heart attack, it was in the context 
of how upset she had been at the time of the flood that connected it to the experience 
itself With the use of the phase 'that was something else sort of going on' she 
indicated that this was an additional pressure on the rest of the family as well as 
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coping with other aspects of the flood experience. As in the case of the effects on 
relationships, the vulnerability of residents in tenns of health issues before the flood 
was suggested as having been exacerbated by the flooding experience. 
In some cases the demands of caring for others was a vulnerability rather than the 
individuals' health: 
R: a fellow with a Downs Syndrome young boy, I mean, he's of Italian descent 
and he's a lovely man but it nearly ruined him, he was so ill over it, [R. Wa8, 
158] 
R: while this was going on before we actually got dried out, she's (Wife) got 
pneumonia cos she's got lung cancer anyway, but she got pneumonia on top of 
that, and that, well, even the doctors at the Middlesex say that's what caused it, 
like, you know, it's the spores out of the, err, thing that caused it, like. [R. Wa7, 
97] 
These Waltham Abbey residents suggested that ill- health or the demands of looking 
after others before the flooding were exacerbated by the flood experience. In the first 
quotation, the resident associated looking after a child with a diagnosis of Downs 
Syndrome as a pressure, that in combination with the flood experience, caused another 
resident to be ill. In the second extract, the speaker supported their connection 
between pneumonia and the flood experience by referring to the opinion of experts 
(doctors). For residents who lived in the house while it dried out it was the fungal 
spores produced by the damp from the flooding that were blamed for ill health. 
All of the residents expressed the strain and anxiety that they attributed to the flooding 
experience. In the examples so far this manifested as, or was attributed to, a physical 
illness. Anxiety in itself was also disruptive in peoples' lives. Parents talked about the 
emotional effects of the experience on themselves and also their children. Following 
the flood, parents felt they had become more sensitive to changes in the weather and 
had become worried when it rained heavily. Their children were also reported to not 
want to attend school if it rained in case the flooding happened again so that they 
would be able help their parents. For younger children, some parents felt the impact 
was still apparent two years later, as this Robertsbridge mother explained: 
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R: Oh very upset, yes, they've never really recovered, cos I'd say that every 
time they see a puddle now, is it going to flood, if it rains, is it going to flood. 
Still very much, very much on their minds. [R. Ro 18,3 5] 
Parents were found to attribute changes in their children's behaviour to the experience 
of the floodwater some time after the event. It was uncertain how much parents 
projected their own anxieties onto their children or how severely the children were 
affected by the experience. Even so, all of these changes observed in their own or 
others' health or behaviour were attributed by residents to the disruption caused by the 
flood experience. In most cases this disruption was associated with the additional 
pressures of everyday living. 
4.6.3 Social interaction within the localities 
Residents in both localities reflected on the effects of the flood experience on local 
social interaction. This involved observations of the effect on the locality as a whole 
in terms of the mutual support, which often resulted in the discovery of new friends, 
as well as comments on the occurrence of new divisions and feelings of isolation. 
There were mixed opinions in both localities as to whether both the advantages and 
disadvantages of this aspect of the experience had endured. 
Just after the flood the reaction of other residents helped some residents cope: 
R: I mean we were all quite gung-ho at that point, you know everyone was 
really joking about, because you know I think people often are in situations 
like that, and also because there were so many of us in that situation. [R. Ro20, 
43-44] 
For this Robertsbridge resident, other residents making light of situation and 
understanding they were not alone in the experience helped them to deal with the 
initial shock of damage and loss. Mutual help between neighbours within both 
localities was apparent particularly during and immediately after the inundation of 
water. In both places, public meetings were conducted with the residents, councillors 
and flood professionals. Within Robertsbridge, the Bruderhof community (a religious 
community just outside the village) offered immediate help to affected residents. 
Straight after the flood, members of this group went around the village offering help 
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with cleaning and providing hot snacks and drinks. 
There were additional village activities in support over the longer term. These 
included the setting up of a local flood fund to help affected residents where there 
might have been insurance claims shortfalls. Over a year after the flood, a "flood fair" 
was held to encourage business (local businesses within both localities suffered with 
the loss of residents when they moved to temporary accommodation) and also to thank 
all those who had helped during the disaster. Similar activities did not taken place in 
Waltham Abbey, but in both localities, residents commented on the increase in local 
friendliness and on new friendships that were formed: 
R: I think we've become a much kinder, much friendlier village because of it, 
and I have a lady down the next street, she has Parkinson's, I go and visit her, 
she was flooded and she was taken out of her home, and for her it was a 
terrible, even worse ordeal for her than it was for us. [R. Ro 12,68] 
R: I think sort of, friendships have been made and we get on quite well, the 
last sort of few houses here, so it's not so much a cornmunity spirit any more, 
but it's more, sort of friendships I suppose, it was a good icebreaker, for sure! 
[R. Wal, 71] 
What was common in both localities, was that some friendships made through the 
experience endured beyond the flooding. Such a negative experience was found to 
have a positive side in the form of an 'icebreaker', which facilitated new personal 
friendships. While, however, the first Robertsbridge resident quoted thought that the 
experience had an overall positive effect on relationships in the village, the second 
Waltham Abbey resident reported that initial feelings of community had faded. 
Another Waltham Abbey resident echoed this feeling: 
R: Well you seem to get to know people in adversity, you know, but as my 
wife said when we were all sitting in or standing in the water, come the 
summer, we'll all have forgotten about it, [R. Wa8,186-187] 
In this case, the resident attributed broader feelings of mutual help to the context of 
the flood situation itself As the threat of flooding diminished with the beginning of 
summer, so did the strength of community spirit. A few new friendships made unng 
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the experience, on the other hand, endured compared with the mutual help between 
residents. 
The knock-on physical changes brought about by the flood could easily have an effect 
on the dynamics of social interaction within a locality. With so many affected 
residents moving out of their houses to temporary accommodation, the whole area 
became deserted much like a ghost town. One Robertsbridge resident who remained in 
her house during the renovation observed this: 
R: The effect on the overall community was quite drastic; there was so many 
empty places. I mean here, our house was occupied and the house over in the 
comer was occupied. The rest were all empty, so again it's like living on a 
bombsite, there's no one around, there's just you. And although you may not 
see much of your neighbours, you see them walking by, and you know, you 
might not spend hours chatting to them but all the time they're around it is a 
community, but suddenly they're not there any more, there's just you, and the 
whole village was like that. [R. Ro 10,139] 
She was not saying that she saw or chatted to her neighbours a great deal before the 
flooding, but more that she missed just seeing them in the locality for occasional 
interaction. Similarly, those who moved away into temporary accommodation also felt 
this isolation and so the situation of dislocation and isolation was much the same for 
those that remained. 
There were only a few comments, even when prompted, about the experience creating 
divisions within each of the localities. But it must be remembered that this research 
did not include the unaffected residents in the localities. Even so, where comments 
were made, differences were felt to occur between those who had been affected and 
those who had not: 
R: Um, community spirit, maybe its lustre does (go) slightly, um, a them and 
us attitude, I found some people, because they'd been flooded, were quite 
superior to the people who hadn't been flooded! "They don't know what they're 
talking about, they haven't been flooded! " so you got that sort of them and us 
attitude. [R-RoIO, 113-115] 
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It has already been illustrated that the experience of flooding is felt by residents to 
create a new knowledge, which can only be understood by those that have been 
through it. Even as a flood affected resident herself, she was critical of the behaviour 
of others in the same situation. Another Robertsbridge resident comments on the 
'them and us' attitude as unwelcome reducing interaction: 
R: you know there is nothing anybody can do, you know, but it's the 
acknowledgement that something quite big has happened to you and 1, because 
I've had a lot, I've had a lot of bereavement in my life, it felt like that, you 
know, people who couldn't come up to you and say something and 
acknowledge it, because often that was all you needed, that's all actually you 
want. [R. Ro20,61-63] 
This resident wanted some acknowledgement from others of the experience she had 
been through. She again felt the lack of knowledge of the experience among 
unaffected residents had made them self-conscious about approaching her. Overall, 
residents expressed both positive and negative effects on the interaction among 
residents within the localities. They felt, that with time, the effects faded with perhaps 
the exception of individual friendships. 
The additional disruptions to everyday life in residents' family relationships, personal 
and others health were attributed to the flood experience that involved disruption and 
dislocation from their house and 'home'. The everyday routines of daily life were 
disrupted and new routines were established. These however, were viewed as 
temporary in the same way as residents viewed their situation as temporary. Family 
relationships, health and interaction among residents, when disrupted, could also 
disrupt everyday life and often lay outside the physical confines of the house. This has 
implications for the construct of 'home', which will be discussed, in Section 7.1. 
4.7 'Home'in a threatened environment 
For those residents who had experienced flooding for the first time, their everyday 
lives had been disrupted over a long period of time during which their houses had 
been transforined into a threatening place. They longed to return to a renovated house 
so that they could continue the everyday lives they had had before the flood. The 
following section illustrates that, with the continuation of the threat of flooding, a 
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transfonnation had taken place in residents' everyday lives and with it in the meanings 
associated with 'home'. 
Initially, on returning to their house, a few residents expressed a feeling that their 
house was no longer the 'home' they had left. The house had a new, albeit similar, 
interior and lost possessions had been replaced. As already illustrated (Section 4-4), 
residents were sensitive to these changes and expressed emotional detachment from 
their new house and possessions. At a more general level, a few talked about a loss of 
an association with the 'home' as a safe place. This Robertsbridge resident expressed 
all of these feelings: 
R: I wanted to be at home, and I think that it's losing that confidence in your 
home, home is meant to be where you go when everything else is wrong, and 
home is where you feel safe and you lose that, you lose that security in being 
at home. I still had that sort of longing feeling 'I want to go home' but I 
wanted it (pause) to not be somewhere that was a worry and dangerous and 
(pause) I think that was the biggest problem, as you lose that feeling of safety 
at home. I don't think I feel it so much now, you do sort of settle back in, very 
peculiar when we first came back in, took weeks and weeks really to settle 
down, because it's home and it's not home, everything was all new and 
different, the same but different, which was peculiar. [R. Ro 15,3191 
A place where 'everything was all new and different, the same but different' was a 
sentiment felt by most residents towards living in their houses again. In common with 
other residents she described how, even with the restoration of items in the house, 
although physically the same, they were not the same for her. 'Home' as a place of 
refuge and of order and safety, had been lost after the flood. A 'settling down' period 
was suggested where, with time, new emotional attachments would be formed. This 
was not the same 'home' she felt she had had before (she would 'sort of settle back 
in. ') and consequently, a redefined 'home' had become established. 
4.7.1 A redefined 'home'through threat andpreparation 
In both localities the threat of flooding remained at the time of the interviews. In 
Robertsbridge, hard mitigation measures had been agreed to protect the village but the 
residents had to face another winter before they might have been completed. 
For 
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Waltham Abbey, no major mitigation measures had been agreed and the threat of 
flooding in the foreseeable future remained. 
In light of this threat of further flooding, all of the residents in both localities had 
undertaken some form of personal mitigation to protect their homes. When, however, 
asked directly if they had taken action, most said that they. had not. Residents' 
accounts revealed some form of change which had occurred either in residents' 
behaviour or alterations to their houses. Behavioural changes included residents 
changing their route home from work so that they could check on the watercourses, or 
by keeping personal possessions upstairs. Alterations to their houses included tiling 
the floors instead of laying carpet, making attachments for flood doors and having the 
airbricks located higher during the house refit. One Robertsbridge resident (R. Ro14) 
had chosen his new furniture so that it was lighter and had made fittings for planks 
that would fit across the room to raise furniture above floodwater. He had also 
installed a kitchen made of solid timber rather than chipboard so that it would dry out 
without warping. His high degree of change or adaptation was the exception and was 
perhaps in part a result of experiencing many floods over the last few years. He had 
also experienced great losses with his first experience of flooding. The 'home' had 
become transfortned from the 'home' his family had first moved into before the 
flooding. He commented: 
R: It's just that we have thought about the whole house as a living entity if you 
like which we have to work with when we get inundated. [R. Ro 14,48-49] 
As a family they now accepted or 'work with' a house that floods. This is not to say 
that they do not mind it flooding, quite the opposite. This resident had devoted, and 
continued to personally devote, a great deal of time campaigning to resolve the 
situation for his and immediate neighbour's houses. It was interesting that his next- 
door neighbour who had experienced the same flooding over an identical period of 
time had not taken the same degree of action: 
R: No! I think we should have done, but no, we haven't. I know next door, 
they've adapted totally. They've got, you know, kitchen furniture all the rest of 
it is, maybe if it happens again we would, but at the moment no, we haven't. 
Like I say, most of this we saved anyway because it was carried upstairs. 
[R. RolO, 130-1321 
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She had confidence in her ability to save things supported by her past experience. 
Other residents also had confidence in their abilities and knowledge of the 
watercourse. They judged the flood as an exceptional event which was unlikely to 
happen again. A few felt it was a matter of luck as this Robertsbridge resident 
commented: 
R: so I felt it was just my bad luck. And I just hoped that we wouldn't have 
one. There we are, it was one of those things. [R. Rol2,24] 
For all of the residents in both localities, if there was another flood it was, they felt, 
inevitable that the floodwater would enter their houses. The Robertsbridge resident 
who had completely adapted his house commented: 
R: I mean this sort of thing will not cater for a flood of October 12th but will 
for a flood that is normal hopefully that was very very exceptional. [R. Ro14, 
48-49] 
Having redefined their house as one that now floods this resident constructed flooding 
in terms of normal and exceptional events. Other residents, as in the case of this 
Waltham Abbey resident, felt that preparing was not possible: 
R: I'd like to know how you prepare for it. Short of building a moat or a wall 
right the way round your property, deeper than what any flood can, then, you 
know, you might stop it on one but if they don't do it they're still gonna get it, 
[R. Wa8,192] 
In light of this and with the knowledge of what the flooding experience involved 
action was taken by residents to minimise losses and reduce the disruption that they 
now realised would be caused with a repeat of flooding: 
R: When it rained for quite a few days and I came down and we sat here 
making a plan didn't we, of what to move first, and the order to move things, 
and then I came and took photographs of all the rooms because we were 
convinced it was going to flood again. [R. Rol5,215] 
This Robertsbridge resident made plans with her family for saving possessions and 
also took photographs in preparation for insurance claims and to refit the house. With 
the experience of flooding, residents now appreciated that flooding was associated 
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with a permanent loss of material possessions and not just damage. They appreciated 
how flooding could disrupt their everyday lives over a long period of time and related 
to this, the emotional disruptions that could occur. As a result of this knowledge and 
with the continued threat of further flooding, residents' everyday lives and 'homes' 
had changed in preparation rather than prevention of another flood. 
4.7.2 A longingfor the 'home'they once had 
All of the residents had chosen to continue to live in their houses following the flood 
and not move to another area. Residents explained that they had chosen to live in their 
locality because they had strong ties with the particular characteristics of the area, the 
local facilities such as schools, with neighbours and due to the close proximity of 
relatives. For elderly residents particularly a familiarity and secure association with 
the area, negated any ideas of moving house. For the residents in this research there 
was no question of moving house with the continued threat of flooding. One elderly 
long-term couple in Waltham Abbey commented: 
Rl: there's so many imponderables and then my biggest fear is neighbours, I 
mean we've got some lovely neighbours, so I've never had that problem with 
neighbours, but when you have the society of today, it frightens the life out of 
you, well it does me, anyway, 
R2: No, we've been very lucky. 
Rl: I'd be reluctant to move from here. [R. Wa8,235-2401 
For elderly residents in both localities, the disruption of moving house in terms of 
illness and a fear of the unknown was felt by them to be a greater risk than coping 
with flooding. For all of these residents, meanings of 'home' were strongly connected 
with the order and routines of everyday life associated with the locality. They were 
not just concerned with their houses. Even with the experience of multiple instances 
of flooding, the residents chose to attempt to preserve these meanings of 'home' rather 
than to start all over again in a new house, and probably a new locality, away from the 
threat. 
Within the context of choosing to stay in their current house it was found that 
residents in both localities were dissatisfied with their redefined 'home' and longed C; p- - 
for the 'home' they had before the flooding. Residents of the two localities, although 
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essentially with the same experience of flooding, had very different views of their 
future. In the short term the threat of flooding for both localities remained. In 
Robertsbridge, however, substantial flood mitigation for the village had almost been 
agreed. There was guarded optimism among the residents that the new measures 
would eventually provide the sense of security they had before the flooding: 
R: But it's all in the past now, and really, I think we now want to look ahead, 
get over it, and not, I said to my neighbour this morning, "I've decided never 
again to say I was flooded. I'm going to move forward and forget it, and start 
my life again. " And that's, you can't keep looking back. [R. Rol2,68] 
There was a sense, illustrated here, that once the threat of further flooding was 
removed, the experience of flooding which included the continued risk would also be 
removed. 'home' would be re-established to how it had been before the flood and 
residents' everyday lives could restart. For a few younger residents, their everyday 
lives might have involved moving house in the future: 
R: when the Environment Agency sent round the letters they said obviously 
having the flood defence system will help with, sort of our house prices and 
the mortgage, the mortgage people, and insurers, that will all help, which is 
good anyway. [R. Ro 18,96-98] 
For these residents, the planned mitigation in Robertsbridge was viewed as a defence 
against future insurance and resale blight of their house. The residents of 
Robertsbridge were characterised by an overall impression of reserved optimism 
about their futures with the prospect of the mitigation measures. In contrast, the 
residents of Waltham Abbey, with no such promised mitigation assurances, gave an 
impression of insecurity and hopelessness regarding their long-term future: 
R: there's no physical action going on at all. And if they do do anything, it's 
going to take four or five years to come up with a scheme, and the way the 
weather's going, you know, there is no future, is there, really, not the way we 
feel, so you, really all you're looking, is hope your insurance is okay, and hope 
we can go through it mentally stable. [R. Wa8,219] 
R: Couldn't stand it again (upset) [R. Wa5,14] 
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R: I look out there and out the back we have got sand bags ready to shove 
under the door, you know on the front porch, but this is how we're living now, 
you know (Cough), I'm having to live like this, I am frightened its going to 
happen again... 
... don't want to know (Cough) I don't think I could take another flood (Upset). 
[R. Wa9,63 and 69] 
There were feelings that even if it were approved, any substantial mitigation would 
mean further years of coping with the current threat before it would be resolved. 
Residents expressed a sense of dread and inability to go through the experience again. 
In Waltham Abbey, there were similar feelings among residents after the 1987 flood 
(Tunstall and Bossman-Aggrey, 1988). The last long-tenn resident quoted commented 
that 'this is how we're living now' which suggested that this was not the everyday life 
or 'home' he wanted. The phrase referred back to a time when life was not like that. 
The redefined 'home' was not the 'home' they wanted and they longed for the 'home' 
they had before the flooding. 
I will finish with one final quotation by a Robertsbridge resident that illustrated the 
tensions, that have been suggested throughout this chapter, between what the resident 
considered to be 'home'. everyday life and the experience and risk of future flooding: 
R: you're worn out all the time, you argue all the time, you snap at each other 
over the stupidest little things, and you don't really realise that it's having that 
sort of affect on you, it's, you know, it builds up, and the affect gets worse and 
worse. So yes, I'd say it nearly split me and my husband up at one stage. It 
could easily have done so, but err, I think we refused to let it! In the end we 
thought it's not beating us, we're going to beat it. So we stayed. I mean, he 
wanted to walk out, I didn't. I said "No, this is my home. It's not my house, it's 
my home, and I'm not going anywhere. " And what annoys us is, annoyed us at 
the time, was people, the council, the Environment Agency, they kept referring 
it to a house, as a house, but to us it's not a house, it's our home. Our kids have 
grown up here, she's been here since, I don't know how old she was, you 
know, she's been here since she was two, sort of thing, and it's our home. And 
I'm not, wasn't prepared to get up and just walk away. [R. Ro 10,80] 
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4.8 Summary 
Residents constructed the experience of flooding as not only the inundation of 
floodwater, but a process also involving the subsequent phases of re-establishing their 
houses. Residents expressed surprise at the extent and prolonged nature of the 
experience. This was viewed by residents as a new understanding of flooding which 
they had not imagined before the experience. This was particularly true in the case of 
those residents for whom this had been the first experience of flooding. 
Throughout their accounts, residents attempted to convey their feelings of dealing 
with the unknown, a loss of control and gradual realisation of loss. Their houses 
became the focus of their attention and were transformed into hostile environments by 
the flood. The houses were not only invaded by the floodwater but also by strangers 
attempting to help the residents. The work required to renovate houses resulted in, 
what residents felt was, further destruction and disorder. All residents were surprised 
by the length of time it took before they were able to live in their houses again. During 
this period, residents expressed feelings of isolation, which were compounded by 
having to justifýv their experience, losses and concerns to others. Residents often felt 
let down by the perceived experts, which added to their anxieties. They constructed 
their flood experience in terms of milestones or stages in a process of attempting to 
regain their houses. 
Throughout the experience of flooding, the losses and disruption in residents' lives 
were revealed. Residents who had not experienced flooding explained that initially 
they were concerned with damage to personal possessions rather than with the 
permanent loss that was revealed to them later in the experience. With loss, the 
emotional value of possessions was emphasised rather than their intrinsic financial 
value. Emotionally, personal possessions were found to provide connections between 
residents'past and their current lives. For some residents, the severity of a flood was 
not defined by reference to its physical characteristics, but rather in terms of the 
emotional value of possessions, which have been lost. This deeper, emotional loss has 
been signified by replacement possessions, which although new and similar, created a 
refurbished house that was initially unfamiliar to the residents. 
With the inundation of floodwater, the house was transfonned into a hostile place, 
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which the residents either wanted to leave or decided to endure depending on their 
strategy for refurbishment. Whether they moved to temporary accommodation or 
remained in the house, major disruptions to residents' everyday lives were 
experienced. Through this disruption, meanings of what 'home' meant to residents 
were revealed. Residents experienced disruption to family routines and the family 
could become fragmented not only by the dispersal of members but also emotionally 
by the pressures of the experience. With the loss of their houses (either functionally by 
remaining in the house or by living away) the meanings of 'home' as a base for 
significant family events, security, familiarity and order were made apparent to 
residents. For most residents, the pressures of the experience suspended their everyday 
lives. The experience in itself was viewed as a necessity to be overcome before their 
everyday lives could continue. The flooding experience was found to exacerbate the 
pressures of other individual and family disruptions and vulnerabilities. Residents 
observed detrimental changes in family relationships, health and in broader interaction 
in the locality, which were all attributed to the flooding. There were mixed opinions as 
to whether the initial altruistic behaviour and divisions immediately after the flood 
rnm bw had endured in the localities. There was, however, a co --- on feeling a -ong residents 
that new personal friendships initiated by the experience had continued after the flood. 
On returning to their houses, residents expressed a change in their feelings about their 
'home' in terms of a loss of security and 'home' as a place of refuge. With the 
continued threat of flooding, all of the residents were found to have made both 
behavioural and physical preparations or adaptations in response to the risk of future 
flooding. There were indications that the degree of adaptation by residents was 
dependent on their belief in ability to respond based on their past experience. All of 
the residents were resigned to the possibility of future flooding of their houses should 
the same situation anse again. Their efforts were directed at protecting possessions 
and enhancing the recovery of their 'homes' rather than a belief that they would be 
able to prevent floodwater entering their houses again. Prevention, however, was 
what they clearly wished for. 
All of the residents in the research expressed strong connections to the locality despite 
the continued risk of flooding. Moving was not felt to be an option particularly among 
the elderly who viewed relocation as possibly more disruptive than living with the risk 
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of further flooding. Residents of the two localities differed in their attitudes towards 
the future. For Robertsbridge, where major mitigation was almost agreed, there was 
reserved optimism that the work would completely remove the threat. In turn, this 
would have restored the 'homes' they had had before the experience and they would 
have been able to restart their lives. In Waltham Abbey no major work towards flood 
mitigation was apparent to residents. Residents' feelings were characterised by 
hopelessness and dread with a continued longing for the 'homes' and everyday lives 
they had before the flooding. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5.0 Lay knowledge, causes, solutions and flooding 
The key theme running through Chapters 5 and 6 will be an illustration of the different 
ways in which knowledge is framed and presented by the different groups (residents, 
local councillors and flood professionals), to support or undennine theories of cause 
and solution to the same flood situation. From respondents' accounts it was found that 
theories or claims of cause and solution to the flooding were differentiated on the 
basis of originating or being framed within broadly two bodies of knowledge: first, 
those who had knowledge gained by observation where signs are attributed to an issue 
and combined with the experience of living locally; and second, those who had 
theories originating or framed within their professional perspectives. For the purposes 
of clarity, this chapter addresses how lay / local knowledge is associated with local 
experience and how this knowledge was used by the relevant parties (residents and 
local councillors). Chapter 6 will illustrate how flood professionals framed their 
construction of cause and solution to the flooding based on their professional 
perspective. 
Two approaches are suggested by Carr (2003) in the definition of lay / local 
knowledge. On the one hand, essentially local knowledge can be viewed as facts, 
information or theories related to a particular place or time bounded by geography and 
history. Davies (1999) explains that local knowledge can be defined as direct 
experience informed by the particular social and physical character of a locality. Such 
knowledge is, in turn, supported by people's attachments to that locality. This 
definition, however, might be viewed as intimating that by virtue of living in the same 
locality and perhaps experiencing the same situation, the knowledge held by all those 
who live in a locality should be similar. It also omits interaction with respect to that 
knowledge between both those who reside in a locality, and between them and other 
groups who live elsewhere. Such interaction might emphasise or change the 
knowledge supported by those living in a locality at any point in time. By adopting a 
more context-specific and negotiated view towards local knowledge, Johnston et al. 
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(2000) suggest local knowledge is socially produced by a confluence of people, 
places, ideas and material artefacts. Here, a relational and interactional perspective is 
taken. It is this more dynamic perspective of local knowledge that will be illustrated in 
my research. It will be highlighted not only how people use local knowledge but also 
how it is viewed by other groups. The importance of observational and local 
experience in informing the application of local knowledge in the support of lay 
theories will be illustrated. The robust status of local knowledge will be examined and 
how it is tested as well as dismissed by those living in a locality. 
In my research, the two groups that were associated with living locally were the 
residents and the local councillors. Although the local councillors lived in the locality, 
they were unaffected by the inundation of floodwater into their 'homes' but shared the 
experience of living in the locality with the residents. For the residents, (Section 5.1) a 
combination of direct experience and lay or local knowledge informed the framework 
for the attribution of causes of the flooding. This in turn constituted lay theories of 
cause and related solutions. Examples will be given of how characteristics or signs 
from direct observations were interpreted in the light of locally derived knowledge 
and previous experience in order that, for residents, a satisfactory cause and solution 
were constructed. In the case of local councillors (Section 5.2), it will be illustrated 
how a combination of professional role and responsibilities together with local 
knowledge and experience framed their interpretation. 
5.1 Residents' knowledge and theories 
It was illustrated in Chapter 4 how residents constructed the experience of flooding. 
The experience of flooding was demonstrated not only to be about the inundation of 
water but also about residents' attempts to recover their properties. With their efforts 
to recover their properties, residents endeavoured to re-establish their concept of 
'home'. Residents viewed re-establishing 'home' as a sign of, and route to, a return to 
an everyday life. The flood experience challenged the concept of 'home', in particular, 
aspects of stability and safety. While residents' property was being repaired, and on 
living in the property again, residents attempted to re-establish 'home' but this was 
challenged by the continued risk of flooding. Residents felt that they had to overcome 
this continued risk if they were going to regain the everyday life they had enjoyed 
before their experience of flooding. The following section illustrates one aspect of 
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their attempt to overcome the continued risk and so re-establish 'home' and an 
everyday life. To overcome this risk, residents searched for a cause, and related 
solution, to the risk. In so doing they were brought into contact with various other 
official parties. This included local councillors who apparently represented residents' 
interests and flood professionals who evaluated and proposed possible flood 
mitigation action who also had their own perspectives on the same situation. For the 
residents and to some extent local councillors, the pursuit of, or disruption caused by, 
their efforts to construct a cause and solution to the flooding also forms part of that 
flood experience. 
The following sections will illustrate how residents' experience and local knowledge 
informed the attribution of cause and solutions to the flooding. The use and dismissal 
of local knowledge in support for certain residents' theories will be illustrated together 
with absence of discussion regarding officials' perspectives of cause and officials' 
work in attaining a solution. 
5.1.1 Local knowledge and observation of theflood 
Flood-affected residents were primarily concerned with the floodwater that had 
entered their own property. When asked what they thought the causes of the flooding 
were, they invariably turned immediately to local issues as the source and cause of the 
floodwater in their houses. In some cases, residents could establish directly 
observations of the floodwater, linking a source with a possible cause. For instance, 
for one group of Waltham Abbey residents, with houses on a street in view of a bridge 
that passed over the Cobbins Brook, to them the flow of floodwater into their houses 
seemed obvious. As one of the residents explained: 
R: Right, you know where the bridge is, it came over that bridge, like a 
waterfall, I mean we stood upstairs watching it come over that bridge like a 
waterfall, it was just like standing looking at Niagara coming over, the top of 
that bridge, [R. Wa6,54] 
The account of this resident was grounded in direct observation of the flow of the 
floodwater. A vivid description was given of the water likened to Niagara and she 
even gave her location in her bedroom for the observation. The situating of residents' 
accounts in details of time and place was typical of their support for their 
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observations. This has already been illustrated in residents' accounts of their 
experiences of flooding in Chapter 4. Providing such detail in accounts may be felt by 
the individual to have added credibility to their observations as it could only easily be 
given by the actual witness (Potter, 1996). These residents' accounts were often 
reinforced with gestures (pointing in the direction of the bridge, down the road and 
then from the front door into the room of the interview) that illustrated the actual flow 
of the water from the proposed cause, directly linking it with the water in their house. 
This again reinforced the direct observational status of their accounts. These residents 
claim that they made the same observations in 1987 when they last experienced major 
flooding of their 'homes'. Resident theories of the cause were reinforced by this more 
recent experience. 
Towards the end of the same street but further away from the bridge there was a more 
complex construction or theory of the cause. Not only were there again animated 
descriptions of the flow of water from the bridge, down the street and into their houses 
but signs of an additional cause. As a woman in one of these houses explained: 
R: but we're getting twofold 1 think basically, we're getting the river and were 
getting the fact that the sewer can't take it either and obviously you're getting it 
coming up, back up from there, because a lot of what we got in here obviously 
was out of the sewer you know, and you don't want to keep anything really 
after that either, [R. Wa6,57] 
This resident's account of the additional cause of the sewer originates from her 
observation of the nature of the floodwater. The sewage contamination was an indirect 
sign of a connection with the sewer but these residents combined this with their 
observations of the bridge and sewer manhole covers lying close to their property, 
which overflowed. Again, this was not their first observation (the same thing 
happened in 1987) but also these residents were affected by the sewer flooding far 
more frequently than flooding caused by the bridge overflowing. For them the 
inundation of floodwater had the additional problem of sewage but both the 
floodwater and sewer water were considered as part of the same flooding situation. 
In Robertsbridge the direct observation of signs that pointed to a possible cause could 
also be illustrated. For a number of years the A21 bypass had been attributed as a 
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cause of the flooding of a particular group of houses just outside the main village. 
These houses were affected by flooding as many as ten times in the years before the 
2000 flood. Residents of these houses constructed the cause in ten-ns of the bypass that 
ran near their properties. As one of the affected explained: 
R: But this is where we get involved with the road of course you probably 
heard that everybody, a lot of people, feel that the road is a dam and it causes 
problems and it did on October the 12th because there was at least a metre 
difference in height between one side and the other of water... 
... I went err went and looked, it's as simple as that really (laugh). I went and 
looked at the places that were flooded and the places that weren't. [R. Rol4, 
65-67] 
This resident's claims about the flooding being caused by the bypass originated from 
personal observation of the water level difference between one side of the road and 
the other. He explained that he had made an effort to investigate his theory that the 
bypass was acting as a dam. The bypass had long been an issue for these residents and 
even before it was built it was felt, and stated to the officials, that it might act as a 
dam. He supported his theory by recounting his direct observation of the water level 
difference on either side of the bypass. This respondent clearly felt that the evidence 
was simple and irrefutable, which he signaled by his laugh. 
For some residents in the main village, which was about half a mile from this group of 
houses, there was an awareness of, but not necessarily involvement in, the historical 
conflict about the building of the bypass. They, however, also tested the theory that 
the road acted as a dam by directly observing the signs associated with it: 
R: I don't know enough about the ins and outs of the bypass to comment really 
because weren't here before the bypass was built, it did seem on that day and 
on subsequent days when it flooded that there wasn't, it wasn't, the water 
wasn't able to get through, you know, there was far more water on the 
Robertsbridge side than on the other side, that was clear, just standing on the 
bridge, you could see that. [R. Ro20,93] 
Although not living in the immediate area of the bypass this resident traveled to a 
location where she observed these signs during the 2000 flood. It was her awareness 
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of the local knowledge of the bypass theory that ensured that she paid particular 
attention to it when there was a flood. The details of this knowledge led her to a 
particular interpretation of the water level difference, which indicated that the bypass 
was acting as a dam. This observation of the water level difference was felt to be 
enough to support the local knowledge of the bypass acting as a dam and infonning 
the theory of the bypass contributing to the flood. 
A possible cause of flooding became established as local knowledge which then 
framed the significance of the signs that had been observed. Another example of this 
was in relation to the claims made by Robertsbridge residents that the Darvell 
reservoir, which lies about a mile outside the main village, released water. As was the 
case with the bypass, residents drew on their observations of the floodwater to support 
their theory about the reservoir causing the flood: 
R: like the reservoir, Darvell reservoir, I know they opened it up there and it 
came down here, it came in the garden here so quick that reservoir's going to 
overflow and they had, you know, OK if they had to let it go, so be it, but they 
won't admit to it, [R. Ro 17,7 8] 
R: But this happened sort of, I don't know, it just seemed very convenient for it 
to happen that time of day. There are some suggestions that the reservoir let 
some water go, but I really don't know, [R. Ro 18,57] 
Both the speed of the onset of the floodwater as 'quick' for the first resident, and that 
it happened during the daytime for the second resident, were felt to support the theory 
that the reservoir released water. Whilst the first resident was adamant that this was 
the cause, the second resident was unsure. As in the case of the bypass previously, 
there was already a context associated with the reservoir. This took the form of 
historical concerns about possible water release from the reservoir when it was being 
built, which were also aired again just after the flood. The idea that the reservoir had 
suddenly released water into the village was circulated among affected residents. This 
or previous concerns regarding the reservoir may have informed their interpretation of 
the characteristics of the flood linking them with a reservoir water release. The non- 
committal nature of the second resident might indicate that for some residents there 
might not have been an immediate link between their observations of the flood and the 
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reservoir. This indicated that this theory might not have been the main theory of cause 
supported by the resident. 
Direct observation as a type of local knowledge holds a special status for residents. 
The detail given in residents' accounts that accompany observational knowledge 
provides strong support for their theories of cause. For some residents, there was often 
a historical context that infon-ned such observations, directing their attention to certain 
characteristics and signs in the attribution of a cause. Residents tested their theories of 
cause when the opportunity arose providing further support for their theories. The next 
section will illustrate how local knowledge without the experience of direct 
observation of the characteristics of the flood, informs residents' theories of cause. 
5.1.2 Local knowledge and observation in the localities 
Some affected residents in both localities were not in sight of, or did not directly 
observe, specific signs of possible sources of the floodwater, that entered their 
properties. In these cases residents turned to knowledge gained from living in their 
locality over a period of time. They often looked for signs of change in the locality 
and made connections with those changes and the flooding. Even for those residents 
who had experienced multiple flooding in the past, the risk of flooding in the localities 
was noted as a change in the localities in the time they had lived there. Such 
knowledge regarding the history of flooding in the locality was based on the 
observations they had made personally or gained from other sources in the area (other 
residents, local councillors, the local media). This knowledge was, however, not 
directly attributed to specific characteristics of the floodwater as in the previous cases. 
In Waltham Abbey, residents whose houses were situated just a street away and out of 
sight of the brook attributed other issues such as floodgates being opened, new 
development in the locality, or just being on the floodplain as possible causes. In the 
case of new development, residents thought that new buildings had created an 
impenneable surface for rainwater. Rather than the water being absorbed by the 
ground and slowly released, as it would have done before the building work, it instead 
quickly flowed into over-stretched watercourses causing the flooding. Residents 
focused on newly built up areas or specifically named structures: 
1: What do you think the causes are? 
R: The new buildings. That's what we reckon. [R. Wa7,15 0-15 1 
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R: You know that factory that was all ground, earth, right? So they built 
concrete, all those new houses, what's below them? Solid surface water, right? 
It can't get away, it don't soak in the ground. So every drop of rain that comes 
out the sky don't go in the ground, right, it goes down into these flood 
channels, they can't cope, that's the trouble, [R. Wa4,182] 
Changes that were observed by residents in their locality in the form of new buildings 
and roads were linked with the flooding. In both localities this new development was 
usually on land that had previously been open ground or fields. The inability of 
rainwater to be absorbed into the ground, and the link between new development and 
flooding, was usually informed by knowledge gained from previous issues 
surrounding new development reported in the local media. In relation to this, 
specifically named structures were sometimes given in accounts, indicating that 
perhaps there were issues regarding them before the flooding. Some Waltham Abbey 
residents focused on a huge Sainsbury's storage hangar as a cause of the flooding: 
R: You know, I don't know if you've seen on the, down at Sewerston Road, 
there's a vast hangar like structure for Sainsbury's, built on a floodplain. Now 
where is that surface water going to go? They say they've made provisions for 
it, but it's either going to go into the Lee, which if the Lee floods it's gonna 
come back to us. Now that's (the structure) sort of three quarters of a mile 
long. [R. Wa8,192] 
This was a relatively new and large structure (almost a third of a mile long) used as a 
national distribution centre for the Sainsbury's supermarket chain. Well-known 
locally, there had been a historical context of local opposition to the building of the 
hangar, which in part included objections based on the possibility of the water runoff 
issue. For this resident, despite assurances from officials (whom he referred to as 
'they') that the building was not to blame, he still stood by his theory and attribution 
of cause. The same resident also focused his attention on the construction of the 
motorways: 
R: We've had the M25 built here, the M1 I built, now that goes in certain, very 
near the area, a lot of surface water comes off into Cobbins Brook from the 
MII and from the M25. [R. Wa8,196] 
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The M25 was another well-known structure in the area and was also a relatively 
recent addition to the locality for this long term resident. Again, historically, the 
motorway had involved local interest and objections before being built. In relation to 
the supporting observational evidence of residents in Robertsbridge (the bridge and 
the bypass) there was, in these Waltham Abbey cases, no direct observational support 
for their claims other than the concept of surface water surface runoff and changes in 
the locality itself. The following account suggests how official interest frames a 
connection between the flooding and new development: 
R: I mean that's what we've been told, by different people. The council have 
actually put it in writing, cos it was in the Star (local newspaper), that they are 
trying to stop these new buildings being built, or any more new buildings 
being built, enn, in the Abbey, because of the water system, [R. Wa7,159] 
Knowledge of official interest that connected new development with the flooding was 
gained not only by local word of mouth but through reports in the local media. In this 
way, residents without direct observation, supported their theories with knowledge 
from apparently independent and 'official' sources. Further observations of changes in 
the localities by residents could also involve the watercourses themselves. Again, such 
observations were based on residents' association with the localities over a long 
period of time. In this respect, one common cause to which the flooding was attributed 
was the maintenance of the watercourses. One Waltham Abbey resident explained: 
R: I mean, I don't think that they maintain the roads and the drains and that 
like they did when I was a kid, I mean when I was a kid, you, alright you didn't 
have as many cars on the road, but you always had the drain people come 
round sort of once a month emptying the drains and, you know, you just don't 
see that now, you don't see them cleaning out the brooks and what have you, 
unless you get volunteers to do it [R. Wa7,291] 
Comparisons with past-observed maintenance practice was used to support the theory 
of a change in that 'they' (or the officials) had not been doing their job properly. This 
elderly resident referred to her childhood as a reference point for her ideas about the 
way in which changes in social practices in the locality contributed to the local 
flooding. A long term Robertsbridge resident of some 40 years used his local 
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knowledge more succinctly: 
R: the ditches, which haven't been cleaned out for about 15 years [R. Ro17, 
118] 
In these accounts, it is not only residents' personal observations, but also their 
association with the localities over a long period of time that supports their theories of 
cause and endows them with a credible status. The attribution of cause could 
sometimes be informed by the local knowledge of other residents, as this Waltham 
Abbey resident commented: 
R: These houses are built too low, a long-term resident said that he used to 
come here ice-skating when a boy. [R. Wa5, I I] 
Although residing in the area for some 45 years, this resident utilised the local 
knowledge of someone who has lived in the area even longer. The historical use of the 
area for ice-skating, a sign of the presence-of standing water, was connected with the 
possibility of flooding of her house. The significance of this knowledge might not 
have been communicated to the resident until its significance as a possible connection 
to the flooding was realised after the event. 
Some local knowledge may not result from the observations of residents but had 
become part of the cultural history of the area. One Robertsbridge resident who 
recalled a challenge to local knowledge - that the river Rother was tidal contributing 
to the flooding - referred to a rhyme: 
R: But all the locals know it is. It is tidal. There used to be a rhyme years and 
years ago in the Seven Stiles pub, I can't remember how it goes, but it was the 
guy put the haystack there in the morning, the water came up the Rother and it 
went back out (the haystack had moved) and when the tide came back in again 
the haystack was back where it was. [R. Ro 17,89] 
This local knowledge was utilised by the resident as credible support for his claim in 
much the same way as direct observation. The credibility of the knowledge was 
derived by virtue of its distinctive nature documented in a rhyme and physical 
presence in an important communal area in the village, the local pub. The presence of 
the rhyme in this communal area endorsed it with acceptance by others, or at least the 
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villagers who used the pub. The basis for the proposition of the rhyme was not 
questioned as it was embedded in the history of the locality. That in itself, like direct 
observation and living in the locality, made this knowledge very robust for the 
resident. The very age of this knowledge 'years and years ago' also gave it credibility. 
Where residents' attribution of cause of the flooding was not supported by 
observational experience of the actual floodwater, connections were sought in local 
knowledge. This knowledge also involved residents' observations, but in relation to 
aspects of the locality that at first might not have appeared to be directly associated 
with the flooding. The causes were associated with changes in the locality either 
physically or behaviourally in terms of routines with regard to the watercourse. Local 
knowledge informing residents' theories of cause were grounded in local observations 
over a long period of association with the localities. It was the personal aspects of 
local knowledge that perhaps gives it a special status and credibility for those using it 
to support their theories. The specific context of residents' experience of the flood and 
relationship with historical local issues was related to the local knowledge that was 
used to support a theory of cause. Although awareness of such knowledge was widely 
dispersed among the residents in a locality, it will be illustrated later that individual 
residents actively attended to only certain locally-derived knowledge in support of 
their theory of cause. 
5.1.3 Residents' knowledge and theoriesframing a solution 
Residents in both localities were searching for resolution to their continued risk from 
further flooding. They were primarily concerned with the flooding of their own 
properties and it has been shown that they focus on the local issues. This section will 
illustrate that with causes framed within local observation and knowledge, the 
associated solutions also remain within residents' area of knowledge. In this way, 
residents' theories were viewed by themselves as realistic and robust. Another issue 
that will be highlighted is how a credible link is constructed by residents between the 
causes already illustrated and their proposed solutions. As found for the construction 
of cause, residents used knowledge based on observation and knowledge gained from 
their local associations to support their solutions. 
It was common that residents' accounts of cause would be immediately followed by a 
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related possible solution. Returning to Waltham Abbey residents who focused on the 
bridge overflow as a cause, the same resident quoted earlier in relation to this issue 
went on to explain: 
R: it was just like standing looking at Niagara coming over, the top of that 
bridge, and apparently there's quite a lot of places that are narrower than they 
should be, and if they was to clean them out and dredge them properly and all 
the rest of it, I'm assuming from that what they've said it would flow a lot 
better [R. Wa6,55] 
She described the structural design of the watercourse as the reason for the flooding 
but suggested not a redesign of the watercourse but better maintenance as a solution 
improving the flow of the water. The responsibility for this action was directed at 
'they. In addition, the robustness of the link between the cause and the solution was 
not dependent on the credibility of the residents' interpretation of the situation but on 
'they' who were reported to have been the source of the solution. This resident 
confirmed later in her account that this knowledge had been gained from comments 
made by local councillors at flood meetings for residents. Resident interaction at 
meetings with officials, or information passed among residents, was found to be the 
key sources of support for their solutions. As one Waltham Abbey resident 
commented on the sewer as a cause: 
R: you see the thing is down Broomstick Hall; they've got Victorian pipe work 
down there... 
... And they should have two sets of pipes, we found this out. 
1: How did you find that out? 
R: Through the council meetings. [R. Wa7,63-65] 
This resident referred to meetings arranged by the town council following the flood. 
For those residents in the sewage-affected houses in Waltham Abbey, support for their 
theory that the sewage system was contributing to the flooding was again derived 
from official interest: 
R: I mean what concerns us a lot is the fact that these sewers they're broken, I 
mean we've had people down here, proper people with drains, the council have 
been down and they have said they're broken, the drains are broken, Victorian 
built them, built in Victorian times, [R. Wa9,95] 
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The resident's theory was not dependent on the ability of the resident to assess the 
technicalities of the situation, but was directed towards the interest taken by others 
with relevant status, in this case officials. Residents' personal observation of interest 
taken by the 'proper people' and 'the council' gave the resident's theory support. The 
observed actions of officials were used to bolster the resident's knowledge and 
theories already held. Residents' dependence upon officials' interpretation in the case 
of the sewer might have been because access and observation of the sewer was not 
available to residents. 
Once again it was prolonged observations by residents of the changes that had 
occurred in the localities that informed possible solutions: 
R: You see, weve got a terrible problem with this small bridge up here, it 
can't take the amount of water, when it does flow, years ago they used to 
dredge it every now and again, and what they dredged from the bottom of the 
brook they put on top of the sides to give it that height, and that's how they 
maintained it [R. Wa8,3 5] 
R: so I imagine it was a combination of factors, and certainly non- 
maintenance, you know good maintenance of dredging streams and all that 
kind of stuff, none of that has been done for years and years, [R. Ro20,93] 
For the first Waltham Abbey resident, local knowledge was used to support the theory 
in the form of an observed change in 'their' past practice. This resident later reported 
that 'they' used to be the National Rivers Authority, which later reverted to the 
Environment Agency, having responsibility for maintenance. As illustrated in the 
second quotation, the lack of maintenance of watercourses was also an issue in 
Robertsbridge. The resident quoted here felt that the cause was a combination of 
factors of which maintenance was one and again, knowledge of changes in local past 
practice was used to support the claim. For both residents, the theory about the cause 
of flooding and a possible solution were clearly connected with locally derived 
knowledge. In this case a change in the social aspect of maintenance of the 
watercourses in the localities and observations of the watercourses overflowing. 
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As found earlier, for residents' theories of cause, when the opportunity arose, residents 
tested their ideas about potential solutions. Again, this added credibility to their 
account as was demonstrated by this Robertsbridge resident: 
R: And also what they have helped with the Environment Agency is obviously 
clearing the streams out and the river, so the water can get away better, which 
I've seen that with heavy rain we have just had, it just, it does flow better 
[R. Rol7,118] 
The positive effects of recent maintenance conducted after the flooding had been 
observed. The action of clearing the ditches by the Enviromnent Agency supported 
residents' ideas that the ditches needed attention. 
It has been illustrated that, as found in the cases of cause, local knowledge also framed 
the solution and supported a link between the two. For residents, the responsibility for 
delivering a solution lay with 'them' or officials. The credibility of residents' claims 
was either gained from locally-derived knowledge or another credible source such as 
officials' comments or investigation of an issue. As found in the support for theories 
of cause, different sources of knowledge could be used to support a similar theory. If 
the opportunity presented itself, residents tested their knowledge and theory in relation 
to their proposed solutions. Even if not supported by individual residents as the 
primary cause and solution of the flooding of their homes, most residents were aware 
of, and assumed that, most alternative theories contributed. 
5.1.4 Residents' rejection ofsome local knowledge 
Local knowledge might be defined, in part, as shared knowledge specific to a locality. 
This was perhaps a rather static and uniform view of locally-derived knowledge. 
Residents of a locality could be aware of multiple claims for the causes and solutions 
to the flooding within the area. The knowledge within which these claims were 
framed was shared and negotiated among residents through word-of-mouth, official 
meetings and media sources. Residents, however, tended to support one of the 
constructions of cause above the others. The supporting knowledge was more likely to 
be specific to their property and other claims were either felt to contribute to the flood 
more generally or they were rejected. Not all theories were accepted with the same 
credence as this Waltham Abbey resident explained: 
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R: I mean, when you talk to people it's all sort of silly talk that, oh yeah, 
someone in Lasing opened this and they shouldn't have done that, and Joe 
Bloggs down at such and such a weir, he done this, done that, it's all gossip. 
[R. Wa4,120] 
This resident dismissed some knowledge held locally as 'gossip' in favour of his claim 
that the flooding was due to new development in the area. Knowledge gained from 
residents' neighbours could also be treated with suspicion: 
R: They had somebody from, this is only hearsay, mind you, people, on the 
comer, were watching somebody with a big drainage unit once, sewage unit, 
supposedly to be photographing the tunnels, and they came out and they said 
that there was two blockages from decaying walls or whatever, that's what 
they said, I mean I don't know quite, we, um, we've never heard anything 
more about it, but it floods still with a shower. [R. Wa8,196] 
For this Waltham Abbey resident who referred to the sewer overflow issue, the 
knowledge was termed 'hearsay' as they did not have the proof to satisfy them that it 
was correct. Residents did not necessarily believe and support every resident theory 
they heard, but attempted to assess each on its merits, supported with either their own 
observations or other evidence. The negotiated status of local knowledge was 
acknowledged by residents; this was illustrated by returning to the bypass issue in 
Robertsbridge: 
R: But this is where we get involved with the road of course you probably 
heard that everybody, a lot of people, feel that the road is a dam and it causes 
problems and it did on October the 12th because there was at least a meter 
difference in height between one side and the other of water. [R. Ro14,65] 
The resident first said that 'everybody' felt but changed it to 'a lot of people'. He 
explained later in the interview that residents of his group of houses outside the main 
village but closest to the bypass had engaged with this issue long before the residents 
of the main village. It was not until village residents got flooded for the first time in 
2000 that they became interested in the bypass issue. But even then, not all residents 
in the village agreed that the bypass was the key contributor to their flooding. They 
instead turned to other issues including the reservoir water release or general lack of 
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watercourse maintenance. As another Robertsbridge resident explained: 
R: There are people within the village who will tell you that if that (bypass) 
wasn't there it wouldn't have happened; I don't believe that, I think it would 
have done, maybe not quite as badly, I'm sure it contributed to it. [R. Rol5, 
261] 
This resident lived some distance from the group of houses closest to the bypass. She 
did not dismiss the bypass altogether but viewed it as possibly contributory to the 
flooding. For residents who lived in the group of houses closest to the bypass it was 
supported as the primary cause. 
It has been illustrated that local knowledge is not uniformly accepted by all the 
residents within a locality but was drawn upon and used in relation to their own 
circumstances regarding the flooding. Thus, a spatial patchwork of different theories 
developed across the localities. This will be discussed further in Section 7.2.2. 
It was illustrated how observations made by residents based on a long association with 
the locality gave a certain status and credibility to the knowledge. The credibility of 
local knowledge, however, could also be undermined or dismissed by residents 
because of its age. In Robertsbridge a resident who had lived in the locality for thirty 
eight years and in their flood-affected house for only eight years commented: 
R: except the older folk, who knew these houses, said oh yes, I knew 
somebody who lived there, I can remember those houses being flooded, I 
really can, and, and as I say that was years and years ago, you know, and, so I 
wasn't bothered, I really wasn't, no, [R. Ro 19,10] 
R: maybe there shouldn't have been, this is a floodplain, maybe there shouldn't 
have been houses built all those years ago when they were built, I don't know. 
I don't know. [R. Ro 19,66] 
This resident explained that she knew that there was local knowledge that her house 
had flooded in the past but this was dismissed on the basis that it had happening a long 
time ago. So even the status of local knowledge within a locality and among residents 
could be undermined by the lack of support or observation of repetition for many 
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years. The resident then went on to explain that her house was built on a floodplain 
and suggested that perhaps it should not have been. The repeated use of 'I don't 
know' indicated her anxiety observed at the time of the interview that this cause was 
probably out of her control and so irresolvable. This suggests that local knowledge 
could sometimes lie uncomfortably with residents. 
5.1.5 Absence of climatic issues in residents' theories 
When asked for the cause of the flooding, some residents jokingly said 'the rain' but 
quickly, and with a more serious tone, moved onto their more strongly-held theories 
of cause already illustrated. Residents only incidentally mentioned, for example, 
issues regarding the possible role of climate change in relation to the flooding. For 
instance, one Waltham Abbey resident casually mentioned: 
R: the way the weather's going. [R. Wa6,219] 
Very few residents addressed this issue as directly as the Waltham resident quoted 
below: 
R: I'm convinced that there's something amiss with the climate, which is 
coming, I mean looking out the door now (storm), it's all happening again like 
noith isn't it. [R. Wa4,126-128] 
At the time of this interview, there was a thunderstorm. This caused newsworthy 
flooding in central London, and may have prompted this response. In Robertsbridge 
there was some recognition in residents' accounts that, rather than the more global 
issue of climate change, the severe local weather before the flood may have 
contributed: 
R: It did rain a lot that year, didn't it, it did rain a lot and it did build up over a 
long time, I think that the water, the ground was so saturated. [R. Ro 18,5 7] 
These types of comments were, however, the exception rather than the rule and even 
if mentioned, were viewed as a contributory factor rather than the main cause of the 
flooding of their homes. It might be the case that the power of direct observation and 
local knowledge provided a clearer connection with residents' personal flooding. With 
the exclusion of climatic issues, residents' theories focused on a more robust and 
achievable way of advancing their goal of a solution to the risk. More robust, 
in that it 
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lay within their own experience and knowledge. The local signs confirming residents' 
own theories of cause had been observed by them, both at the time of the flood, and 
historically with and without flooding of their houses. Lesser climatic conditions 
could still result in flooding of roads and fields, if not their houses. In turn, these signs 
of flooding had been observed by residents over a long period of time. A link between 
these lesser flooding events, but associated with the same observed sips, was then 
made with the main flooding. Thus the severity of the storm might have been 
excluded from residents' theories of cause as it was not a major factor in past flooding 
events. This directed residents' attention towards more achievable ways of advancing 
residents' goal of a solution. More achievable as residents' theories worked within 
systems that already operated, or had ceased operating in their localities. A 
comparison could be made between the demands for better watercourse maintenance 
(keeping ditches clear of rubbish) with that of influencing the climate. Residents' 
theories of cause and associated solutions were framed within their observations and 
knowledge closely associated with a solution. A solution in which climatic issues are 
central to the cause perhaps was not immediately apparent or wished for by the 
residents. 
5.1.6 Awareness of official efforts to reduce the risk 
Although the residents in both localities had clear and detailed theories of the causes 
and solutions to the flooding, related views and efforts of officials received little 
attention in residents' accounts. In Robertsbridge, an engineering flood mitigation 
scheme was about to be signed off and started. There was, however, very little 
mention of it among the residents' when asked about causes and solutions. 
R: what they're planning to build now, along the back, this big bund that will 
stop the water, [R. RolO, 82] 
R: We had, funny enough we've had plans here, they're going to build a bund 
that's going to come to about the end of the stable then they're going to build a 
wall right around the property like that and a bund to finish off there, [R. Ro 18, 
39] 
R: Now they're talking about re-routing this bit of stream out there, taking it 
further back so that they've got room to put in a bund. Haven't heard the latest, 
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haven't heard anything from them for a little while have we? [R. Ro 15,268] 
A bund is a large earth or clay bank flood defence that the Environment Agency and 
council (flood professionals) had proposed would surround most of the village. As 
illustrated in these accounts, most residents were aware of the plans of the flood 
professionals but did not give those plans the same concern and enthusiasm involving 
the detail of their theories. There was no questioning or considered opinion offered by 
residents regarding the scheme. In this way perhaps it could be said that the scheme 
did not resonate with residents' concerns. This will be discussed further in Section 
7.4. In the last of the residents' accounts above there was also an indication that 
residents had not been kept informed of the progress of the scheme 'Haven't heard the 
latest'. This may have been an indication of a deeper lack of knowledge among 
Robertsbridge residents of the officials' scheme as a whole. This might, in turn, have 
weakened any apparent connection for the residents between residents' theories of 
cause of the flooding of their homes and the solution proposed by the flood 
professionals. 
In Waltham Abbey, a scheme was being investigated but was well behind the progress 
that had been achieved in Robertsbridge. Most residents had experienced a major 
flood in 1987 and were also aware that a flood mitigation scheme had been turned 
down for the locality soon after that flood. It will be illustrated in Section 6.2 that the 
flood professionals were continuing to work towards a solution for the locality but 
there was little awareness among the residents of this work: 
R: we're in the same position now as we were when it happened in 1987 
nothing has changed. And they say we've got to make our own flood wardens, 
we9ve got arrange our own, eff... 
... We've got to make our own 
flood preventions... 
... 
Our sandbags are ready, that's our defence for flooding. [R. Wa8,122] 
R: I'm sure that there are areas that are much higher risk than we are, so, they 
must be able to do stuff, they must be able to, but as I say I'm sure it's, the 
probability against the cost of it, that they're just reluctant. [R. Wal, 55] 
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The first resident was completely unaware of official work on proposals for flood 
mitigation schemes other than flood professionals promoting flood wardens and self- 
reliance. For the second resident, the reason for the lack of any apparent work was 
financial. As illustrated in Section 4.7.2 there were feelings of hopelessness among 
Waltham Abbey residents. From the residents' perspective, this was probably due to a 
combination of little observable work having been conducted to protect their homes 
since 1987 and a lack of knowledge of any efforts and progress towards an official 
mitigation scheme. How this perspective by residents' of official interest in their 
situation compared with the perspectives of local councillors and the flood 
professionals will be illustrated in the following section and the next chapter. 
5.2 Local councillors' knowledge and theories 
The next section will investigate how living locally could in part inform the 
knowledge that local councillors attended to and the ways in which they used that 
knowledge to stipport their theories. Although aware of residents' knowledge and 
theories, councillors did not always interpret and support them in the way in which 
residents did. Whether the local councillors had their own construction of the causes 
and solutions to the flooding will also be examined. In both localities, the local 
councillors interviewed were from the Parish or Town councils and resided in the 
areas. Some councillors, in addition to their positions in the local councils, also held 
positions in the District and County Councils. Although living locally, none of the 
houses of the councillors interviewed had been affected by the floodwater and none 
had personally experienced flooding of their houses. In both Waltham Abbey and 
Robertsbridge, the local councillors interviewed had long associations with the 
localities and had taken an active role representing the affected residents, their 
constituents, during residents' flood experience. 
It was immediately apparent that councillors' accounts of the causes of the flooding 
were sometimes very similar to those of the residents in their localities. Their local 
council role; acting and listening to residents may have influenced this. In addition to 
this, as local residents themselves, they inevitably shared some of the experiences and 
concerns of other residents. The role of local councillors' role in representing 
residents, however, brought them into contact with other official groups including the 
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flood professionals who, it will be illustrated in Chapter 6, had their own different 
construction of the flooding. This section will illustrate how the councillors attempted 
to balance these different perspectives in order to help residents. 
5.2.1 Local councillors awareness of different theories of cause 
Looking first at the issue of whether councillors were aware of residents' theories of 
cause, a Waltham Abbey councillor who was a representative on both the Town and 
District Councils commented on residents' claim of the bridge as a cause: 
R: Yes the bridge, you know, water comes down, blocks up with trees and 
rubbish further along and up it comes and over the road, and it backs up all the 
way along the stream, doesn't it, till the whole lot's overflowing, but it starts, 
when it starts to flood, the problem is down by the bridges, and the pipes that 
lead out, and then it just slowly backs up until everything's flooded. Let's hope 
we don't get another winter like that one. [Lc. Wa24,180] 
The councillor was aware of residents' concerns about the bridge causing the 
watercourse to overflow. While residents' accounts focused on the structural issues 
and the social solution of maintenance, the councillor focused on a combination of 
structural reasons for the blockage caused at the time of the flood. As was found in 
residents' accounts, the structural design of the bridge was viewed as contributing to 
the problem; but the blockage was felt to be a result of the flood situation itself. 
Residents viewed the cause as a longer-term problem existing before the flood 
situation. Although the official agreed with the residents that there was a problem with 
the bridge, no direct solution was offered. Instead, the climatic conditions, which 
could occur again, were highlighted as the cause. With no solution offered, the 
councillor simply hoped that there would not be a repeat of the bad weather. 
Councillors' accounts of cause were more likely to involve reference to natural issues, 
and less to socially mediated issues such as watercourse maintenance. It might have 
been the case that the latter had implications for their responsibilities in their role 
representing the council. Councillors' accounts were sometimes vague regarding their 
own responsibilities, but were clearer regarding the Environment Agency, Regional 
councils and the highways and water authorities' responsibilities when commenting 
about residents' issues. This illustrated that whilst the councillors remained aware of, 
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and sympathetic to, residents' claims, their own interpretation of those claims was 
made within the context of their role and responsibilities as councillors. As such, 
admitting a fault in bridge design or a lack of maintenance might have implied some 
fault with the council in representing the residents' on these issues with other official 
groups (e. g.: the Highways Authority and Environment Agency). 
Local councillors were also brought into contact with flood professionals both within 
regional councils and the Environment Agency, where the councillors listened to 
advice on assessments of the flooding in their locality. Through this, the councillors 
became familiar with the flood professionals' greater focus on climatic issues as 
attributable to the flooding (which will be illustrated in Chapter 6). The local 
councillors were attempting to balance the concerns of residents with those of other 
official parties. In Robertsbridge, a District Councillor attempted to explain residents' 
accounts of the bypass as a cause: 
R: so everybody thinks the bypass is a problem, and again its perceived 
wisdom, the Environment Agency have done models on it, which people think 
oh desk top, you know they don't know, and certainly during the flood and 
subsequent floods it looks higher on one side than the other, but that maybe the 
camber and all sorts of things, but the Environment Agency did the 
calculations for when that bypass was built, so they are not going to say that 
the calculations were wrong, [District Council Lc. Ro2l, 116] 
In her account, the councillor illustrated that she questioned both the knowledge 
supporting residents' theories and the knowledge supporting the Environment 
Agency's theories. On the one hand there was work or modeling undertaken by the 
Environment Agency. She felt that the residents had knowledge of this work but also 
indicated that the residents might have dismissed it. With her reference to 'oh desktop, 
you know they don't know' she implied that residents did not find this knowledge 
credible. Perhaps it was too removed from the residents' local knowledge of direct 
observation and experience to be considered seriously. Although the councillor agreed 
with residents' observations of the water level difference either side of the bypass 
road, she was also aware of a claim by the Highways Authority that these observations 
might have been due to differences in the camber of the road. Equally she undennined 
the Environment Agency position with her comment that the Agency would not have 
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admitted to getting calculations conducted before the bypass was built wrong. The 
councillor was balancing accounts from the residents, the Environment Agency and 
the Highways Authority. She was placed between two forms of knowledge, the local 
observed knowledge of residents and the technical knowledge of the Environment 
Agency and Highways Authority. She did not totally dismiss or accept either type of 
knowledge but questioned both as 'perceived wisdom'. The balancing of different 
groups' theories was typical of the stance taken by local councillors but they did not 
always appear to prevaricate as was illustrated in this case. 
5.2.2 Local councillors' tactical supportfor theories 
Local councillors were aware, both of residents' theories of cause, and theories of 
other official groups. Councillors' judgements of which theories to support were 
strongly associated with their roles as councillors. By representing the residents in the 
pursuit of a resolution to the risk of further flooding councillors attempted to assess 
different theories in relation to their chances of leading to a solution. Their judgement 
of local knowledge was not solely based upon credibility, but on wider issues of a 
political nature. Another Robertsbridge councillor illustrated this, again in relation to 
the bypass issue: I 
R: What I wanted to do, and what the rest of the council wanted to do was to 
get on and get something done, and what we, what we felt with the 
Envirom-nent Agency and the way they went along that line too, they said that, 
you know, if you're talking about knocking down the bypass and rebuilding it, 
then you're talking about long term strategic things, also, opening the route for 
compensation. I don't think the Ministry's ever going to admit that they made a 
mistake with the bypass. [Lc. Ro23,50] 
The decision to ignore the stance taken by residents was described as a tactical 
decision based on what was felt to be achievable for the residents in terms of time, and 
what could have been achieved with other official groups. He did not dismiss the 
residents' claims as unfounded but with supporting discussion with the Envirom-nent 
Agency the residents' claim was not felt to deliver an achievable solution. This point 
of view was reasoned against how he and the Envirom-nent Agency judged the 
Ministry would view the situation and behave. The decision was justified on the basis 
of the councils' goal of providing an achievable solution. 
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Local councillors were aware of the theories and supporting local knowledge of 
residents. As illustrated among the residents, local councillors, by virtue of being 
residents of the locality themselves, neither dismiss nor blindly accepted local 
knowledge solely on the basis of its status of having been derived from local 
experience and observation. Councillors investigated and questioned the claims made 
by all the groups involved, including residents. The same Parish Councillor in 
Robertsbridge described how he tried to clarify the bypass issue at a meeting: 
R: but there are all sorts of anecdotes you know, about it being two foot 
different between the level one side, and that the council measured it and 
photographed it, not true. The council did not measure it, but these things are 
said at public meetings, and then they go around, despite the fact that I stand 
up and said 'no, that's not true', it, you know, it goes round as fact... 
... the Highways Agency person who was at that public meeting, that eventually 
was called, he said 'you have to remember that there is a camber difference. 
There is, there is a difference between the height of the road on both sides of 
the bridge anyway because of the camber so without proper measure, 
measurement, that won't be, you know, the visual thing may simply be an 
optical illusion because of that. ' I don't know whether that's true or not, I mean 
it maybe, [Lc. Ro23,50] 
The councillor referred to local knowledge as 'anecdotes' perhaps because it was not 
supported by what he considered as evidence. He illustrated what he might consider to 
be evidence when he attempted to clarify the issue by disputing claims that the council 
had undertaken measurements of the bypass. For this councillor, photographs and 
physical measurements might have constituted evidence. This might have been 
prompted by the counter-argument of the Highways Agency suggesting that the 
difference observed by residents was an optical illusion of the road camber. The 
problem of the flooding was reduced to conflict over measurements of the water level 
on either side of the road. This again illustrated that the councillors were attempting to 
balance the concerns of the residents with the counter claims of other official parties. 
Without the evidence that he felt was required to resolve the issue, he was left unsure 
as to which claim was credible. 
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Although the local councillors worked closely with the Environment Agency, they 
explained that they were not always privy to all the information they would have 
liked. A Waltham Abbey local councillor commented on attempts to gain information 
from the Environment Agency with respect to a decision that was based on a statistic 
called the cost benefit ratio: 
R: Well this is all good stuff for you if you can find out how they do it, cos we 
can't actually [Lc. Wa24,26] 
With a previous major flood occurring in Waltham Abbey in 1987, this councillor had 
already experienced rejection of a flood mitigation scheme for the locality on the basis 
of the cost benefit ratio statistic. Referring to the Environment Agency as 'they', he 
wanted more information on how the statistic was calculated because it had been 
explained to him that it had been central to that decision. Despite his efforts, he was 
unable to get the information from the flood professionals involved. While the local 
councillors balanced which theories would better serve a solution, it will be illustrated 
how the flood professionals tactically managed infon-nation in order to progress a 
scheme in Chapter 6. 
Councillors were also found to actively try to test residents' theories themselves and 
some had formally questioned the various parties involved on residents' behalf A 
Robertsbridge councillor commented on the Darvell reservoir water release issue: 
R: Well I think the interesting thing about local knowledge is that a myth or 
perceived wisdom gets stuck, absolutely stuck, so somebody thought they'd 
pulled the plug on the Darvell reservoir and there's no, I mean we went up 
there, we've had a look, there's no way that could of happened, and what made 
people think that because the water came very quickly, like a wall almost, but 
there's no way that could of happened, [Lc. Ro2l, 116] 
The councillor was fully aware of the residents' theory that the reservoir had released 
water and the support residents gave through their observations of the floodwater. In 
this case the councillor dismissed the residents' theory and supported her view by 
reporting a personal visit she made to the reservoir. The status of her personal 
investigation and observations at the reservoir were used to support her claim. With 
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this supporting evidence, the residents' knowledge was consigned to 'myth' as from 
her point of view it was no longer credible. She commented on her frustration, often 
made by officials, of how when faced with alternative evidence, residents' theories 
remained supported by the residents. This was one of the few times that residents' 
knowledge was tenned 'local knowledge' in accounts. Where the term was used, it was 
by local councillors and flood professionals rather than the residents themselves. The 
reason for this may be that when dealing with claims from a number of parties, 
officials felt it was necessary to make the distinction between the knowledge of 
residents and that of official parties. As already indicated and as will be further 
illustrated in Chapter 6, the distinction might have been informed by what officials 
viewed as constituting credible information. In the case of the local councillors, 
however, the decision of which theories should be supported was directed more by 
political judgements on which theories would best serve the residents, their 
constituents. 
5.2.3 Local knowledge informing councillors' theories 
The following section will, however, illustrate that councillors views were informed 
by living locally and interacting with residents. Their theories of cause were, as in the 
case of the residents, also subject to the context of observations of change and local 
historical issues that had affected the localities. Living in a locality, and interacting 
regularly with the residents, did not, however, always mean that the theories of cause 
and solution supported by councillors or interpretation of residents' theories were the 
same. 
Although all officials (local councillors and flood professionals) had to balance the 
opinions of different parties, what distinguished those officials who lived locally was 
that they held very similar views or theories of cause to those of the residents. As in 
the case of residents, the councillors' personal observations and experiences of living 
in the locality often supported such views. With theories supported by this local 
knowledge, councillors were also brought into conflict with other official parties. As a 
Waltham Abbey councillor commented on the issue of new development in relation to 
the building of the M25: 
R: we've had the effects of the M25, that's shed more water this way towards 
the town and it's stopped the natural drainage of the land, that's been a major 
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effect since it was built, [Lc. Wa24,176] 
The councillor clearly sides with the resident theory that the M25 contributed to the 
flooding. In the same way as the residents, he also felt the M25 had affected the 
drainage of the land and went on to dispute the claims made by other official parties: 
R: and the agency that looks after the M25 won't even recognise that, you 
know, it's true. We know because we've lived here. [Lc. Wa24,176] 
It was not technical information that was used to support the theory, but the status of 
the local knowledge through association with the area. His frustration mirrored that of 
other residents - that an official group did not recognise his claim. 
The experience of living locally did not necessarily mean that councillors were able to 
completely understand the residents' perspective regarding theories of cause. When 
asked about the sewer issue in Waltham Abbey, the same councillor felt that residents 
only focused on what they could see in terms of the brook flooding rather than the 
sewer itself- 
R: Well they tend to focus more on the brook, on Cobbins Brook, you see. 
1: On Cobbins Brook, yes the bridge, yes. 
R: Because that's a thing they can see, isn't it, they can see the water levels 
rising there, they can't see the sewers until they actually overflow, so they 
don't see that as an ongoing problem. When you drive down Broomstick Hall 
Road and you look at the river you say, crikey that's high, it still might only be 
two feet below the parapet, but you can't see the sewer which may be very near 
its point of blowing up, you know you can't see that, can you. Not till it 
actually erupts that you've got a problem, or you know it's a problem. But the 
brook is there to look at, and people look at it, you know. [Lc. Wa24,120-122] 
Throughout councillors' accounts, there were indications that they attempted to 
understand and empathise with residents' views. For this particular issue, residents' 
accounts had already demonstrated that they were concerned about the flooding from 
both the brook and from the sewer. The councillor, however, felt that residents were 
not aware that the sewer was a problem. The inability of residents to directly observe 
the level of the water in the sewer was felt by the councillor to have concealed this 
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additional problem from residents. The residents explained that the presence of 
sewage in their homes, and overflowing manhole covers even with less severe storms 
signaled to them that the sewer was an ongoing problem. For residents, it was not 
viewed as technically a separate issue in the same way as the coucillor, but was all 
part of the experience and risk of flooding. Although the councillor was a local 
resident, he had not experienced the flooding and misunderstood the way residents' 
viewed the problem. Living locally, in itself, clearly did not lead to councillors 
holding exactly the same perspective as residents. Flood professionals who were not 
residents of the locality interpreted the same situation in the same way as councillors. 
5.2.4 Councillors' role and local knowledge informing theories and action 
By virtue of their roles as councillors, local councillors also held their own distinctive 
theories of the causes and solutions to the flooding derived from their observations 
and experience of living locally. In their role as representatives of the locality, 
councillors were able to take a wider area perspective than that of the residents. As 
was the case for residents, local councillors' solutions could also rely on the actions of 
others, including the residents. For example, one Waltham Abbey councillor 
suggested that a change in the area's population profile had made the locality more 
vulnerable to flooding: 
R: Waltham Abbey used to be a very, very good area, people used to really 
spend their lifetime helping everybody, you couldn't walk down the road 
without somebody saying hello... 
... But now, the 
Abbey's been made into a much bigger area, the population's 
increased, [Lc. Wa25,61] 
A change in the character of the locality had been observed that perhaps, the altruistic 
nature of residents had diminished with the increase in the population. There was a 
suggestion further into this councillors' interview that this change had resulted in a 
loss of civic responsibility for the general care and reporting of problems concerned 
with the watercourses. This in turn made the area more vulnerable to flooding. 
Another councillor in the locality also made this observation and took it a step further: 
R: These people walk past these things (streams), see them overgrown, full of 
rubbish, and it just goes past them. So you've got two different communities 
really. You've got those who have lived with it and know what the results of 
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neglect can do, and others who don't understand what neglect can do because 
they've not experienced it before. And that's a large proportion of our new 
intake. [Lc. Wa24,82] 
The councillors placed some of the responsibility for overseeing, care and 
maintenance of the watercourses on residents. In some cases, watercourses that 
backed onto residents' gardens were legally their responsibility but there was also a 
sense that councillors were attempting to reinstate an apparent community 
responsibility that had been lost. New residents to the locality were believed to lack 
the local knowledge of the water system in the area. The councillor described two 
communities: the long term residents, who had the knowledge gained through 
experience of living in the locality, and the new residents who had not. Both 
councillors gave accounts of personally clearing small amounts of rubbish from 
ditches themselves: 
R: Now I personally went down and cleaned them drains myself, right, in fact 
one man pulled up and said "Cor blimey we're lucky we got somebody from 
Epping now. " I said, "Yes, well I'm from Waltham Abbey and I'm the 
councillor" and he didn't believe me. [Lc. Wa25,27] 
Their definition of responsibility of taking action not only related to residents 
reporting possible blockages but also in some cases actually doing the work. Such 
altruistic behaviour in relation to the locality was perhaps part of the character and 
role of councillors, but they also expected the same sense of responsibility of 
residents. Councillor theories of cause placed the problem of the flooding partly with 
the residents. There was a sense of frustration among councillors of residents' lack of 
support not only of councillors' views but also councillors' attempts to help them. In 
both localities, but particularly in Waltham Abbey where residents felt abandoned by 
officials, the councillors gave an impression that they had been battling to help the 
residents who were apathetic: 
R: Yes but in the interval between, they don't do anything, this is the 
problem... 
... This is so 
depressing. And you need to keep pressure up continuously, this is 
what I've been trying to do for the last two years at least, to get people to 
understand that if they just sit back and wait for it to happen again, it will 
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happen, and they'll have the same problem they've got, they had two years ago, 
join us in trying to, you know, get something done to stop it happening again. 
[Lc. Wa24,84] 
Set in the context of councillors' observations earlier of diminished altruistic 
behaviour among residents in the locality, this Waltham Abbey councillor expressed 
his frustration that residents' motivation to resolve the situation also declined with 
time following the flood. For this councillor, in common with the councillors in both 
localities, he felt the main impetus for a solution to residents' continued risk of 
flooding was through his own efforts. In both localities within a couple of months 
after the inundation of floodwater councillors were active in raising awareness of the 
plight of the locality and residents at a national Government level. Local councillors, 
together with flood professionals were central to the organisation of this action. They 
wrote letters to their local Members of Parliament, arranged meetings and gathered 
residents' concerns. In Robertsbridge, however, there appeared to have been a far 
more active and successful campaign by local councillors in comparison with the 
accounts of activity undertaken in Waltham Abbey. A councillor in Robertsbridge 
commented on his role: 
R: I was also pushing to get, to try to raise the profile of Robertsbridge, to try 
and get something done in terms of flood defences, so I wrote to Elliot Morley 
(Government Minister), because I knew he'd been in Uckfield, asking if he or 
someone else would like to come to Robertsbridge and have a look, or would 
he meet us up in London. We started then to get some response. We got the 
High Sheriff of the County to come down and have a look. The Chairman of 
the County (Councio phoned up and said could they'd come and they did... 
... we 
held this medieval fair in the village last summer, which re-launched the 
trade back in the village, and the Lord Lieutenant came, and formally reopened 
the Post Office, and we had a reception for her, [Lc. Ro23,28] 
The councillor attempted to raise the profile of the locality by inviting, and associating 
the locality, with the interest of key official personalities. Elliot Morley (DEFRA 
Minister for the Environment and Agri-Environment with responsibilities for the 
Environment Agency and flood and coastal defence) and the County councillors held 
specific responsibilities related to the flooding. The Lord Lieutenant was a personal 
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representative of the Queen in the county and invited involvement might have been 
viewed purely as an attempt to draw attention to the locality. The 'medieval fair' was 
also a widely-publicised event in the locality. It attempted to demonstrate to residents 
and the wider area that business within the village was again trading. Another purpose 
of the fair was for flood-affected residents to meet and recount their experiences and 
thank all those who had given their help during the flood. Councillors also helped to 
arrange meetings with prominent officials soon after the flood. One such meeting was 
arranged with Elliot Morley in London as a Robertsbridge councillor commented: 
R: we went up to see Charles Wardle who was the MP at the time, [he] was 
very good, and he arranged a meeting with Elliot Morley and we went up there 
with the chap from the Post Office and other people, and people from Rutley 
Close, and he was going to give us half an hour and he gave us over a hour of 
his time, he'd been well briefed, he knew exactly the problems, [Lc. Ro2l, 152] 
As well as officials, the meeting involved a number of residents who represented 
business interests in the village as well as being residents of Rutley Close whose 
houses were near the bypass and had been frequently flooded. With her final 
comment, the councillor suggested that she felt that they were given sufficient 
attention and there was awareness of their situation by the Minister. This level of 
activity was not demonstrated in the accounts of local councillors in Waltham Abbey. 
Of course there was some self publicity in councillors' accounts but the difference 
between the two localities was apparent and supported by residents' and the flood 
professionals' accounts. 
With their role in the council, local experience and observations, councillors also 
developed their own theories of cause. This often placed the solution to the flooding 
with the actions of residents, which was interesting, as illustrated earlier in the chapter 
residents also placed the solution with others including the local councillors. For both 
localities the councils played and continued to play a central role in representing 
residents in their pursuit of a solution to their continued risk of flooding. 
5.3 Summary 
Residents were primarily concerned with issues surrounding the flooding that caused 
floodwater to enter and disrupt their homes. This was illustrated by Robertsbridge 
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residents of the main village who only became involved in the issue of repeated 
flooding of a group of houses on the outskirts of the village when they personally had 
been flooded for the first time. Residents' theories of the causes and associated 
solutions to the flooding were informed by knowledge derived from their observations 
of the floodwater at the time of the flood and local knowledge supported by prolonged 
observation and association with the locality. Residents often supported their theories 
with officials' views and observed interest in residents' concerns. The personal and 
locally-situated origins of residents' knowledge gave, for residents, their theories a 
credible status. In turn, this knowledge then framed residents' theories and directed 
what signs were attended to and linked with the flooding. This is not to say that 
residents blindly followed local knowledge but that they related and sometimes tested 
that knowledge in the context of their specific circumstances. There were few 
instances of flood professionals' theories of cause and solution appearing in residents' 
accounts. 
Residents were aware of, and also agreed with, a number of residents' theories of 
cause that circulated in their locality but mainly only supported one. That theory was 
usually more relevant to their own property. In this way a spatial patchwork of 
different resident theories was formed in each locality. The credibility of local 
knowledge among residents could be undermined if the significance of that 
knowledge relative to flooding was not recognised at the time or was ignored by 
residents on the basis that it had not been reaffirmed over time. 
For residents, the solution to the flooding lay with the actions of 'others' or official 
groups. The residents were primarily concerned with changes in the locality 
attributable to the actions or inaction of officials leading to the flooding. Such theories 
evolved from residents' observations privileged by living locally. These provided an 
attainable way of resolving the continued risk of flooding when compared with flood 
professionals' reasoning based on climatic conditions. This will be illustrated in 
Chapter 7. 
In contrast, local councillors were aware of the theories of cause and solution of 
affected residents and they attempted to understand the perspective that residents took. 
Living locally and sharing local knowledge, however, did not necessarily mean that 
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this was always successful. Councillors did not, for example, have the experience of 
residents' gained through the sometimes repeated flooding of their homes. 
Councillors' interpretations were informed by the context of their roles and 
responsibilities in the council. Where councillors' theories were shared with residents, 
they were brought into conflict with other official parties. Their role as councillors 
could result in a wider perspective of the locality over a period of time from which 
their own and different theories of cause to those of residents (and flood professionals) 
could become established. These involved some responsibility for the flooding being 
placed with the residents. Councillors observed a change in their localities in terms of 
residents' concern for both the watercourses, and for an involvement in action to 
pursue a solution to the risk of flooding, which declined with time after the flooding. 
With regard to residents' theories, councillors attempted to balance the claims of all 
official groups against them. Whether theories were supported or rejected by the 
councillors was assessed on the basis of not only the credibility of the knowledge 
supporting them involving councillors' own investigations but also political 
considerations. There were indications that the basis of evidence required by 
councillors, depended upon the basis of evidence provided by officials' counter 
claims. Councillors were illustrated to use the observations and experience of local 
knowledge to support their theories as the more technical knowledge and perspectives 
of officials' interpretations. Positioned between the residents and a number of official 
parties, the councillors made political judgements on which theories to support. The 
stance they adopted was not so much based on the credibility of knowledge, but what 
might have been more successful to gain a solution for their constituents, the 
residents. In both localities the councillors were found to play a key role in 
representing and organising the residents in the pursuit of a solution. That role 
appeared to be more aggressively pursued in Robertsbridge than in Waltham Abbey. 
Living in a locality was instrumental in the development of a certain type of 
knowledge based upon experience and associations within a locality. Such local 
knowledge was not equally supported or used in residents' or local councillors' 
theories of cause and solution within a locality. The issue of relevance in terms of 
individuals' experience and circumstances or role, informed how local knowledge was 
used. The next chapter will illustrate how the knowledge and roles of flood 
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professionals gave rise to a different construction of the cause and possible solutions 
to the flooding. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6.0 Professional knowledge, causes, solutions and flooding. 
This chapter investigates the way in which flood professionals account for the causes 
of flooding and what solutions they identify as appropriate. I use the term flood 
professional, because of their formal training and government responsibilities. They 
hold key decision-making roles relying on specialist technical knowledge with regard 
to flooding. In comparison with the local councillors (Section 5.2), flood 
professionals' role and formal training is more specifically focused on issues of 
flooding. Also, in comparison with the local councillors, they have responsibilities 
that involve a number of flooded localities, not just one, and do not reside in those 
localities. Flood professionals have formal training related to flooding, usually with a 
civil engineering background, working within the district councils, county councils 
and the Environment Agency. One flood professional for Waltham Abbey held a 
shared position between the Environment Agency and the District Council. All those 
included in this analysis were key actors who had at the time of the flooding, or 
continued to have, responsibilities for the localities. 
Flood professionals' accounts illustrate how their professional role informs their 
attribution of cause and solution to the flooding. Particular attention will be paid to 
how flood professionals' knowledge was characterised and specialised to the group, 
through the resources available to them, their training, and their use of terminology 
and understanding of the complex procedures involved in their role. This culminated 
in different solutions to those supported by residents, and to some extent local 
councillors. For the flood professionals, different solutions combined with the 
demands of the procedures required to progress them, results in a tactical utilisation of 
locally derived knowledge and theories. In relation to this, it will also be shown that, 
although the decisions made by the flood professionals are informed by technical 
evaluations, the interpretation and use of the information is negotiated within an 
economic and political context. There are indications that the tactical management of 
information by flood professionals can contribute to the isolation of residents from 
discussions involving flood professionals' solutions that in turn contributes to the 
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maintenance of residents' theories. The success of flood professionals' efforts to 
engage with residents on flood-related issues will be investigated. For the purposes of 
this analysis 'engagement' involves flood professionals' awareness and interpretation 
of residents' theories and successfully conveyed to residents their own theories of 
cause and solution. Before investigating if and how the flood professionals engage 
with residents' locally-derived knowledge and theories, we must first understand what 
the key concerns of flood professionals are, and how they approach the problem of 
flooding. 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate that, compared to residents, a different knowledge 
framework is utilised by the flood professionals to assess the flooding situation. This 
results in a different attribution of cause and to a different proposed solution. These 
sections will illustrate how their professional assessment and the procedural demands 
of their roles shape the cause and solution. It illustrates the complexities of flood 
professionals' assessment and the inherent specialist knowledge drawn upon in their 
framing of the issue. 
6.1 Flood professionals' attribution of cause 
For the flood professionals, their professional training occurs within a scientific and 
mainly engineering envirom-nent and their experience is derived specifically from 
watercourse management. Framed within this formal knowledge, an assessment of 
cause takes a completely different perspective to that of residents. This is clearly 
illustrated when we compare what the flood professionals identified as the main cause 
of flooding with that of the causes focused upon by residents. As illustrated in Section 
5.1.5. with their focus on local issues, very few residents in either locality attributed 
severe weather or climate change as the main cause of the flooding of their homes. In 
the accounts of the flood professionals, however, a completely different emphasis is 
noted. In both areas when these officials were asked about cause, they immediately 
turned to natural explanations of climate change, extreme weather or the particular 
characteristics of the area draining into the watercourse (watercourse catchment area). 
This was illustrated by two accounts in relation to Waltham Abbey: 
R: certainly over the last three years a quite dramatic change in climate, I think 
2000,2001 the winter was the wettest on record since 1766 with 40% more 
precipitation than average so I mean it was phenomenal, [County Council 
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Fp. Wa27,101] 
R: I think, it's very easy to come up with many causes, you'll often hear 
development which is true, increased impermeable surfaces, which is true, but 
I think we shouldn't go too far from the reality that it was a very extreme 
rainfall event on an already saturated catchment, [Environment Agency 
District Council Fp. Wa26,69] 
The first official focused on a change in the climate resulting in more severe weather 
conditions, while the second official acknowledged the presence of a number of 
different theories of cause. His use of the phrase 'easy to come up with' suggested that 
other explanations of cause although contributory, 'which is true', were not as well 
informed as his explanation of cause. He also argued that extreme weather is 'the 
reality' or origin of the flooding but it also combined with a saturated catchment. His 
reference to 'the reality' also drew attention to the status he placed on his knowledge 
and perspective of the cause of the flooding. It was presented as the defining and true 
perspective on the cause. In both accounts, the use of specialist technical language is 
illustrated. In the first account the claim was supported with statistics. Such statistics 
would have been readily available and discussed among the flood professionals who 
held an interest and role in watercourse management. By contrast, residents would 
have had to first search for, and obtain the data, and then have the required knowledge 
to utilise it effectively. As well as the use of statistics, there was the use of 
terminology such as 'precipitation' and 'saturated catchment', both of which frame 
their theories within the technical and formal area of expert knowledge. Conveying 
theories couched in such tenninology might be seen to endow it with a scientific 
gravitas, which might be felt by the officials, to give the claims additional support and 
status. This use of technical information, terminology and acronyms for assessment 
procedures was a common feature of the accounts of the flood professionals. It will be 
illustrated throughout this chapter. For Robertsbridge, again, the focus was on the 
weather but also the characteristics of the land: 
R: I mean I think we did have a really good reason, you know we knew why 
most of the problems with flooding the rainfall event was just, was extreme 
and the catchment was extreme because its relatively steep so the water will 
rise very quickly, and yet departs very quickly as well because it's the nature 
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of the clay catchment, [Enviromnent Agency Fp. Ro22,16] 
In addition to the severe weather conditions, the characteristics of the land were also 
taken into account affecting the flow of water into the village. He suggested that his 
was a 'really good' assessment of the cause. He used 'we', as he was part of a wider 
Environment Agency team involved with Robertsbridge. 
For flood professionals in both localities, the main cause of the 2000 flooding was the 
rare, 'phenomenal' or 'extreme' rainfall or conditions combined with the 
characteristics of the land in both locations. What is immediately apparent is that the 
flood professionals were primarily focused on the major flood in 2000. As illustrated 
in Chapter 5, residents' and, in part local councilors, theories of cause were informed 
by living in the locality over a long period of time. This involved experience of 
sometimes less severe weather conditions contributing to flooding, or near-flooding, 
of residents' houses. Such experiences could reinforce local theories that are applied 
by residents to the latest flood situation. Residents attributed cause to lack of 
watercourse maintenance, structural design (sewage systems), new development 
(bypass) and actions at the time (dam water release). This is not to say that the flood 
professionals were not informed of past flooding in both localities, but that their focus 
was on the latest and rare situation. 
6.2 Flood professionals'pursuit of their solution 
The flood professionals were concerned with this extreme, and what they described as 
rare, flood situation and were attempting to protect all the residents at risk from a 
repeat of the same severity of flood. Residents, on the other hand, were concerned 
with the flooding of their own homes and informed by observation of local flooding 
and very specific locally-derived knowledge. The following section will illustrate that 
flood professionals pursue their solution directed by concern for the whole locality, 
basing their assessment on the rare flood situation and their professional knowledge of 
the established procedures to obtain funding for that solution. Not only were the flood 
professionals' solutions framed in an engineering context but also in economic and 
political contexts. These will be illustrated, in turn, in the following section. 
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6.2.1 Solutions engineeredfor the rareflood event 
The flood professionals for both the localities associated with the Environment 
Agency and the County / District Councils were found to work together very closely. 
In fact one flood professional had a role in both camps. In comparison with the local 
councillors in Section 5.2. the flood professionals within councils had wider 
responsibilities that included other affected localities. The flood professionals were all 
in a position to propose flood mitigation solutions costing millions of pounds. The 
flood professionals associated with the Environment Agency provided the knowledge 
and resources that linked the proposed solution with possible funding from DEFRA. 
With engineering expertise and experience gained in flood defence, flood 
professionals' focus was found to be primarily on engineering defensive solutions 
more than, say, social solutions. Social solutions in this case might have taken the 
form of pursuing projects of adaptive living with the flooding in flood resilient homes, 
flood preparation and even relocation of homes outside the flood risk area. These may 
have been given some consideration but the experience, professional knowledge and 
emphasis on gaining a speedy solution probably pointed, for the flood professionals, 
to solutions lying in an engineering defence. In both localities, framed within 
preventing the flooding of properties as a result of severe and rare flooding conditions, 
substantial hard engineering projects were proposed. For Waltham Abbey, a potential 
scheme was still at the planning stage and unrefined: 
R: You know the catchment, which is clay (referring to a map), where are we 
now, its enonnous catchment, its got, its got half of Epping Down draining 
into it, which is why we are looking at that tributary being a potential thing. 
[County Council Fp. Wa27,156] 
R: attenuation, is that you put lots of little dams on the water courses upstream 
and you can take the peak off the main flow that goes through so by the time 
the peak that causes the flood will be smaller because you've got the little 
dams all over the place taking a certain amount [Environment Agency 
District Council Fp. Wa26,39] 
Both flood professionals' accounts illustrate that the solution was framed within their 
expert knowledge. Knowledge of the characteristics of the watercourse and land were 
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demonstrated during the interview with the use of a map to explain, that the 
watercourse 'got half of Epping Down draining into it' and the ground as 'clay'. There 
was again the use of terminology such as 'catchment', 'tributary' and 'main flow' 
situating the account in specialised knowledge. In the second account it was felt 
necessary by the respondent to explain the terminology of 'attenuation', which forms 
the basis for the proposed scheme in Waltham Abbey. That is regulating the flow of 
water into the locality so that it did not overstretch the brook causing it to flood. The 
flood professionals had a major role in the planning of the solution, which with their 
specialist knowledge, placed the focus on the engineering issues. 
In the case of Robertsbridge, a more defensive engineering structure was proposed 
and at the time of the interviews the work was about to start on construction. 
Essentially it involved building a continuous defensive barrier right around the village 
in the form of an earth (clay) bank or bund. At key exits and entrances to the village, 
such as watercourses and roads, removable flood gates would be installed. This is 
referred to as a stand-alone scheme and is an expensive major engineering solution. 
Even so, it was deemed necessary by the flood -professionals in order to prevent a 
flood resulting from similar levels of severe climatic conditions. 
In their assessment of cause, flood professionals relied on their interpretation of the 
records of the weather conditions and characteristics of the flooding and catchment 
area. They would not necessarily have had the direct observational and past 
experiences of all the situations upon which residents' theories of cause were based. 
Flood professionals' solutions attempted to work with the factors addressed within 
that assessment such as regulating the flow of water into Waltham Abbey, or creating 
a barrier to the flow in Robertsbridge. It might be argued that with the experience and 
knowledge of the flood professionals residing in flood defence and their familiarity 
with other localities' engineering solutions, this course of action was inevitable. As in 
the case of the residents (Section 5.1.3), there was often a close association in flood 
professionals' accounts of the cause of the flooding with an achievable solution. For 
flood professionals an assessment of cause based on the criteria required to evaluate 
and pursue an engineering solution would, if feasible, result in a proposal for an 
engineering solution. In other words it might be argued that the type of solution 
familiar to the flood professionals and with procedures in place to undertake it frames 
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the assessment of cause. 
6.2.2 Solutionsframed in economic terms 
While Section 5.1.3 illustrated how residents focused on achieving a solution, there 
was no mention in their accounts of the financial implications of that course of action. 
Flood professionals were preoccupied with the economics of progressing their 
solution. The solution was not only shaped by the engineering possibilities but also in 
terms of their ability to gain funding for the scheme from the government department, 
DEFRA. The flood professionals' assessment of the likelihood of gaining funding was 
called a pre-feasibility study: 
R: the pre-feasibility study is very much a quick and dirty assessment of need, 
priority and also some scoping of the actual problem itself. It's a very, its 
almost like a quick and dirty way of establishing whether you're going to do 
any more work, and if so when, and what format the work will probably take. 
[Environment Agency / District Council Fp. Wa26,15] 
Although described here as a 'quick and dirty assessment' the flood professionals also 
explained it as an engineering-based study costing many tens of thousands of pounds. 
It wasl however, viewed as 'quick and dirty' in comparison with a far more detailed 
'full feasibility' study costing hundreds of thousands of pounds. The full feasibility 
study was usually required so that the funding of a scheme could be assessed by 
DEFRA. The main output from such studies was a 'cost benefit ratio' which helped 
DEFRA to prioritise the funding of proposed schemes nationally against a country- 
wide national budget for flood defence. As explained in the following account of an 
Environment Agency official for Robertsbridge, whether their scheme went ahead was 
dependent on the cost benefit ratio and also on competition from other flood affected- 
localities: 
R: DEFRA asked us for a list of, I think it was four sites, whether there was a 
constraint or not I don't know, but we ended up giving them four locations 
where we believed there maybe a stand alone scheme or were the hot spots for 
flooding. We chose in the Kent area, Yalding and Robertsbridge and Lewes 
and Uckfield, and so we had some money to do a quick pre-feasibility study 
and of the two, the Yalding study showed there was no stand alone scheme, 
there was no cost benefit for building walls around Yalding, and so we then 
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had to go back to Yalding parish council and explain that message, but at 
Robertsbridge, thankfully for them really, there was an opportunity, it said if 
we built the scheme we were going to have a positive cost benefit ratio 
[Environment Agency Fp. Ro22,22]. 
For the Council and Environment Agency flood professionals, the cost benefit ratio 
was central to informing their initial, and DEFRAs' later, decision on the feasibility of 
their solution. The procedure involved in generating the ratio for their affected locality 
was a major preoccupation of the flood professionals. In the account above, the 
Environment Agency official explained that a pre-feasibility study generated a cost 
benefit ratio for Robertsbridge which was more favourable than the ratio obtained for 
a scheme in another village, Yalding. This illustrated that the flood professionals were 
working with a number of localities and that the ratio informed which locality would 
receive further study towards funding for a solution. The degree of influence that the 
outcome of the ratio had upon that decision will be investigated later in the chapter. 
Essentially, a cost benefit ratio was explained by officials as the ratio of the cost of a 
proposed mitigation scheme against the financial benefits to the locality of having the 
scheme in place. This was set in the context of the severity of storms that could occur 
over the life of that scheme. This is a simplified explanation of the ratio but the 
following account of a council flood professional for Waltham Abbey illustrated a 
more involved explanation: 
R: for a scheme to be viable at all... 
... it has to bear the benefit cost greater than 1, right, basically what that says is 
the, what you do is you do a net present value analysis over a 60 year period 
and you say that the cost of damages over that 60 year life of a scheme will be 
whatever it is, which is based on the insurance claims and you assess the 
probability during each year of particular events occurring and basically you 
do a statistical analysis which says that over that 60 year period you, the 
probability is that you'll get 1 in 100 year storm, and a variety of other 
(storms), you can actually say what the probability of an annual occurrence is, 
so in other words in any one year there's 0.1 chance of there being in I in 100 
years storm etc, so you can actually build up a net economic benefit which is 
the net present value of all the costs of all the insurance claims over the years 
that the scheme will be in place, you then compare that net present value of the 
142 
scheme which is the benefit of the scheme, in other words economic damage 
to be avoided, you then compare that with the current day capital costs of the 
scheme and say well, yes it matches or it doesn't, obviously if the cost of the 
scheme is only a third of potential benefits, then even DEFRA will fall over 
themselves to build it, as it currently stands with the current point system, I 
think you do need, depending on what the other considerations are, and 
DEFRA are revising the point system, you do need probably a benefit cost of 
about 2 for a scheme to be anywhere near viable, certainly on fluvial but I 
think tidal looks different, but historically benefit cost of just over I probably 
wouldn't get you a DEFRA grant fund, [County Council Fp. Wa27,16] 
The account illustrates that issues surrounding economic considerations is another 
area of knowledge or expertise held by the flood professionals other than purely 
engineering. The explanation was again peppered with terminology. Rather than 
engineering based, the terminology was financially based, such as 'net present value', 
rcapital costs' and 'viable'. Also, statistical language was used in describing the 
contribution of the probability of the occurrence of storms. It is interesting that what 
appears as a scientifically-derived figure, the ratio, was still open to a certain degree 
of interpretation i. e. what figure would get a scheme close to obtaining funding from 
DEFRA. Even this explanation of the cost benefit ratio was superficial, only giving 
the relationship of the various elements in the calculation. At this level of explanation, 
it did not address the details of how the costs of the scheme and possible damages 
were calculated, nor how the annual probability of storms was assessed. The annual 
probability of storms was defined by officials as the 'return period': 
R: it all came down to defining the return period of the event, which should be 
relatively, its fundamental to what the (Environment) Agency do... 
... the reason why we need to understand the return period is the benefit costs 
are sensitive to it, [District council and Environment Agency Fp. Wa26,23] 
The return period was another major focus in the accounts of the flood professionals 
regarding a solution. In order to assess the cause, the flood professionals focused on 
the severity of the weather. The return period was used as a means of communicating 
the relative severity of storms among the flood professionals, and formed an integral 
part of their working language. Interpretation of the return period required an 
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understanding of statistical language in relation to the concept of probability. The 
flood professionals explain that a return period of a one in a hundred year stonn, by 
virtue of its rarity, was a severe storm. The rarity was expressed as a probability and 
as such required an understanding of statistical probability. In particular, in Waltham 
Abbey, some residents expressed dismay that they had been told the 1987 storm was a 
one in a hundred year storm yet a similar severity of storm occurred again thirteen 
years later. The return period was misunderstood by residents as a prediction of the 
period of time that would elapse before a similar storm would occur again, and not the 
probability of it occurring again. Hence their dismay, and view that the Envirom-nent 
Agency had got it wrong when a similar storm reoccurred well within a hundred 
years. A statistical understanding that the probability of one event did not influence 
when the next event would occur was not appreciated by the residents. The return 
period, however, was a fundamental part of the language among flood professionals 
and transferred into communication with residents. Although this misinterpretation by 
residents was recognised by the flood professionals, without an alternative term or 
explanation to use in its place, the flood professionals still continued to use it in 
communication with residents. 
It has been illustrated that the flood professionals' assessment of cause and solution 
was framed within their area of knowledge, that of engineering and flood defence. But 
it is also informed by their knowledge of the established procedures required in order 
for the advancement of their solution. These procedures were based on a scientific 
protocol involving complex calculations and specialist knowledge. While the 
procedures shape the way in which the cause and solutions to the flooding are 
discussed, the next section will illustrate that there is a degree of negotiation and 
tactical use of the procedures. 
6.2.3 The tactical and negotiated nature of economic procedures 
It has been illustrated there was an element of interpretation in which a cost benefit 
ratio figure would gain consideration for funding for a locality and a scheme. 
Throughout the accounts of flood professionals, it was apparent that procedural 
knowledge was important. The following section will show that flood professionals 
tactically lever the characteristics of the affected locality that feed into the procedural 
system in order to advance a solution. 
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Differences now became apparent in the roles of flood professionals depending on 
whether they lay within the councils or the Envirom-nent Agency. For council flood 
professionals the funding for a mitigation scheme did not necessarily completely rely 
on DEFRA funding. This was illustrated by the account of a Waltham Abbey flood 
professional while explaining the cost benefit ratio: 
R: for a scheme to be viable at all even for my council to pursue a scheme, 
irrespective of DEFRA grant, it has to bear the benefit cost greater than 1, 
[County Council Fp. Wa27,16] 
'Irrespective of DEFRA grant' councils could pursue another grant that contributed to 
the total cost of the scheme. As the same flood professional went on to attempt to 
explain: 
R: if we can't get DEFRA grant aid, it's a question of whether this council is 
prepared to raise that money itself and we can get funding back from 
government under a totally untransparent scheme, I think its called the 
Standards, SSA, the Standards Spending Assessment you can actually get 
some money back on money we spend on flood defence, whether you can for 
capital schemes or not I'm not really clear, but ultimately it will come down to 
our council's, whether we choose to fund that, [County Council Fp. Wa27,18] 
Another means of funding, a mitigation scheme, was introduced in this account but 
even the flood professional was unclear about the details calling the scheme 
'untransparent'. The basis on which the council made an assessment on whether to 
fund a scheme via this route was also unclear. But again it illustrated that knowledge 
(even if only at a level of awareness of alternative routes to funding) was privileged to 
the flood professionals through their role in their organisations. 
In terms of obtaining funding for a scheme, as already illustrated, satisfying the 
requirements of a cost benefit ratio was the key focus of flood professionals. The 
flood professionals often commented on the tactical leveraging of the variables that 
fed into the ratio calculation. An example of this was given for Waltham Abbey where 
a previous cost benefit analysis in 1990 had fallen well below the required level of 
feasibility. But following the reoccurrence of flooding in 2000 some of the variables 
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that fed into the cost benefit analysis changed as a result and potentially improved the 
ratio. So another analysis was underway: 
R: the October 2000 is a big one, so that's going to skew, in terms of statistics 
and the return period of the event, its now more likely an event so you are 
more likely to have annual damages going up so the damages go up, [District 
Council and Envirom-nent Agency Fp. Wa26,21 ] 
With another major flood affecting the locality repeating the analysis would give an 
improved ratio in favour of flood professionals' solution. It was found, however, the 
flood professionals were attempting to improve the ratio still further by employing a 
new format for the cost benefit analysis: 
R: we're working to the new DEFRA guidance which comes, is applicable 
from April 2003, previously absolutely right 1990 Cobbins Brook was purely 
economics, it would of benefited from some kind of social deprivation index 
on the Cobbins that has been applied... 
... We've been now using, there's a three, its all very fresh this, 
its three 
criteria, one is the environment side heritage sites, there is the economic side 
traditional benefit costs and there's the people side, which uses the indices of 
deprivation and I think from Cobbins they did benefit and they got some extra 
points which would help their prioritisation... 
... so the additional points 
it got from the people factor ultimately didn't, they 
didn't make the extra bit, it was there already as an improvement it is very, its 
just very sensitive to economics, the people on its own, social factor on its own 
won't. won't do it, and that's the way its designed really, so quite good, 
although its very new. [District Council and Environment Agency Fp. Wa26, 
29-33] 
Although over eight months ahead of the implementation of the new DEFRA 
guidance, the flood professionals were attempting to improve the ratio for Waltham 
Abbey by employing the new format. This included a new additional factor in the 
calculation, which took the form of the Indices of Deprivation. The Indices of 
Deprivation provided a measure of deprivation for every ward and local authority area 
in England (8414 Wards). The indices combined a number of indicators covering a 
range of issues (employment, income, health deprivation and disability, education 
146 
skills and training, housing and geographical access to services) into a single 
deprivation score for each area. The new calculation improved the score for the 
locality in favour of a scheme but the flood professional, at this point of assessing the 
new format, did not think it was a major contribution. 
Historically the flood professionals, as well as being involved in the engineering 
practicalities of a scheme, were primarily financially- focused. Until very recently, the 
cost benefit analysis had not included any measure of local social characteristics. 
Inclusion of the Indices of Deprivation was planned for later in the year. Flood 
professionals worked within the constraints of the funding procedures, but even with 
the cost benefit ratio framing an economic decision, there was a degree of negotiation 
in the interpretation of what the number meant. Even so in their decision against an 
earlier mitigation scheme in Waltham Abbey, the ratio was cited to residents and local 
councillors as the key support for that decision. It might be said that the ratio gave an 
impression of scientific objectivity and through the complexity of its calculation, a 
certain mystery that may be viewed through the eyes of residents and local councillors 
as apparently distancing flood -professionals from onerous decisions. In other words, it 
was not the flood professionals that were to blame for the decision going against 
Waltham Abbey, but Waltham Abbey itself that was to blame. In the case of Waltham 
Abbey, the more recent ratio was judged as warranting further investigation: 
R: ideally we would of liked to have said, as it did in 1990, it's a very low 
benefit cost, or the opposite, it's a very high benefit cost, but we felt, we 
straddled the unity mark, and that came out sort of April this year that 
decision, so we sort of unlined and urred as to what can we do, why is it so 
uncertain, and then we convinced ourselves that there was probably a chance 
of going forward so in August, July, we applied for additional expenditure to 
take the project forward as a (full) feasibility study, [District council and 
Envirom-nent Agency Fp. Wa26,2 1] 
The account illustrates how the flood professionals without, in their opinion, a definite 
pass or fail from the cost benefit analysis were then left to make a judgment. They 
'ummed and urred' and 'convinced' themselves to move to the next stage and commit 
ftuther substantial funds. Another flood professional for Waltham Abbey commented 
on a tactic that could be employed in such a situation if, as a flood professional, you 
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worked in the council: 
R: I can go to my councillors and say by conventional economic analysis this 
scheme economically balances, in other words in terms of economic damage 
to the district if we spend this amount of money now then we're actually going 
to forestall economic losses to our residents over the next 60 years, it balances, 
if you then say OK if you take into account trauma and health and all the rest 
of it, all the social goods, then obviously those intangibles mean that it's worth 
doing the scheme. [County Council Fp. Wa27,16] 
As part of a council, with the availability of alternative funding routes, justification to 
pursue a solution could be informed by additional issues outside the constraints set by 
the cost benefit ratio for DEFRA funding. With an 'uncertain' cost benefit ratio, the 
council flood professional reframed the basis for the decision by employing another 
form of analysis, 'conventional economic analysis'. It could be interpreted from the 
use of the term 'conventional' that the DEFRA cost benefit analysis was viewed as 
something special and outside a standard route to funding. The means of obtaining 
funding for a solution could be refrained within economic, and perhaps social and 
political criteria so that a decision could be made ('political' for councils in that 
affected residents form part of their constituents for whom progressing the scheme 
might have been seen as enhancing their political position). 
It is clear that flood professionals were continually applying pressure within the 
procedures and the systems involved in progressing a scheme in favour of helping 
affected localities. For both localities, the flood professionals did not give an 
impression that they were leveraging issues within the procedures in order to prevent a 
mitigation scheme: in fact, the opposite was true. It was illustrated how decisions in 
favour of a scheme could be supported with the interpretation of the cost benefit ratio 
and the negotiated nature of the final decisions that were made. The decisions that 
were made depended on the role of the flood professional, either via association with 
the Environment Agency or councils, and the funding routes that were available. The 
procedural requirements could shape and in some ways restrict flood professionals' 
assessments. The flood professionals were attempting to gain financial approval from 
DEFRA or council members: so there was also a wider political dimension shaping 
those decisions, which will be illustrated in the next section. 
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6.2.4 Solutions framed in political terms 
It has been illustrated that the procedures for obtaining funding for a flood mitigation 
scheme provide a framework which informs flood professionals' assessment of the 
viability of pushing for a solution. Within the framework of the procedures, the flood 
professionals could tactically leverage the possibility of a solution being agreed. It 
will be illustrated in the following section that the flood professionals also framed the 
likelihood of achieving their solution within a wider political context of will or need 
for a scheme to proceed. The wider political context, they suggested, could both 
reduce the procedural time, and ease the decisions taken within it to advance the 
solution. 
First, I shall address tackling the issue of the time required in order to progress a 
solution. In Waltham Abbey, a scheme had not yet been approved, and time was a key 
concern of the flood professionals. As one commented: 
R: And it's not necessarily straight forward that these things are these days, 
it's, once you overcome the financial hurdle (oj) the benefit costs and 
justification, there's all the actual project issues like the environmental 
constraints associated with the scheme, the fact that you need to find a 
technical solution to do this, so once you get approval it's not the end of day, 
it's actually the very first step of a very, much longer process which will take, 
I would imagine four, five years... 
... there's so much internal approvals required, because of the legislation in 
terms of how the Agency works, but it does slow things down and it's October 
2000, it's October 2002 now and it's two years and all we've done is confirm 
that Cobbins Brook floods. [District council and Environment Agency 
Fp. Wa26,25,47] 
The full extent of the possible time involved in a flood mitigation scheme of this kind 
was revealed as an additional four to five years to completion. In the first line of this 
account there was an indication that the process itself had changed, becoming more 
complex and adding to the time involved. For flood professionals in Waltham Abbey, 
their frustration with not yet achieving approval for funding a scheme was apparent. 
The final line of the account was a flippant remark on the part of the flood 
professional, emphasising his frustTation. It was flippant in that further into his 
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interview he described a great deal of work that had been conducted in order to move 
the project forward. Opportunities for reducing the time the process would take were 
not apparent to flood professionals working either for the council or the Environment 
Agency within Waltham Abbey. 
It was illustrated in Section 5.2.4 that the local councillors in both localities attempted 
to raise the profile of the flooding in their areas through writing letters and arranging 
meetings with their MPs. In Robertsbridge there appears to have been a far more 
active and successful campaign of applying pressure to other officials from a number 
of different directions. An Envirom-nent Agency flood professional commented on 
how this might have influenced the decisions made for Robertsbridge: 
R: I recognised, is that there was still a possibility that the scheme wouldn't 
get, wouldn't get 100%, wouldn't get funded because we wouldn't get cost 
benefit ratio, there was a lot of people who wanted the scheme to go through, 
there was a lot of people who stood to benefit from the scheme going through, 
there was the Environment Agency, myself, because the flood defence 
committee would see it as a measure of my success that we build a flood 
defence scheme, the flood defence committee wanted to see it as a success 
because many of them on the committee are members of local authorities or 
the county councils, so they wanted, there was political reasons. [Envirom-nent 
Agency Fp. Ro22,241 
This sense of political momentum was also conveyed by the other flood professionals 
and local councillors in the locality. This was one of the few accounts by flood 
professionals where the role of the flood defence committees was mentioned. It was 
explained that the committee was an executive committee of the Environment Agency 
comprising representatives from DEFRA, the Environment Agency, relevant councils 
and in some cases, residents. The committee approved a budget and any work plans. 
Even without achieving a favourable cost benefit ratio, it was intimated in the account 
that there was sufficient 'political' momentum within the committee for the scheme to 
go ahead. Taking a wider perspective, the same official commented: 
R: I think the Minister needed a flood scheme to be built so that they can show 
they've done something for the extra money they've spent, the Agency needed 
the scheme because the Agency has got problems over the border at Lewes and 
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Uckfield, so we needed to be shown to be doing something, and so everybody 
wanted a success story and be able to provide for their selfish objectives you 
found the approvals route was a lot, a lot easier and had it been, had you been 
fighting, [Environment Agency Fp. Ro22,32] 
This account introduced the idea that there was a wider Government and Environment 
Agency interest in advancing the scheme, thus making progression through the 
procedure much easier. This was perhaps demonstrated by the difference between the 
two localities in terms of progress towards a solution. In July 2002, the Robertsbridge 
scheme was almost officially approved and initial construction work immanent. At the 
same time in Waltham Abbey, a full feasibility study was still awaiting a decision to 
commence in order to gain funding approval. In terms of progress, this placed 
Waltham Abbey at least a year behind Robertsbridge. It appeared that the political 
context played a role in drastically reducing the procedural timescale for 
Robertsbridge. After a national flood disaster of the order of the 2000 flooding, it was 
likely that the Government needed to demonstrate action and perhaps Robertsbridge 
was lucky to be singled out as the locality where that action was to take place. This is 
speculative, but supported by the feelings of respondents in, and associated with, the 
locality, gained outside of the recorded interviews. 
It has been illustrated that if the opportunity arose, the flood professionals could 
tactically take advantage of the political context in order to advance their solution. 
The Environment Agency flood professional for Robertsbridge summed this up: 
R: we managed the political elements of the project as well as the engineering 
and the PR, we sort of looked holistically at what do we need to get this, this 
scheme through, looking at a year ahead really. [Environment Agency 
Fp. Ro22,26] 
The 'political elements' were viewed by this Robertsbridge flood professional as part 
of progressing the mitigation scheme. It involved the management of the concerns of 
residents, which he tenned 'PR' (public relations), and the political elements both of 
the scheme and within the procedure itself. As already illustrated, this involved the 
creation of awareness of the situation in the locality at ministerial level, leveraging the 
feasibility of the mitigation, and ensuring that all the procedural stages ran smoothly. 
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He viewed it as a 'holistic' approach. Waltham Abbey flood professionals did not 
comment in the same strategic terms: 
R: I think now there's sufficient public pressure and the government is under 
such pressure to be seen to be doing something, that I think they'll want to 
spend the money. [County Council Fp. Wa27,57] 
In this example, the flood professional was speaking of national rather than local 
pressure on the government to do something; in fact, 'to be seen to' do something, a 
similar position to that intimated by the flood professionals for Robertsbridge. It has 
also been illustrated that the flood professionals employed long term strategies and 
specific tactics in order to advance a scheme within the established procedures. These 
involved the support and participation of local councillors in creating a positive 
political context. In both localities, local councillors wrote letters to MPs, investigated 
residents' theories and arranged public meetings, in which flood professionals 
participated. As illustrated in the last two accounts, there were indications that the 
involvement of other groups was viewed as either something to be managed or an 
additional variable that could leverage the progress of the flood professionals' 
solution. The next section will address the extent of, and reasons for, flood 
professionals involving residents in terms of residents' locally-derived knowledge and 
theories. 
6.3 Tactical engagement with lay knowledge and lay theories 
Flood professionals focused on hard engineering solutions to the flooding. The 
demands of the established procedures for funding flood mitigation schemes focused 
flood professionals' attention on engineering, economic and political issues. This may 
work to exclude other forrns of knowledge about the flooding. Decisions regarding the 
extent to which lay knowledge was engaged with, and which lay theories were taken 
seriously will be investigated in the following sections. It will be demonstrated that 
there was some engagement by the flood professionals with residents' knowledge, 
however this was mainly at a tactical level. Residents' knowledge and theories were 
regularly dismissed using inforination privileged by the access afforded by flood 
professionals' role and formal training. 
152 
6.3.1 Flood professionals'engagement with residents' claims of cause 
It was clear from the accounts of the flood professionals in both localities that whilst 
they were aware of the residents' theories about the causes of the flooding they 
engaged with residents in relation to their own assessment of cause as a function of 
severe climatic conditions. Residents usually focused on a solution for their own 
property and it has been illustrated that the focus of the flood professionals was much 
wider, taking in the whole locality and all affected residents. While the flood 
professionals were aware of specific resident theories, the demands of their role and 
the procedures they followed gave little space for engagement. In addition, their 
training and the knowledge used to assess a situation (as illustrated previously) could 
result in a different interpretation of residents' theories. The approach flood 
professionals took when assessing a situation was derived from their formal training. 
They were found to unpack a proposed cause into a number of elements. This was 
illustrated with the theory supported by some Waltham Abbey residents that the 
flooding was attributed to both the brook and the sewer. A flood professional for 
Waltham Abbey was aware of the claim and commented on it: 
R: The residents of Waltham Abbey in fact are under a misconception because 
the main source of flooding at Waltham Abbey is the main river, it's not 
Thames (Water), this sewer flooding is an intermittent problem which in fact 
occurs at much lower flow rate, much, you need much less of a storm. [County 
Council Fp. Wa27,14] 
The residents' theory was felt to be a 'misconception' or a misunderstanding for it is 
suggested that if residents understood flow rates in the flood professionals' terms, then 
the sewer would have been viewed as a separate issue. As illustrated previously, for 
the flood professionals, the severity of storm defined whether flooding had occurred. 
The sewer overflowing in less severe weather conditions meant that the sewer was not 
viewed as the main problem. As illustrated in Section 5.1.1 the residents did consider 
the sewer to be a major part of the problem. Residents were not concerned with the 
relative contribution of the main river and the sewer to the flooding because when 
there was a sufficient storm, the water entering their houses contained sewage. It was 
the presence of sewage in residents' homes that was felt to be a major part of the 
problem, not simply the inundation of water. In the account above, the flood 
professional framed the issue on technical grounds in order to attribute relative 
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responsibility for the flooding. This was with a view to attaining a solution but in so 
doing, the main concern of residents of the presence of sewage in their homes was 
lost. Thus, there was a significantly different understanding of the problem between 
the residents and the flood professionals, which could have led to conflict rather than 
constructive engagement. 
Some residents' theories of cause were engaged with by the flood professionals but 
dismissed when viewed in relation to their own assessment of the cause. Some 
Waltham Abbey residents supported the theory that new development increased the 
flow of water into the brook causing it to overflow and flood. A flood professional for 
Waltham Abbey commented on the theory related to the Sainsbury's hangar: 
R: Sainsbury's was always, the massive Sainsbury's, that was always very 
contentious, its actually a bit of a red herring, it doesn't actually contribute 
massively to what's going on, but there's a perception, it is, it's a very large 
consented impermeable surface that contributes to the problem, that's what 
they perceive, the actual, its impact is fairly marginal, [District Council and 
Environment Agency Fp. Wa26,5 1] 
The flood professional admits the building has been contested historically and claims 
to have understood the concerns of residents. He admits that the building did 
contribute to the flooding but this was felt to be 'marginal'. He commented that it was 
'a bit of a red herring'. This term suggested that in relation to his assessment of the 
flooding based on a ma or climatic cause, the residents' theory was misleading or 
distracting and, as such, it was dismissed. The view that residents' theories detracted 
from their own explanations of cause was a common view among flood professionals, 
and will be illustrated further in this section. 
The use of language by the official, such as, 'consented impermeable surface' placed 
his theory within the technical and professional arena of knowledge. This added 
weight and support to the status of the claim. The use of the p*ase 'the actual' set 
against 'what they perceive' placed his theory in 'reality' compared with the 
residents' theory that appeared to have no supporting evidence. 
The flood professionals regularly dismissed residents' theories using information 
154 
made accessible by their role and formal training. For instance, another flood 
professional used such information to take a more defensive stance regarding the same 
Sainsbury's hangar: 
R: That's an interesting perspective, we did, Sainsbury's developers actually 
had to do detailed modelling to justify to the Agency and us that that 
development was not going to adversely affect at-flood-risk properties, they 
spent f 10,000 and commissioned Halcrow to do a back-water study... 
... so in fact, yeah their concerns about Sainsbury's are irrelevant, they're not 
founded. [County Council Fp. Wa27,93-95] 
The use of the cost of the study undertaken by a named respected company added 
weight to support his theory. The type of study that would have been commissioned 
by the company was both detailed and followed a scientific protocol in engineering 
terms. In this account, the expensive study consigned the resident theory to 
irrelevancy. The official implied that the theory held by residents was quashed with 
the introduction of this study. For the flood professional to consider a counter claim it 
perhaps would have needed to be framed within the same scientific credentials. Again, 
as in the case of the use of the term 'red herring', the term 'irrelevant' suggested that 
the residents' explanation was distracting attention from that which he considered to 
be the main cause. The same official was less dismissive of another structure that 
Waltham Abbey residents and a local councillor felt contributed to increased flow of 
water into local watercourses: 
R: people have to have something to blame, don't they, and the bigger and 
more and inanimate the object is, but just something that you can pin your 
anger or your frustration or whatever despair on is probably it, but in fact no, 
the M25 is very unlikely [County Council Fp. Wa27,154] 
Here the contribution of the M25 causing water runoff was felt to be 'very unlikely' 
rather than dismissed completely. Without a supporting technical study to dismiss the 
residents' theory he attempted to understand why residents supported this theory and 
used this explanation to undermine it. His explanation was founded in psychological 
terms rather than engineering principles. He was aware of the anger, despair and 
frustration of residents and connected this with what he viewed as unfounded 
attribution to big 'inanimate' objects. This was classic utilisation of a belief in an 
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expert / lay divide in knowledge, with the knowledge of residents dismissed as 
emotional folk knowledge. Again, the residents' theory was viewed as very unlikely 
and not the cause of the flooding supported by the flood professionals' theory. 
This section has illustrated that while flood professionals were aware of the lay 
theories of the causes of the flooding, their different basis of knowledge and 
experience borne out of training and role, led them to a quite different construction of 
cause. As a result, all of the concerns of residents were either dismissed or not felt to 
make a major contribution to the flooding. In some cases, this different perspective 
could result in a failure to understand what is really of concern to residents. 
6.3.2 Reasonsfor the tactical engagement with lay knowledge and theories 
It will be demonstrated in this section that the flood professionals made considered 
decisions whether to, and to what extent, they engaged with residents' theories. This 
can range from being aware but dismissing a theory to taking action in relation to it. In 
this way, flood professionals' engagement with residents' theories might be viewed as 
tactical. It will be illustrated that the decisions made by flood professionals revolve 
around adroitly advancing their own favoured solution, and have a related goal of 
maintainIng their credibility within the locality. Protecting their own and their 
organisations' credibility in itself supported the flood professionals' preferred 
solution. Easing the process of gaining funding and progressing a scheme, in part 
depended on managing resident conflict and appearing competent to other official 
groups such as the councils and DEFRA. 
In Robertsbridge, at the time of the fieldwork, the project for a mitigation scheme had 
progressed to a far greater extent than in Waltham Abbey. As a result, the 
retrospective account given by a particular Environment Agency flood professional 
for Robertsbridge was extensively used in this section. His observations gave a 
reflexive and succinct account of flood professionals' underlying motivations behind 
engagement with residents' theories. A similar stance was apparent in the accounts of 
other flood professionals. 
In the following account the flood professional commented on the residents' theory 
that the A21 bypass in Robertsbridge acted as a dam. It was acknowledged by the 
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flood professionals and local councillors that it was an issue for residents but it 
required further study. He felt he had to make a decision about whether this residents' 
theory should be engaged with further: 
R: I really felt that it was a dead end, that it wasn't actually going to get, it 
would give them what they wanted, but it wouldn't get them what they needed, 
what they needed was a flood alleviation scheme [Environment Agency 
Fp. Ro22,22] 
The official had made the decision that the theory was not worth engaging with 
further on the basis that he felt the residents needed the flood professionals' solution 
of 'a flood alleviation scheme'. Tackling the A21 as a possible cause was felt to be a 
'dead end' as it did not lead to the flood professional's goal of preventing another 
major flood and so it was partly dismissed. He continued: 
R: so generally speaking we were all going to look at the A21, but in reality, 
we didn't look an awful lot at the A21 , other than to prove that 
it didn't 
compromise the scheme that we were doing because the scheme was what they 
needed and to spend resource and time on the A21 would of increased the 
costs and delayed the scheme we were trying to put forward. [Environment 
Agency Fp. Ro22,22] 
His evaluation of the residents' theory was framed within the demands of the 
procedure to attain the officials' solution. So the time and budgetary demands of that 
procedure informed the decision. Based on this, it was decided not to pursue the 
bypass theory as an issue. It was a decision based on the officials' terms and from 
their perspective the A21 was only an issue in that it did not 'compromise the 
scheme'. Addressing it on the residents' terms was viewed as a barrier to the 
progression of the officials' solution of an engineering-based large flood alleviation 
scheme. Although indicated to residents that the A21 would be investigated, the 
degree of engagement with the issue and residents was restricted. This degree, or lack 
of motivation, for engagement was not communicated to residents at the time and in 
this respect might be viewed as a hidden agenda on the part of the flood professionals. 
However, this reasoning was communicated to the local councillors who were aware 
of the flood professionals' long-term strategy. 
157 
Tactical decisions for the degree of engagement with lay theories of cause could also 
be based on protecting the wider credibility of the official group. Although flood 
professionals dismissed a particular lay theory of cause, a decision might be taken to 
actually address it as an attempt to appease residents' concerns. Flood professionals 
believed that such action also served to protect them from accusations of negligence 
should flooding occur again. This was illustrated in the following account of flood 
professionals instigating watercourse maintenance in the period after the flood had 
occurred. It addressed one of residents' theories of cause, which flood professionals 
were aware of, that a lack of maintenance had caused the flooding: 
R: we put machines in the village that people could see the work that was 
being done, you know we had guys in where the guys had their, and the vans 
were parked on the roads, people could see them, but we didn't want the 
maintenance to be done without being visual, you know, it had to be... 
... because the biggest fear was you go into the next winter without being able 
to do anything because there just wasn't the time, you know it takes years to 
develop flood defence schemes, [Envirom-nent Agency Fp. Ro22,20] 
The visibility of the work to residents was deemed to be an important issue. Not 
visibly tackling watercourse maintenance combined with a repeat of the flooding was 
felt to have severely unden-nined the credibility of the Environment Agency. This 
meant that the Environinent Agency, by pursuing their favoured solution, had placed 
itself in a difficult position. As previously illustrated, the procedure involved in 
gaining funding for a scheme can take well over a year. During this period there was a 
concern among flood professionals that they needed to be seen by residents to engage 
with their concerns. Naturally even with this maintenance work flood professionals 
believed that a repeat of the weather conditions that caused the last flood would again 
result in substantial flooding. As a Robertsbridge district councillor explained: 
R: OK it may not have helped anything, but it actually gave a bit more 
confidence, and it was a good thing to do straight afterwards, to do 
housekeeping jobs that had never been done for years and years and years. 
[Lc. Ro2l, 108] 
There was an admission here by the councillor that certain maintenance work had not 
been done in the past, which partly confirmed residents' claims. As illustrated in 
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Section 5.1.3 such work could substantiate residents' theories if it was observed to 
improve the situation, even if the improvement observed by residents was not under 
the same severe weather conditions. So flood professionals, in their view, struck a 
balance between what the residents wanted, and what they felt both the residents and 
they themselves needed. Protecting the credibility of the Environment Agency and 
other official groups might be viewed as also advancing the flood professionals' 
preferred solution. 
Flood professionals did give positive reasons for engaging with resident knowledge 
and theories. For example, one flood professional supported the involvement of 
residents and other parties: 
R: I think it's essential really. I mean on a fairly low sort of isolated level on a 
project, the sooner you get residents involved the better it's going to be, the 
sooner you get their representatives councillors involved, the easier it's going 
to be for your scheme and then the better, the better you're solution is going to 
be at the end of it because you won't be developing ideas in isolation, [District 
council and Environment Agency Fp. Wa26,105-106] 
While describing engagement as 'essential', he was clearly still reserved about the 
degree to which residents should be involved as he argued for only 'a fairly low sort 
of isolated level on a project'. The residents' involvement was also framed within 
advancing the flood professionals' solution. The comments 'better', 'easier' and not 
'developing ideas in isolation' were all directed at the flood professionals' solution or 
project. The residents and local councillors were involved in a sort of discussion in 
order to advance the flood professionals' solution. There was no question, however, 
that the solution that would be supported by the flood professionals would not be that 
different to the one proposed by the flood professionals. 
For flood professionals, the value of locally-derived knowledge was also framed 
within their own requirements. It was found that such lay knowledge could also be 
supported by the officials themselves either as a result of living locally (Section 5.2.3) 
or documented within the organisation itself A flood professional for Waltham Abbey 
commented on the compilation of a flood defence policy document within the council: 
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R: the first thing we did was to identify the critical water courses, we knew 
where they were, everybody that worked here knew where they were, we knew 
the hot points, we knew the points that were going to flood from local 
knowledge, been here long enough the inspector has been here seven years, 
but it had never been formally recorded, so this is what this (document) does. 
[County Council Fp. Wa27,83] 
The knowledge of the watercourse had been gained from, in this case, an inspector's 
long association with the area. The flood professional termed such knowledge as 
'local knowledge' even though it is the council that now laid claim to that knowledge. 
This local knowledge, as in the case of residents (Section 5.1.3), was given a special 
status by the flood professional based on how the information was acquired. As with 
the residents, the status of this information was derived from the association with the 
locality over a long period of time. This time, however, it was a flood professional 
that had made the observations which were acceptable even though the knowledge 
was gained via similar means as the knowledge which supported residents' theories. 
Flood professionals often used such methods of gaining supporting evidence for lay 
theories as a basis for dismissal of residents' theories. In this case, however, the 
knowledge was not disputed and was valued warranting documentation. It appears 
that for flood professionals, the status of knowledge was dependent on the source and 
its relationship to their own assessment of cause rather than on the method of its 
collection. 
In comparison with residents' accounts of cause (Section 5.1), those of the flood 
professionals were very different. In both localities the flood professionals' solution 
to the flooding was rarely mentioned in residents' accounts and in any great detail 
(Section 5.1.6). This could possibly result from residents' focus on their own property 
and the robustness, for them, of the supporting evidence for their own theories of 
cause. Also from the point of view of flood professionals the tactical nature and ability 
of flood professionals to interact with residents in relation to residents theories may 
favour exclusion of residents discussing flood professionals' theories and solutions. 
These issues will be illustrated in the following section and discussed further in 
Chapter 7. 
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6.3.3 Barriers to interaction between flood professionals and residents' theories 
The following section will explain flood professionals' understandings of why 
residents continue to support their own theories and do not adopt or support 
alternatives. Flood professionals focused on restrictions imposed or inherent within 
their roles and organisations as to the cause of ineffective engagement with residents. 
Ineffective, in the case of flood professionals, would have entailed residents not being 
aware of, and supporting the claims made by the flood professionals. It will also be 
illustrated from flood professionals' accounts and the accounts of other parties that the 
knowledge, training or ability and motivation of flood professionals could also 
undermine effective communication with residents. 
First, flood professionals' comments regarding the way in which their role prevented 
effective engagement with residents will be considered. The flood professionals 
associated with the Environment Agency proposed that the lack of resources available 
in their role restricted their ability to interact with residents. They were in part 
sympathetic to this situation as they explained that the imperative to engage with 
residents was a new and still evolving change within their organisation. The 
Environment Agency flood professional for Robertsbridge commented on the 
demands of interaction with residents: 
R: I suppose to a certain extent if, if we recognised that the public interface 
was actually part of the job and that it takes up a lot of time and its quite 
stressful on the individual... 
... I was talking to his assistant and 
literally dealing with one very active flood 
victim in one town had driven him to have time off with stress because he's 
been getting letters every single day, it's not so bad when you've got a team of 
33 around you that you can say you need to answer to this letter or you deal 
with this individual, [Enviromnent Agency Fp. Ro22,78] 
He contended that the amount of time involved and the stress of continually 
responding to residents', often emotional, claims were not issues recognised by the 
organisation as part of the job. As a result, resources were not made available, and so 
impeded interaction with residents. What was also apparent in this and the next 
account was that the officials were reacting to rather than initiating interaction with 
residents. Also, it was not only residents who required a 'reaction' as a Waltham 
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Abbey official (who was in part associated with the Environment Agency) 
commented: 
R: The only problem we have with it is more of a capacity problem because if 
every week, for me I do one day a week on this project, if every week I come 
in there's 5,6 letters, replying to a resident, MP, Elliott Morley and a 
councillor then I reply to these people, by the end of the day I've replied to 
these letters but I haven't actually progressed the project any further, so I mean 
that's no excuse, but it's frustrating from that perspective... 
... But the 
irony is (if) they were better informed they wouldn't be writing to 
you, [District Council and Environinent Agency Fp. Wa26,109-110] 
This account illustrated the nature of the officials' workload, which was also alluded 
to in the first account. He indicated that the problem was not only reacting to the 
demands of residents, but also to the representatives of residents as well. This was 
described as difficult given that he was balancing a number of projects and was 
constrained by time. He made an interesting observation at the end of the account with 
the comment that most of this work could have been negated by better communication 
with the residents and other officials in the first instance. This implied that the 
communication more generally (outside responding to individual requests) was not 
very good. Again, the requirements of the residents were placed secondary to 
progressing the flood professionals' solution or project. Communication from outside 
the demands of the project potentially undermined that progress. In this way, 
interaction with the residents might not have been viewed as an integral part of the 
project. The Environment Agency flood professionals framed the barriers to 
engagement with residents in terms of resources within the organisation, and focused 
on reacting to residents' theories rather than a proactive communication with them. 
The flood professionals suggested that the role of interaction with residents was not 
given full recognition as part of their role by the organisation. An Envirom-nent 
Agency flood professional for Waltham Abbey also suggested that within an 
organisation, recognition of the importance of involving residents varied among flood 
professionals: 
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R: I would say in the Agency it's often seen as a pain to have to involve 
people... 
... It comes down to individuals, which is sad, [District council and 
Environment Agency Fp. Wa26,105 -106] 
As already illustrated in the previous accounts, the action of involving residents was 
not viewed in positive terins. He also commented that resident involvement could be 
dependent on the choice of the flood professional running the projects. This placed the 
control of whether resident voices were even heard in the hands of the flood 
professionals themselves. This control was already illustrated with the tactical 
management of involvement with residents' theories of cause. It has also been 
illustrated (Section 5.2.2) that the tactical management of information by the flood 
professionals was conducted in relation to the local councillors. 
This is not to say that flood professionals did not make attempts to interact with 
residents' theories directly and to communicate their own theories to residents. Even 
in the early days following the flood in Robertsbridge, attempts were made to engage 
with residents' knowledge and theories. A visit to the tidal control sluice gates of the 
river Rother was arranged for a group of residents in order to attempt to explain the 
tidal situation for Robertsbridge. Here, a physical demonstration of the requirement 
and presence of the sluice gate structure supported flood professionals' dismissal of 
residents' theories that the river was tidal or the gates could have been opened thereby 
causing the flooding. The fact that flood professionals thought it was necessary for 
residents to actually visit the site might have indicated the robustness of residents' 
theories but also the difficulty experienced by flood professionals in effectively 
communicating their theories to residents. 
There was the assertion by flood professionals that their inability to convey their 
knowledge framework to residents in a manner which residents could understand 
impeded residents adopting official theories as the cause. This was illustrated with the 
comments of a flood professional for Robertsbridge: 
R: I mean I think we did have a really good reason, you know we knew why 
most of the problems with flooding the rainfall event was just, was extreme 
and the catchment was extreme because its relatively steep so the water will 
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rise very quickly, and yet departs very quickly as well because it's the nature 
of the clay catchment, and so we had to explain the engineering principles and 
try and put those into ternis that people could get a grasp of and I think that's 
half, that was half of the battle. [Environnient Agency Fp. Ro22,16] 
The important issue for the flood professional was being able to communicate the 
supporting engineering knowledge or principles to the residents. It was implied that if 
this had been successfully achieved, it would advance acceptance among residents of 
the flood professionals' theory of cause and their solution. The complex nature, 
however, of those engineering principles has already been illustrated. This indicates 
that when, how and where such communication took place became an important issue. 
At the first public meeting, an attempt was made by the flood professional to interact 
with local theories: 
R: I mean when (1) did (a) presentation at the first public meeting there was a 
section in the presentation, misconceptions sections, this didn't happen, this 
didn't happen, that didn't happen, so we kind of knew some of the issues that 
were already coming ahead. 
1: So it was titled misconception? 
R: Yeah, yeah it was and people didn't believe us, but you know and we 
argued for hours [Environment Agency Fp. Ro22,48-50] 
This again might be viewed as another occasion when the flood professionals 
attempted to tactically manage residents' theories in favour of their own interpretation 
of the situation. The use of a pre-prepared chart titled 'misconceptions' in the first 
'angry' public meeting was found not to be fruitful even though they 'argued for 
hours'. Such a title and stance taken by the flood professionals could be viewed by 
residents as contesting rather than engaging with their strongly-held beliefs about the 
causes of the flooding. There was no attempt in the presence of the residents to 
understand their views, they had been assessed and dismissed even before the meeting 
had started. There was a clear illustration here that the background and training of 
many Environment Agency, and probably council, flood professionals was not geared 
towards this type of communication role. A combination of tactical engagement both 
outside and inside meetings perhaps culminated in keeping residents in check and 
minimising disruption to the project. But this may have also isolated residents from 
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that project contributing to the maintenance of their theories of cause and solution. 
The tactical management of information while in the short term advanced the flood 
professionals' scheme may also have had repercussions for the relationship residents 
had not only with the project but with the organisation itself One Robertsbridge 
resident explained her dissatisfaction with her interaction with the Environment 
Agency: 
R: The Environment Agency? Depends. Um, if you're talking about the people 
you meet face to face when they're coming round to check the water levels 
and all the rest of it, brilliant. lf you're talking about the people higher up, they 
treat you like you're morons and they promise things and don't do it. They 
don't answer a direct question, um... 
... You ask a question and they, they sort of try and fob you off with an answer 
without giving you the actual facts. [R. RolO, 82-84] 
This resident's dissatisfaction was based on her experience of the responses from 
different individuals within the organisation rather than the organisation as a whole. 
She characterised individuals based on their role within the organisation. While happy 
with those she regularly met 'face to face' it was the responses of those 'higher up' 
that she found less satisfactory. Taking into account that it was these later flood 
professionals that have been the subject of the present analysis, perhaps this was a 
result of the communication strategy that was employed. The tactical management of 
information appeared to be a double-edged sword. On the one hand it might have 
enabled a project to move swiftly forward, but on the other hand it could isolate 
residents from that project and weaken any basis for future interaction. 
6.4 Summary 
It has been illustrated in this chapter that for flood professionals different knowledge 
from that of the residents and local councillors informed a different attribution of 
cause and solution to the flooding. Such knowledge arose from the flood 
professionals' training, role and experience in flood defence. For residents, and to 
some extent local councillors, theories were informed by knowledge based on their 
local experience, a focus on their own properties and the context of past flood related 
issues in their locality. For flood professionals their theories were informed by 
knowledge based on their professional knowledge which focused their attention on the 
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whole affected locality, climatic events and the most recent severe flood. Flood 
professionals viewed their own theories as the true assessment of cause and others as 
being at the most contributory to it or at least completely irrelevant. 
Flood professionals' theories and decisions were not only informed by engineering 
knowledge but also by their economic and political context. It was indicated that this 
knowledge, experience of past schemes and the procedures already in place resulted in 
completely different theories of cause from those of residents. As a result of such 
procedures, flood professionals were, as well as focused on the engineering principles 
of a scheme, financially focused, working within the demands of feasibility studies 
that involved factors such as the cost benefit ratios and return periods. The flood 
professionals were illustrated as attempting to leverage those factors and their 
knowledge of procedures in favour of decisions to progress a scheme. In this respect, 
the role of flood professionals either within the Environment Agency or the council 
dictated the range of routes that could be pursued in an effort to obtain funding for a 
scheme. The influence of a wider political context of will, or need for a scheme was 
illustrated by comparing the progress between the two localities and supported by the 
accounts of flood professionals. The importance of this context in reducing procedural 
time by easing decisions made regarding projects was indicated. From the flood 
professionals' point of view this involved raising the profile of the locality with the 
help of local councillors, within national government, gaining the support of the flood 
committee and the tactical management of residents' concerns through meetings. 
Flood professionals were found tactically to manage residents' theories of cause in 
favour of progressing their solution. As a result, residents' theories were often 
dismissed as misconceptions, distractions or emotional folklore in comparison to flood 
professionals' 'true' theory that supported their solution. Flood professionals 
dismissed residents' theories with the use of technical studies and information 
privileged by their role. There were indications that it was the source of knowledge 
itself that provided credibility and status through the eyes of flood professionals. 
Through this process there were indications that both the flood professionals and 
residents used similar processes for the collection and testing of their supporting 
evidence for their theories. Although flood professionals attempted to understand 
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residents' concerns, flood professionals' knowledge and roles often meant that 
residents' theories were not interpreted in the same way as the residents had. This had 
the potential to create an impasse in communication between residents and flood 
professionals thereby undermining any work to build a constructive relationship 
between the groups. 
The decisions made about the degree of engagement with residents' theories was 
informed by the impact such interaction would have on the progress of a scheme and 
the maintenance of the flood professionals' credibility within the locality. Such 
decisions excluded residents from the details of why those decisions were made. 
Communication to local councillors was also found to be tactically managed by the 
flood professionals. Local councillors were informed of the reasons supporting flood 
professionals' decisions when local councillors' efforts were viewed by flood 
professionals as strategically preferential to the scheme. 
The theories supporting flood professionals' solutions were rarely mentioned in 
residents' accounts of cause and solution to the flooding and residents continued to 
support their own theories. This may have been due to the robust underpinning of 
residents' theories but was also likely to be due to the nature of the flood 
professionals' interaction with residents. Flood professionals suggested their efforts in 
communicating with residents were undermined by the restrictions of their roles, 
procedures and a lack of the Environment Agency's recognition of the resources 
required to undertake such interaction. The accounts of the flood professionals in part 
supported these observations indicating reactive rather than proactiVe interaction with 
residents. 
It was also suggested that there may have been a lack of training or ability among 
flood professionals to perform such an activity and indicated that the motivation to do 
so may vary among flood professionals. This was particularly the case where the 
interaction with residents may have been viewed as possibly creating problems for a 
project rather than helping to progress it. 
A possible result of tactical involvement with residents by flood professionals was a 
lack of ownership of flood mitigation proposals and perhaps an undennining of any 
relationship between the groups as a basis of future communication. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7.0 Discussion of Results 
The aim of this thesis was to gain an understanding of the definition and experience of 
flooding from the perspectives of flood-affected residents and officials who had a 
concern for flooding. In order to facilitate this in the previous three chapters an 
analysis of the accounts of affected residents set in comparison with those of officials 
has been provided. The officials were defined as local councillors and the flood 
professionals working for regional councils and the Environment Agency. From the 
analysis of these accounts, a picture of different social constructions of flooding has 
emerged. For the residents, their claims regarding the experience of flooding were 
explained; and for all of the groups, their ideas about the definition of the problem of 
flooding and their suggested solutions to it were explored. Adopting a social 
constructionist perspective facilitated investigation of how and why these definitions 
became established for each group. The importance and role of the knowledge 
particular to each group in informing their definitions of the problem of flooding was 
emphasised throughout. In addition, the analysis has illustrated that the nature of the 
interaction between the groups in terms of communication and negotiation, (or more 
specifically lack of negotiation) could play a major role in the maintenance of the 
theories supported by each group. 
In this chapter I will draw out the key findings from the preceding analysis and 
indicate their relationship and contribution to existing literature. The chapter will 
discuss how recognition of the importance of the concept of 'home' highlights the 
extent of disruption to residents' lives: purely focusing on the inundation of water into 
residents' houses would not capture this crucial dimension of the experience of 
flooding. Differences in the type, similarities in application and the status of 
knowledge and experience held by the residents, local councillors and flood 
professionals will be discussed. I will discuss how and to what extent flood 
professionals involved residents in their decisions regarding the causes and solutions 
to the flooding set in the context of a public participatory approach. 
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7.1 'Home'and evetyday life redefined byflooding 
All the residents in this research had experienced flooding of their houses, and for a 
few, this was not their first experience, but for all the residents flooding had disrupted 
their concept of 'home'. Benjamin and Stea (1995) suggest that 'home' is a concept 
that is difficult to clearly define and communicate and Dovey (1985: 34) that it is 'an 
intrinsically intangible phenomenon. ' In reviews of the literature on 'home', Mallett 
(2004) and Moore (2000), illustrate the extensive range of meanings associated with 
it. There is a distinction made between a house and a 'home' (Mallett, 2004) where 
'home' is associated with any or all of the following: place, space, feelings, practices 
and/or an active state of being in the world. Although understanding the concept of 
'home' was not the intentional focus of this, or past flooding research, the concept of 
'home' was found to encompass the experience of flooding revealed in the residents' 
accounts. 
In Chapter 2 it was explained how Hewitt (1983) introduced a wider social 
perspective to the understanding of the causes of disasters moving beyond a focus on 
a 'natural' disaster as primarily the product of geographical processes. It is not the 
occupation of a floodplain that makes flooding a hazard (Mitchell, 1990) but as 
suggested by Blaikie et al. (1994) a combination of the flooding and social 
vulnerability that contributes to the risk of disruption in peoples lives. How flood- 
affected residents constructed their experience of flooding informed an understanding 
of their vulnerability to the hazard of flooding. Although residents had different 
physical experiences of flooding dependent on the various characteristics of their 
location and the floodwater, there were common themes of social disruption running 
through their accounts embodied in their discussion of the concept of 'home'. 
My research revealed that the disaster of flooding constituted a prolonged disruption 
to residents' everyday lives. The damage caused and attempts by residents to renovate 
their houses were central to this disruption. Home, however, was more than just their 
house. With flooding came a sense of loss of 'home', and, in residents' attempts to re- 
establish 'home'. the 'home' became a metaphor for their everyday lives. This 
research adds to the literature by demonstrating that the continued risk of flooding 
resulted in a redefinition or transformation of individuals' concept of 'home'. The 
change was from the 'home' they perceived before the flood to a 'new' 'home' where 
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residents attempted to continue their everyday lives. Through understanding the 
meanings people associated with 'home' their vulnerability to the possible disruptions 
in their everyday lives with the loss of 'home' through flooding were highlighted. 
It was also illustrated in Chapter 2 that historically, disaster and hazard social research 
has focused on the social impact of the period of the hazard event itself. This is 
usually a short period before, during and after the occurrence of the hazard resulting in 
the disaster. The few exceptions that move beyond this temporal focus in flooding 
research are Erikson (1976), Tapsell et al. (1999), (follow-up studies to their earlier 
work) Tapsell (2000), Tapsell and Tunstall (2001) and Tapsell et al. (2003). In 
common with this thesis, these studies investigated the retrospective accounts of 
affected residents sometime after the flood event. The experience of flooding was 
revealed as prolonged, ongoing and encompasses more than the event or inundation of 
the water itself. In his investigation of the 1972 Buffalo Creek coal refuse dam 
collapse in West Virginia, Erikson (1976) demonstrates how the experience of 
flooding was long lasting. One and a half years later, almost all of his respondents still 
suffered from identifiable emotional disturbance. The residents in my research also 
expressed their continued distress some two years after the event or inundation of 
floodwater. Erikson (1976) explains his respondents' prolonged emotional disturbance 
with reference to the characteristics of the flood event and losses encountered at that 
time. The accounts of residents in my research however, supported by the research of 
Tapsell et al. (1999), Tapsell (2000), Tapsell and Tunstall (2001) and Tapsell, et al. 
(2003), illustrated that residents' negative experiences were also related to issues 
occurring well after the event. It is important to note that this was not predominantly a 
continued reference back to the inundation of floodwater into residents' houses nor 
the particular physical characteristics of the hazard itself. Rather it was directed at 
issues in relation to their struggle to regain their homes. In contrast to Erickson's 
(1976) research, his flood victims completely lost their homes and were relocated out 
of the area, which may account for this difference in the focus in accounts. Tapsell et 
al. (1999) describes flooding as a 'multi-strike' stressor, involving: the flood event 
itself, the disruption and problems of the recovery period, and the worry and anxiety 
about the risk of reoccurrence. The results presented in Chapter 4 illustrated these 
characteristics but also described how this process informed residents' anxiety 
through the disruption to their everyday lives (Green et al. 1985). 
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By investigating this disruption, my research corroborates and contributes to the 
literature on the concept of 'home'. For residents, re-establishing a sense of 'home' 
was viewed as a sign of, and route to, a return to an everyday life (Section 4.6). In her 
paper on 'home' and homelessness Dovey (1985) investigates the concept of 'home' 
in terms of an experiential phenomenon, a relationship between people and their 
environment. She suggests that 'home', in part, forms a spatial order or secure centre. 
While this might be defined by the symbolic and physical boundaries of the property, 
'home' can exist beyond them to include the surrounding locality, the town and 
landscape. Even within this extended space outside the physical boundaries of the 
house there is still an association with order. It is residents' personal experience of 
order (or everyday life) that is common in their construction of 'home'. 
7.1.1 A loss of order 
My research illustrated how a sudden and catastrophic change to the order in 
residents' lives was associated with a loss of the sense of 'home'. Dovey (1985) also 
acknowledges that the concept of 'home' is dynamic and the meanings associated 
with a sense of 'home' can change with time and vary across individuals. A series of 
social and spatial dialectics are introduced to help to facilitate an explanation of the 
changes in the meanings of 'home' that can occur. In essence she suggests a 
dichotomy between, within and outside the concept of 'home'. Within the concept, 
'home', in my research was a representation of, for example, a private, familiar and 
secure space; while outside was a less defined public, strange and dangerous space. 
For the flood-affected residents, the 'home' as a private, familiar and secure base for 
everyday life was challenged by the flood experience. Although the focus for the 
residents was their house, the loss in the order of everyday life also manifested itself 
outside the physical confines of their property. Examples of this were illustrated in 
accounts of disruption to work, leisure activities and family routines such as taking 
children to school. Although such activities lie outside the house, the loss of order is 
associated with, and lies within, residents" concept of 'home'. For residents, regaining 
'home' was a metaphor for regaining the order of their everyday lives. 
Within the physical boundaries of residents' properties, it was not only the flood event 
itself but also the challenges of renovation of the property that transformed 'home' 
into a place associated with disorder and distress. Fitchen (1989) investigated how 
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perceptions of environmental pollution are affected by attitudes towards the particular 
environment being polluted. He describes how the cultural meanings of 'home' are 
threatened by the invasion of hazards. In my research, those affected by flooding 
insisted that the experience was more than the inundation of clean water. The often 
polluted floodwater that entered a property transformed the 'home' into a disordered 
and dangerous space. Residents emphasised their anxiety about polluted water 
entering the sanctity Of their houses in their attempts to convey the 'true' character of 
flooding. They relied on a common understanding of a 'home' as a clean and ordered 
environment as a basis to communicate their horror of the experience. This experience 
was not limited directly to the hazard or inundation of floodwater but also involved 
insurance assessors and builders entering the house. This was required to instigate 
insurance claims, the process of the drying out of the house and its renovation. 
Residents also described the intrusion of others in tenns of an invasion. There was a 
transformation of 'home' from a private to a public space. Furthermore, with the 
widespread flooding of 2000, their 'home' became an even less private domain, being 
associated with a wider flooded community. Their 'homes' had now become an 
example of, and used by others to demonstrate, how the flooding had affected the 
locality and all localities nationally. Their 'homes' were now also an integral part of a 
local and national issue. A transformation had taken place in residents' concept of 
'home' from a private space or domain situated outside special attention, interest or 
comment of non-family members. The disruption of their 'home' had resulted in it 
becoming part of a wider discussion nationally about flooding. 
7.1.2 A longingfor 'home' 
It was in the context of the disruption of the flood experience that 'home' became the 
focus and metaphor for what had been lost. It is, as Olsson (1981: 126) suggests in his 
description of a yearning for 'home', that 'the lack' is when such relationships are 
expressed. Order was what the residents yearned to regain. Being away from 'home', 
Dovey (1985) suggests we have to be alert and adaptable, while at 'home' the stability 
of routine behaviour and experience allows relaxation. The majority of the 
interviewees voluntarily lived in temporary accommodation for between eight and 
fifteen months. My research illustrated how attempts were made to establish a 'home' 
in the temporary accommodation, but how this fell short of residents' expectations; 
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lives were described in terms of being 'on hold' and there was an expressed desire to 
return to their old houses. Such findings are echoed in the research of Khattak (2002) 
who investigated the disruption in the uniform meanings of 'home' for Afghan 
women refugees. The research is based in another culture, gender specific and at first 
sight deals with a more traumatic event than the voluntary move to temporary 
accommodation in the UK. Even so there were similarities between the experiences of 
displacement recounted by the refugees Khattak (2002) studied and those of flooded 
residents in the UK. One resident, for example, in my research apologetically likened 
her experience to how she would have imagined a refugee to feel. Those residents 
who decided to remain in their houses during renovation also reported similar feelings 
in terms of isolation and disruption. In this case the movement of neighbours out of 
the locality created the isolation, and the disruption was caused by living in 
ergonomically dysfunctional houses. 
For the refugees in Khattak's (2002) research their new houses are not felt to be a 
'home'. The refugees, in the case of the residents, also had constant thoughts of 
returning 'home' making them feel their 'present' was temporary and preventing them 
from coming to terms with it. The flood-affected residents commented that moving to 
temporary accommodation often resulted in a sense of dislocation from family 
members and hindered everyday interaction with their network of friends. This 
supports the suggestion by Dovey (1985) that the order associated with 'home' is 
sociocultural and is a representation of a patterning of behaviour and experience. She 
also suggests that this should enable 'home' to be transposed from place to place. In 
my research, however, the findings related to the residents who moved to temporary 
accommodation demonstrated the importance of the social place and locale as a 
context for the facilitation of order, a finding which supports Khattak's (2002) 
research. For Giddens, (1984) 'home' is a unit of interaction that is intrinsically both 
spatial and social. This is not to say that with time order and so 'home' would not 
have been established in a new context. Benjamin et al. (1995: 133) comment on the 
temporal aspects of 'home', 'a home cannot be produced at once; it has its time 
dimension and continuum, and it is a gradual product of the dweller's adaptation to 
the world. ' What was common to both Khattak's refugees and the flood-affected 
residents of this research was that there was always a yearning for, and a possibility of 
returning to their old locality. It was perhaps the apparent temporary nature of the 
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residents' situation that acted as a barrier to the redefinition of 'home' in a new 
context. 
It might be thought that residents were yearning for an idealised 'home', remembering 
mainly the positive aspects of their everyday lives before the flooding. The residents' 
accounts suggested, however, that the disruption of everyday life with the renovation 
of their houses was so severe that any improvement of order in their lives was perhaps 
the ideal and not an idealised memory of how life used to be before the flood. This 
was illustrated with residents' acceptance of the fact that they were experiencing 
difficulties in relationships, business and other aspects of their personal lives before 
the flood but they still yearned for the 'home' they had at that time. 
7.1.3 'Home' and personal possessions 
Even on return to, or starting to live in, renovated houses, there were barriers to the re- 
establishment of 'home'. Familiarity and attachment not only find 'emotional 
expression in places but also things' (Tuan, 1974: 99). The findings illustrated that the 
residents' personal possessions or mementoes held emotional as well as economic 
value. This is supported by the research of Erikson (1976) and Tapsell et al. (1999) 
where the loss of possessions is felt to be a link with the affected residents' past and 
future. Lave and Lave (1991) find that the public tends to focus on the largest, and 
most destructive, rather than the most recent flood. My research suggested (Section 
4.3) that it was not so much the magnitude of the flood but destructiveness in terms of 
loss of personal possessions combined with the disorder it caused in residents' lives, 
that was important. 
In both localities personal possessions were not only lost to the floodwater, some were 
also lost when residents had to put them into storage while they moved into and 
between temporary accommodation. When residents returned to their renovated 
properties the importance of possessions in re-establishing 'home' was illustrated 
(Section 4.4). Attempts to re-establish 'home' were also challenged by the loss of 
possessions even though they were sometimes replaced with new identical items. 
Residents explained that they would take time to get used to the 'new' home and that 
time was required for new emotional attachments to be formed. In terms of the spatial 
dialectics outlined by Dovey (1985) the possessions within a house have a bearing on 
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the re-establishment of order and a feeling of 'home'. Residents anticipated that with 
time their 'new' 'home' would change from the 'strange' to the 'familiar', or in other 
words, become redefined as their 'home'. 
7.1.4 The redefinition of 'home' 
For all residents, another aspect of order in the concept of 'home' that was not re- 
established following the flood, even with the renovation of their houses, was security. 
Having been flooded, their house was associated with a new risk and was not the safe 
haven it seemed prior to the flooding. There was a redefinition of 'home' by residents 
(in particular for residents who had experienced multiple flooding events in the same 
house) as 'a home that floods'. Residents did not accept this new insecurity but 
actively searched for a cause of, and solution to, the flooding. Although not the 
solution they sought, residents were all found to have adopted some form of 
behavioural or physical adaptation to the risk of further flooding. Such strategies 
ranged from paying particular attention to weather conditions and river levels to 
physically changing their houses. The risk, however, remained when it was not, for 
most residents, present before. The insecurity of flooding had now become part of 
residents' everyday lives or new order that redefined 'home'. Establishing a 'new' 
redefined 'home' acting as a metaphor for everyday life was perhaps necessary for 
residents to move their lives off 'hold' and forward. This idea is based on research 
(Charmaz, 1983; Williams, 1984; Bury, 1991; Carricaburu and Pierret, 1995; Harvey 
et al., 2000) in the sociology of health, which illustrates individuals' normalization of 
a health risk and the transformation of their biographies or identities in order to come 
to terms with their present and move their lives on. This concept might also be applied 
to residents' concept of 'home' with a redefinition required so that their lives could 
move on. In these terms, residents' everyday lives and their homes, are closely 
associated with their identity and feelings of order and security. 
In effect, residents did not return to the homes they had before the flood and as 
Khattak's (2002) research suggests the absence of 'home' may be a reason for their 
inability to deal with the present. Residents, (particularly the elderly) were adamant 
that they preferred to stay in a 'home' that might flood, rather than move to a new 
house where they would have to completely re-establish 'home' again. So redefining 
'home', in the absence of a solution to prevent the flooding, was perhaps the only 
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option that appeared to be available to residents. This was in the context that residents 
regarded any adaptive measures they put in place as insufficient to prevent flooding of 
their houses. Such measures were instigated to reduce damage in order to help to 
maintain or re-establish 'home' should flooding reoccur. 
Fried (1986: 333) defines 'home' as the 'core place of experience'. He further 
explains: 'it is the realm in which we live, from which we move out into the wider 
world and to which we return'. The disruption of 'home' as a metaphor for the 
disruption of everyday life was the main expression of residents' experience of 
flooding. Pursuit of an everyday life in the face of a persistent, new environmental 
challenge demanded, for residents, a resolution to that problem and necessitated their 
redefinition of 'home'. As Dovey (1985: 43) comments 'knowing that we have the 
power to remain in a place and change it permits us to act upon and build our dreams. ' 
The disruption experienced by residents in their everyday lives took the form of a 
sudden and prolonged disorder coupled with the pressures of attempting to maintain 
and regain order: sudden in its appearance and prolonged beyond the immediate 
hazard. In fact, it represents an ongoing disruption with the continued threat of further 
floods. The continued risk of flooding and associated insecurity reduced residents' 
power or control in their lives. The research of Tunstall et al. (1994 and 1997) focused 
on what attracts people to remain in a flood risk locality, but in addition to these 
issues, my research emphasised the apparent possible disorder to residents' lives 
incurred by relocation to another area. Living with the risk of flooding was preferable 
to the purposeful disruption of moving away from it to re-establish a new 'home'. 
Relocation would not only mean the loss of the stability of their current 'home' but 
also (particularly for those in Robertsbridge), the loss of the attractions associated 
with living close to a watercourse. Such attractions are part of family life and can be 
appreciated by their children (Tapsell et al., 2001; Tunstall et al., 2004). The redefined 
'home', that included various forms of adaptation, provided stability in residents' lives 
relative to moving house. This is best explained in Burton et al. (1993: 12 1) through 
the model of coping involving absorption, acceptance, reduction and relocation, 
outlined in Chapter 2. The category of relocation was not an acceptable option to 
these residents. 
A redefinition of 'home' does not necessarily mean that the risk of houses flooding 
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was reduced but it might make residents less vulnerable to the effects of flooding. The 
adaptations they adopted might, in the event of another flood, enable a faster and less 
disruptive re-establishment of everyday life. For flood-affected residents, the return to 
a sort of stability in their lives might be regarded by officials as fertile ground on 
which to encourage greater adaptations or resilience to a continuing hazard. 
Alternatively, residents' experience of disorder and new outlook in the form of a 
redefined 'home' might correspondingly also create inertia in the face of further 
changes in their lives with adoption of flood preparation strategies. This might appear 
as the complacency described by White (1964) to the future risk of flooding. For all of 
the residents, a sort of stability was achieved but to varying degrees. Even with 
provision in the 'new' home for the continued risk of flooding, memories of their 
flooding experience, meant that everyday life continued to be dominated by a life- 
restraining aura of foreboding with regard to future floods. 
This research has demonstrated that understanding the meanings associated with 
'home' can be used to provide insights into the disruptions that can and do occur in 
the everyday lives of people exposed to this hazard. Disruptions of this nature are 
prolonged well beyond the hazard event itself. White (1974), Wisner (1986) and 
Mitchell (1990) recognise that issues related to a hazard can be more spatially and 
temporally remote than immediately apparent. Uncovering meanings of 'home' could 
highlight vulnerability to certain hazards that are not at first obvious, widening the 
perspective out from the direct impact of the event itself This in turn can inform 
possible adaptive measures and their ability to reduce the disorder that might be 
encountered by those at risk. O'Brien et al. (2004), in relation to research conducted 
on possible social impacts of climate change, suggest that environmental vulnerability 
can be viewed in two ways: either as the 'end point' (net impact of a hazard) or, as 
they argue, the 'starting point' (current state on which the hazard acts). In these terms, 
my research has taken an end point analysis and has revealed the importance 'home' 
played as an aspect of vulnerability to flooding. As well as the instabilities, the 
stability and order that residents seem to have had before the flood could be viewed as 
a vulnerability that might not have been apparent before the disaster. 
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7.2 The roles of knowledge and experience in the attribution of cause 
The LJK's national flooding disaster in 2000 left the flood-affected residents of the 
two localities researched attempting to understand why they had endured this 
experience. As this was a repeated experience of flooding prior to October 2000 for 
some, attempts by these residents to understand and resolve the issues surrounding the 
flooding were already underway. Such an understanding for residents was pursued 
with a hope that a particular cause would be revealed that when addressed, would 
negate their personal risk of future flooding. For these residents, this would in turn 
remove their continued anxiety about a repetition of the experience. As I have 
proposed, removal of this risk was viewed by residents as a major step towards 
restoring the 'home' and everyday lives they believe they had in the localities before 
the experience. 
Residents' efforts to reveal a cause and solution to the flooding was not a separate 
issue but was intrinsic to their flood experience. It was undertaken in conjunction with 
their experience of refurbishing their houses and attempts to re-establish their homes. 
Through residents' efforts to understand, and within this evaluate the cause of the 
flooding, they were brought into contact with other official groups. These groups were 
also investigating the disaster and attempting to reduce the risk of further flooding on 
residents' behalf. Such interaction with these officials was also a new experience for 
most residents. This section will pull together and expand on the observations in 
Chapters 5 and 6 about how knowledge and experience inform residents' and 
officials' attribution of cause and shape their attempts to resolve the risk. I will 
highlight the heterogeneity of claims not only between, but also within, the groups of 
residents, local councillors and flood professionals. Spatial relevance informing 
residents' theories of cause will also be illustrated and discussed. Finally, although 
knowledge and experience may differ between the groups leading to quite different 
theories of cause, there are communalities in the application of that knowledge and 
experience. This indicates that experts' characterisation of residents' theories as 
irrational, in contrast to their own objectively-based views, is largely unfounded. 
7.2.1 Recognition of heterogeneity ofgroups 
Two key groups appeared in residents' accounts as playing a role in residents' 
attempts to establish a cause and solution. I categorised these as local councillors, who 
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adopted the role of representing their residents in pursuit of answers and solutions, 
and flood professionals, who worked for the councils or the Environment Agency and 
were charged with assessing and developing flood mitigation schemes. Interviews 
with representatives of these groups and the subsequent analysis of their accounts 
(Chapters 5 and 6) revealed that within these categories there was a consistency in 
their constructions of the cause and solution to the flooding. 
A paper by Garvin (2001) on the 'epistemological distances between scientists, policy 
makers, and the public' suggests that the categorisation of the public and experts into 
groups can make artificial distinctions, masking important points of heterogeneity 
within the categories. In Chapter 4 common themes of residents' experience were 
identified and illustrated but the specific details that made up those experiences were 
found to vary between the individual residents involved. Such differences resulted 
from, in part, the physical characteristics of their properties and of the flooding in 
their localities. In Section 5.1 it was illustrated that within the localities residents 
supported different but mainly single theories of cause of the flooding while aware of 
a number of different theories that other residents supported in. the locality. Why 
residents support different theories was explained by differences in their personal 
experience of the flooding and how locally-derived knowledge informed those 
experiences. In Section 5.2.3 local councillors were found to sometimes support but 
also contest official theories of the flooding depending on their experiences of living 
locally. Even within local councils, different councillors had different constructions of 
cause (climatic cause versus a lack of economic investment in defences) dependent in 
part upon their particular interests and the background or professional knowledge they 
brought with them to their role as councillors. Finally the third group, flood 
professionals in Chapter 6, constructed cause dependent, in part, upon flood 
professionals' affiliation to either the council or Environment Agency. This in turn 
informed their ability to pursue different routes to gain funding for a proposed 
mitigation scheme. The procedural routes they could adopt, I suggested, could restrict 
the issues focused upon by this group in support of a scheme. Fordharn (1998) 
emphasises the practical importance of being aware of socio-economic heterogeneity 
within groupings in relation to flood mitigation, which often attempts to build public 
consensus. She suggests that overlooking the 'non-homogeneous' nature of 
communities can lead to conflict by highlighting the uneven distribution of costs and 
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benefits of such schemes. Equally my research illustrated the non-homogeneous 
nature of residents but in relation to causes and solutions and in addition within 
, groups representing or working on 
behalf of communities or residents. 
The heterogeneity that exists within groupings in terms of the creation and use of 
knowledge should always be kept in mind (Garvin, 2001) but by applying the 
categorisation in Chapters 5 and 6, important commonalties were exposed both within 
and across the groups. Across the three groups (residents, local councillors and flood 
professionals), the importance of experience, knowledge, and role-informing theories 
of the attribution of cause could be drawn out. For residents, their role involved 
attempting to re-establish their everyday lives through a resolution to future risk. The 
role of local councillors involved representing the residents while undertaking their 
other responsibilities as councillors. The role of flood professionals was to provide an 
effective flood mitigation scheme within certain financial constraints. It was found 
that commonalties of the experience, knowledge and role within the groups informed 
distinctive and different attributions of cause between the groups. Such observations 
support and develop ideas found in previous research on flooding in relation to 
Environment Agency engineers and residents (Fordham, 1998). They also support 
wider sociological literature on the importance of knowledge and experience in the 
attribution qf cause (Irwin, 1995; Wynne, 1996; Brown, 1997). 
A new dimension to the flooding literature was presented in my research in Section 
5.2 with the inclusion of local councillors as a group. Local councilors relied less on 
their own experience to shape their theories of cause and solution than residents and 
flood professionals. However, it was illustrated that, by virtue of living locally, local 
councillors constructed their own theories in line with the residents or based them on 
knowledge and experience gained from their role. They made decisions about which 
of the theories presented by residents and flood professionals they would champion, 
from the point of view of best advancing a flood mitigation scheme in their locality. 
7.2.2 Relevance through proximity contributing to residents' theories of cause 
A key distinction was illustrated between residents' focus (Section 5.1) on the 
flooding of their own houses and flood professionals' concern (Chapter 6) with the 
locality as a whole. Residents' concern for the flooding of their own houses 
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introduced a spatial dimension related to the experience and relevance of knowledge 
supporting residents' theories. Similar observations of attribution of cause in research 
conducted on other hazards in the research of Bickerstaff and Walker (2001) also 
illustrate a spatial dimension in terms of sites of risk. Their investigation of the public 
understandings of air pollution revealed the importance of local setting and experience 
on public awareness and concern for the source of a pollutant. Public residential 
proximity to the source of a pollutant was found to influence the degree of awareness 
and concern. Those residing closer to the source showed increased awareness and 
concern. This was explained by Bickerstaff and Walker (2001) in terms of increased 
relevance of the source in people's lives. The same was true in my research regarding 
residents' awareness and concern for some sites having played an important role in the 
flooding of their houses. Although residents were aware of other local theories of 
cause, they were found mainly to support one theory above the others - the one most 
credible in relation to the flooding of their house. 
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To visually illustrate the issue of proximity Figures I and 2 (on previous page) are 
schematic diagrams of each of the localities. Key roads are represented as black lines, 
key watercourses as blue lines and respondents' houses as brackets. The schematics 
are inaccurate in terms of scale but illustrate the orientation to the sources of cause 
that appear in residents' theories relative to the houses. Although residents were aware 
of multiple theories, they tended to support just one, which is represented by the letter 
inside each set of brackets. This was not always the case, as it will be noticed that in 
each locality one respondent expressed support for two theories equally. In 
Robertsbridge one respondent was represented as a question mark as he was not asked 
what theories he supported. Both schematics visually represent my observations made 
in Section 5.1.4 of how multiple sites and theories of cause were supported in each 
locality. A patchwork pattern indicated a relationship between the proximity of 
residents' houses to a particular source and the main theory they supported. 
Although proximity may initially appear to explain why residents supported certain 
theories above others, this in part ignores the importance of experience and knowledge 
informing those theories. Certainly proximity may give the opportunity for 
observational experience thereby encouraging a connection between the source and 
residents' houses. Such direct observations of air pollution were not possible for 
residents in Bickerstaff and Walker's (2001) research and it is suggested that residents 
relied on intuition and signs. In my research some residents could observe the passage 
of the water into their houses from a local source. Similar situations were, however, 
apparent with the findings on air pollution where flood-affected residents relied more 
on knowledge gained from living in the area to imbue certain sips or characteristics 
of the floodwater with importance. In these cases the source attributed to the cause 
was either in close proximity to residents' houses or in a location that made it relevant 
to their theory . This was 
informed by historic concerns for certain structures (bypass, 
M25, reservoir, Sainsbury's hanger) in relation to possible flooding. It is also however 
illustrated in both Figures I and 2 how proximity to a source does not always dictate 
the main theory of cause as in some cases neighbouring residents supported different 
theories. In Robertsbridge one resident in the path of the possible reservoir water 
release did not support this theory although his neighbours did. In Waltham Abbey 
without observation of the floodwater emanating from the area of a bridge or the 
experience of sewage in their houses residents living just yards away in the next street 
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turned to other experience and knowledge gained from living locally. Rather than just 
proximity it was the interplay of observational experience and the importance of those 
observations or signs informed by local knowledge that shaped the residents' 
definitions. Goodwin (1994) describes the importance of knowledge infori-ning signs 
of attribution in relation to experts. My research illustrates how knowledge can inform 
which signs are attended to among both experts and the public. 
While for the purposes of analysis, it was useful to make a distinction between 
experience and knowledge in an attempt to understand how residents' theories had 
emerged, it was perhaps not so clear in residents' accounts at what point experience 
translated into knowledge. Waltham Abbey residents' observation of the passage of 
the water from an overflowing bridge into their houses was, for respondents, a 
repeated experience with similar flooding having occurred in 1987. So, the previous 
experience could have been viewed as knowledge and the more recent experience 
having confirmed knowledge already held by those residents. In addidition, residents 
acquired experience or knowledge and the point at which they acted on each other was 
not clarified by residents' accounts. For instance, knowledge that the Robertsbridge 
reservoir may have released water could have been gained after the experience of the 
inundation of floodwater. In such a case, retrospective knowledge of the possibility of 
water being released could have increased the significance of certain observations of 
the characteristics of the floodwater. Those characteristics might have remained 
insignificant without that knowledge. 
Alternatively residents may have been aware of historic concerns and been concerned 
about the possibility or risk of the reservoir relea sing water well before the flooding 
occurred. This, ' 
in turn, could have emphasised particular characteristics of the 
floodwater at the time of the flood. What is clear is that when knowledge and 
experience come together, residents' theories are formed. If and why theories are 
supported by residents as their main construction of cause was dependant upon the 
relevance of that knowledge in relation to their own properties and also various 
rhetorical issues, which will be discussed in Section 8.1. 
7.2.3 The status of lay and expert knowledge 
The status of locally-derived knowledge was illustrated as not only based on 
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knowledge surrounding the flood experience and historic issues in the localities, but 
also as being closely associated with living in the locality. Stocker (1995: 549) 
suggests that lay knowledge 'is generally based on experience, practice and detailed 
observation over long periods of time'. Observational experience contributed to 
knowledge of the localities for long-term residents with not only the physical changes 
observed in their areas but also behavioural changes such as watercourse maintenance 
practice. It was the personal nature of these observations and residents' long 
connections with the locality that gave the knowledge a special status for those living 
in the area, for both residents and local councillors. This status was derived not only 
from the length of association with the area but, in the case of a rhyme in 
Robertsbridge, (Section 5.1.2) the form in which the knowledge was presented. On the 
other hand, it was also illustrated how longevity without repetition of events that serve 
to refresh local knowledge also resulted in potential physical and/or behavioural 
changes being ignored by residents (Section 5.1.4). 
Local knowledge of flooding could be undermined and contested by residents if not 
judged by them to have been relevant to their particular theory, experience or 
reaffirmed over time. It was the personal and local associations with the area, tested 
over time, that imbued such knowledge, and theories they support, with a special 
status and robustness for residents. 
In comparison, the knowledge used by flood professionals was based on the formal 
knowledge and training of civil engineering (Sewell, 1974; Fordham, 1998) and the 
experience of flood defence (Section 6.2). Supported by research of Fordham (1998), 
in relation to Enviromnent Agency engineers, my research also illustrated similar 
characteristics for the flood professionals who worked for the councils. The 
experience and knowledge held by them was found to be quite distinct from that of 
residents. Flood professionals' different focus in the assessment of the problem 
informed by different knowledge and concerns resulted in a completely different 
attribution of cause from that of residents. The concerns of flood professionals were 
found to have been not only involved with the engineering issues of developing a 
flood mitigation scheme (Fordham, 1998), but also the economic and political issues 
regarding the progression of a scheme. 
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Institutionalised formal processes described by feasibility studies informed flood 
professionals' assessment of the problem. These involved probabilistic and economic 
indicators of risk such as the return period and cost benefit analysis. Rayner (2003) 
discusses the use of scientific measures in government decision making and sees an 
over reliance by officials on measures such as the cost benefit ratio that reduce 
problems down to a single metric. For Rayner (2003: 167) 'technical analysis mostly 
provides cover for the implicit exercise of judgement. ' The measure itself, as in the 
case of the cost benefit ratio, can be blamed for decisions avoiding a more discursive 
interaction between the parties. 
7.2.4 Scientific approach and negotiated decisions 
Research conducted on lay understanding of risk (exemplified by Wynne, 1993; h-wing 
1995; Irwin and Wynne, 1996; Wynne, 1996; Brown, 1997; Yearly, 2000; Fischer, 
2000) explores lay and expert attributions. Supporting this body of work, my research 
has illustrated the negotiated nature of decisions made within the formal 'scientific' 
approach. The approach is scientific in the sense that it was unified, rule based, and 
systematically employed in order to test observations. Framed within a positivist 
perspective of numerical interpretations of the environment, couched in the 
terminology of expertise, the flood professionals' attribution of cause was presented to 
residents and local councillors as an objective and rational assessment. Flood 
professionals assessed the risk of flooding on the basis of probabilities and 
communicated with residents in terms of statistics (return periods) and numbers 
(rainfall and cost benefit ratios). These forms of communication were themselves used 
by the flood professionals 'as metaphors for facts and certainty' (Garvin, 2001: 447) 
supporting their decisions. Residents' and local councillors also interpreted them as 
such. 
Flood professionals' accounts revealed the negotiation and political leveraging that 
was undertaken to enable progression of a scheme. This was an aspect of flood 
professionals' work that was not revealed to the public (Latour and Woolgar, 1979) 
and the scientific grounding of the processes flood professionals' employ maintained 
the objective appearance of their decisions. A unified approach was adopted by flood 
professionals in both localities focusing on signs for the whole locality that included 
the climate or storm severity, characteristics of the land (topography, geology, type) 
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and the watercourse (type, flow). This undoubtedly contributed to a degree of 
consistency in flood professionals' accounts of cause. 
Flood professionals' expert experience, association with their institutions and also 
their commissioned studies conducted by named companies' supported their evidence 
for attribution. These issues imbued flood professionals' knowledge with the 
institutional status of objective and rational 'true knowledge' (Fay, 1995). Flood 
professionals' accounts, however, illustrated that throughout the feasibility studies, the 
resultant measures could be leveraged and interpreted in favour of a particular 
decision. This was a different picture to that of the clinically 'scientific' objective 
reasons for a decision portrayed to residents and local councillors, particularly if a 
decision was unpopular amongst residents and local councillors. In support of flood 
professionals, any leveraging was illustrated to be in favour of progressing a scheme 
for residents. Despite this, however, the evidence is not as clear-cut as the flood 
professionals often suggested. 
7.2.5 The credibility of lay knowledge among experts 
My research challenged the view of experts that 'the public has a tendency to react 
emotionally or viscerally to complexity and is often incapable of appreciating the 
uncertain nature of environmental issues' (Garvin, 2001: 445). There were similarities 
illustrated in the processes by which knowledge was utilised in the formation of 
theories by both the residents and the flood professionals. Brown (1997) describes a 
form of citizen science in lay-expert conflicts. In this case people undertake lay 'ways 
of knowing' about technical and environmental hazards. Brown defines this as 
C popular epidemiology' where in order to understand the processes involved in a 
disputed problem, the public gathers data, direct and marshal knowledge and 
resources. In describing the process of popular epidemiology, Brown (1997) identifies 
a systematic approach in lay ways of knowing. Similarly Irwin (1995) and Wynne 
(1996) present cases where lay experience and the marshalling of knowledge create 
lay theories that expose expert knowledge as falling short of adequately informing 
expert decisions. Fischer (2000) illustrates how citizen science is not so different to 
the formal science employed by experts. He suggests how both the objective stance of 
expert knowledge and the typecasting of lay knowledge as 'irrational' is undermined. 
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A systematic approach by residents in the construction and support of their theories of 
cause was suggested in my research (Section 5.1). Residents not only combined their 
experience and knowledge in order to construct their theories, but also tested them 
when the opportunity arose (Section 5.1.3). The residents equally employed what are 
deemed as positivist methods in order to support their theories with their own 
measurement techniques. This was illustrated with Robertsbridge residents observing 
the levels of the floodwater either side of the bypass (Section 5.1.1) or the effects of 
watercourse maintenance on the flow of the brook in Waltham Abbey (Section 5.1.3). 
Rather than the emotional and thus, possibly, irrational attribution of cause by 
residents that is sometimes implied by both the local councillors and flood 
professionals, there was a systematised effort on the part of residents to construct their 
theories. The 'emotional' aspect of the residents' theories could be found in the very 
personal nature of their experience and association with the area. It was this personal 
and sustained observation of an area that, for the residents, added weight to theories 
rather than undermining them. It was clear from residents' accounts that they viewed 
their experience and knowledge as equally objective and systematised as that of 
officials. 
It was also illustrated how prolonged experience and knowledge within a locality 
enabled residents to adopt a different and wider view of the flooding from that of the 
flood professionals. While the flood professionals were concerned with the wider 
locality, residents were concerned with the wider social effects of the flooding. The 
observations of residents reached beyond the causes of the flooding, to flooding as a 
cause of other disruptions in their and other residents' lives, for example to health. The 
idea that lay knowledge is narrow, irrational and emotional is undermined by this 
research: residents were observed to construct their theories in much the same way as 
the flood professionals. 
While the status of the knowledge supporting residents' theories was grounded in the 
personal nature of their origins, the status of flood professionals' knowledge was 
grounded in a scientific approach, which might have been viewed as distancing them 
from such emotional attachments. Flood professionals portrayed their decisions based 
on such an objective stance. It was illustrated how they became involved over time 
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with the localities and residents, and how their decisions were infonned by political 
considerations and came out in favour of the residents' situation. Flood professionals, 
perhaps, also appeared to distance themselves from the residents' situation in terms of 
how they involved residents in decisions and handled residents' concerns. These 
issues will be discussed in the next section. 
7.3 Consultation and thepursuit of a solution 
My research supports earlier research that suggests that residents view floods as man- 
made and controllable events (Lave and Lave, 1991; Rochford and Blocker,, 1991; 
McCarthy, 2000) and turn to 'the authorities' (in the current research represented by 
local councillors and flood professionals) to blame and seek a solution. My research 
illustrated how local councillors expected some residents to shoulder some 
responsibility for taking action (Section 5.2.4). The Environment Agency also looked 
to residents' to take action in their personal preparedness for flooding. Although it 
was suggested that residents did take action through personal adaptations in 
preparation for another flood, it was argued that this was in order to reduce disruption 
rather than to prevent it. 
While all the groups (not just residents) are searching for a quick and easily 
implemented solution, the residents' definition of the problem meant that the solutions 
they identified were concerned predominantly with working with systems 
(maintenance, drainage systems, building policy) that were already in place in the 
locality. The problem definition for residents was based on localised changes 
supported by observations of similar past flooding events. Flood professionals were, 
however, attempting to protect all the affected residents from a storin and conditions 
of a similar severity to that experienced in 2000. Given flood professionals' definition 
of the problem, whole new systems (dams, bunds, flow management) were required as 
a solution. In this way my research identified a gap between not only the residents and 
flood professionals' theories of cause, but also their proposed solutions. How and the 
extent to which the residents and flood professionals interacted, and perhaps should 
interact in the future, with regards to their proposed solutions will be discussed in this 
section. 
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7.3.1 Residents' ignorance offlood professionals' work 
Residents' accounts were predominantly focused on their own theories of the causes 
and solutions in relation to their houses and not the theories of the flood professionals 
(Section 5.1). Flood professionals were shown to focus on the theories of the residents 
as well as their own (Section 6.3). It is the absence of discussion in residents' accounts 
of the flood professionals' proposals that is of interest here. Even when asked 
specifically about possible official solutions, residents either expressed their lack of 
knowledge in Waltham Abbey or degrees of vague understanding of flood 
professionals' mitigation efforts in Robertsbridge. If residents did address flood 
professionals' solutions it was not to directly contest them but instead to treat the 
solutions with a 'wait and see' attitude to either their progress or efficacy. In Waltham 
Abbey, residents were largely unaware of flood professionals' continued efforts to 
resolve the situation in relation to the 2000 flooding. Some residents knew of the 
feasibility study conducted in relation to the 1987 flooding but not in any great detail. 
Reasons for residents' apparent ignorance of flood professionals' solutions will be 
explored here. They will be discussed in relation to rhetorical issues in Section 8.1. 
Flood professionals and local councillors expressed frustration at the preoccupation of 
residents with their own theories and residents' limited knowledge of experts' 
solutions. In Waltham Abbey, this lack of resident awareness and interest in flood 
professionals' work might have been attributed to the absence of communication from 
flood professionals (and to some extent local councillors) to residents with regard to 
progress in developing a solution. A tactical decision was taken by the flood 
professionals not to communicate with residents, as they were concerned that there 
was nothing to say while feasibility studies for their proposed solution were still being 
undertaken. This decision was supported by the assumption that providing information 
would unrealistically raise residents' expectations. An assumption was made by the 
flood professionals about the ability of residents to understand the purpose of 
feasibility studies. In Robertsbridge, it was shown that flood professionals regarded 
that the inclusion of residents' views as creating additional work and pressures in 
progressing a project. This may have also played a role in flood professionals' 
decision in Waltham Abbey. In these ways, decisions by flood professionals not to 
communicate their progress to residents may have also been based on flood 
professionals attempting to maintain greater control of the process. 
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7.3.2 Inclusion of residents but tactical exclusion of their views 
in both localities, but particularly in Waltham Abbey, the tactical exclusion of 
residents from knowledge by the flood professionals acted as a double-edged sword. 
On the one hand it may not have reduced residents' expectations but on the other 
hand, it created an apparent lack of interest among residents in flood professionals' 
proposals. I use the word 'apparent' as residents' accounts showed a definite interest 
in resolving the problem. The exclusion from flood professionals' knowledge was also 
demonstrated among local councillors. One councillor in Waltham Abbey, who was 
acting on behalf of both the residents and flood professionals, complained of a lack of 
access to information (a cost benefit analysis) in order to understand how flood 
professionals arrived at their decisions (Section 5.2.2). Fischer (2000: 23) suggests a 
lack of access to 'knowledge hinders the possibility of active and meaningful 
involvement'. In Waltham Abbey, a lack of awareness and involvement in the flood 
professionals' proposed solution had contributed to residents (and also to some extent 
the local councillors) feeling a real sense of hopelessness and abandonment by the 
flood professionals. 
It is on the issue of residents' theories rather than the solutions of the flood 
professionals that conflict between the flood professionals and residents occurred. It 
was illustrated (Section 6.3.3) how the flood professionals viewed this conflict as a 
barrier to their own theories being accepted by residents and their solutions being 
progressed. It was the opinion of flood professionals that their solutions would negate 
residents' different theories of cause by protecting the whole locality: either 
defensively in Robertsbridge, with dams and bunds; or through water flow 
management in Waltham Abbey. By controlling or defending the flow of water into 
both localities, the issues of the overflowing bridge, poor watercourse maintenance 
and overflowing sewers may not occur. Issues of living in the floodplain and new 
development together with the bypass and reservoir would lie outside the proposed 
flood managed areas of both localities. 
Set against flood professionals' assertion that their solutions would solve residents' 
theories of cause, there were indications that residents' theories would not have 
simply disappeared with the implementation of flood professionals' solutions. They 
would have probably contributed to the continued support of residents' theories that 
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maintained mitigation measures were required to overcome their various theories of 
cause. The flood professionals viewed their work and the solutions that they 
generated, as being for the good of the public and so did not consider them to be 
contentious. As a result, the sceptical stance of the residents appeared irrational or 
6perverse' (Fordham, 1998: 29) to flood professionals and to some extent local 
councillors. (However, for the local councillors, a greater understanding of residents' 
motivations arising from their continual interaction with residents and personal 
experience of living in the locality may have tempered this view). 
Flood professionals canvassed the views of residents immediately after the flooding in 
both localities. They attempted to understand these views, and in some cases, to act 
upon them. Flood professionals in both localities made efforts to convey to residents 
their assessment of the cause and possible solutions. For several months after the 
flood, flood professionals in Robertsbridge continued to keep residents abreast of their 
progress. In Waltham Abbey, communication was mostly directed at the local 
councillors. It is not the efforts of the flood professionals to bring residents together to 
discuss the flooding that is questioned here, but the manner and goals that the flood 
professionals employed. The flood professionals and local councillors convened a 
series of local public meetings with residents in both localities soon after the flood. 
From the accounts of all the groups, the first meetings were described as 'angry 
meetings' and subsequent meetings were characterised by a decline in residents' 
attendance. This perhaps indicated that residents found the meetings of little use. Both 
flood professionals and local councillors believed that these meetings were useful in 
so far as they allowed residents to vent their anger and voice their opinions. The 
meetings were also viewed as a means of involving the residents (in a discussion 
about the flooding, its possible causes and solutions) in a type of public participation. 
7.3.3 The consultation a roach to residents' involvement 
It is beyond the focus of this discussion to provide a complete review of the various 
concepts and approaches that can be adopted in public participation. Instead I will 
discuss how flood professionals attempted to involve the residents in discussion about 
flood mitigation and decisions in the two localities. This will be described as a 
consultation approach as compared with a more participatory approach. Concepts of 
guardianship and deliberation inform debates about the degree of participation and 
192 
approaches that can be employed to involve the public K" in decisions with experts. 
Guardianship approaches assume that there is an unequal distribution of moral and 
technical capabilities amongst the public. From this position it is perhaps more 
appropriate to rely on the competence of a minority in decisions (Pellizzoni, 1999). If 
a democratic approach is to be adopted in decision making, the public needs to be 
involved. It is argued that in order for productive decisions to be made, the public has 
to be brought to the same level of knowledge and competence as the experts. This 
concept informs the public deficit model of communication. In this model the inability 
of experts to convey their ideas which form the basis of decisions, is undermined by 
public ignorance of the experts' area of knowledge - or in other words science. For 
Rayner (2003: 165) the public deficit model is still 'entrenched' in the practice of 
government agencies and for Fordham (1998) among Envirom-nent Agency engineers. 
Fischhoff (1995: 140) identified a developmental model of the stages within 
institutions in the communication of risk (Chapter 2). Stages ranged from 'getting the 
numbers right' through to 'making them (public) partners'. Flood professionals' 
theories were supported by knowledge couched in technical terminology informed by 
their professional training and experience. These aspects concerned Robertsbridge 
flood professionals who believed the technical nature of their supporting evidence was 
a key barrier and explanation for their failure to communicate their theories of cause 
and solution to the residents (Section 6.3.3). 
Fischhoff (1995) concludes that rather than adopting a staged approach to 
communication with the public, a more unilateral approach incorporating all the 
stages should be taken. In other words, a focus on only certain aspects of 
communication via a gradual, staged process should be avoided. The flood 
professionals recognised that there was a problem with the terminology they used in 
communicating with residents (eg. return periods and cost benefit ratios) but perhaps 
just this aspect of their communication distracted attention from wider issues that 
would have encouraged participatory practice. It is suggested by Goodwin (1994: 613) 
quoting Wittgenstein (1958) that 'If language is to be a means of communication there 
must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in 
judgments. ' It was perhaps not enough for flood professionals simply to communicate 
their formal knowledge to residents; rather the decisions and the rationale for those 
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decisions should have been made clear to all involved. 
In participatory practice, there should not only be an increase in the accessibility and 
comprehensibility of information to the public, but also the opportunity to influence 
decisions that are made (Pellizzoni, 1999). In public participation a two-way 
interaction between the public and decision makers is emphasised and included within 
this deliberation among the participants. Different approaches can be adopted in order 
to facilitate public participation so that decisions can be discussed and a decision can 
be made that is mutually agreed or at least one that everyone can tolerate (Abelson et 
al., 2003). The concept of deliberation, which encourages collective 'problem solving' 
discussions, and approaches that can be adopted, are assessed by Abelson et al. 
(2003). Deliberation allows 'individuals with different backgrounds, interests and 
values to listen, understand, potentially persuade and ultimately come to a more 
reasoned, informed and public-spirited decision' (Abelson et al., 2003: 241). Public 
participation and deliberation can be set against methods of public involvement that 
result in coercion, manipulation or deception. In my research, supported by the 
research of Fordham (1998), it appears that flood professionals' involvement of the 
public was not so much public participation in this sense, but consultation. In a 
consultation process, the public are asked for their views but they can be disregarded. 
Fordham (1998) describes how international legislation has supported and encouraged 
public consultation and participation in environmental decisions at a local level with 
the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 initiatives (UNEP 1993). Earlier, for European 
member states, public participation was set as a legal requirement through the 
European Community Directive 85/337/EEC, although some latitude was given for its 
interpretation and implementation. Fordham (1998) suggests that procedures 
introduced in the LJK to implement this directive in 1988 (Statutory Instrument 1217 
for land drainage improvement works proposals) involve the public only when options 
have been chosen and the public are left with little choice except to accept or reject it. 
Participatory processes fail if key decisions are made before stakeholders are brought 
together (Glicken, 2000). As illustrated in Section 6.3, flood professionals' decisions 
to involve residents were often taken for tactical reasons or were consultative in 
nature: or as one flood professional explained, it was a form of TR' (public relations). 
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Flood professionals attended residents' meetings with their own assessment of the 
problem and a proposed solution already in mind. In this way residents' theories that 
did not support the position taken by flood professionals were viewed as 
6misconceptions' or 'red herrings' and dismissed. It has already been discussed how 
and why the theories of both the flood professionals and residents possessed a special 
status for the holders of those theories. 'Difficulties arise when there is disagreement 
about what is relevant and what counts as evidence' (Rayner, 2003: 166). This was 
evident in both the localities with conflict arising over the residents' theories. 
By prior contact with local councillors and by attending the public meetings, the flood 
professionals became more aware of residents' theories. Some theories drew upon a 
history of dispute before the flood and it is here that the flood professionals were able 
to support their dismissal in the meetings with previously commissioned studies. For 
the flood professionals the authority or status of these studies was grounded in their 
scientific basis or 'idealised role as an illuminator of reality, a slayer of falsehoods, 
and a generator of truth' (Garvin, 2001: 447). Other residents' theories such as the 
Robertsbridge reservoir water release and the Waltham Abbey sewer required further 
investigation by the flood professionals which involved gaining data from the water 
authority. Other theories were tactically ignored (Robertsbridge bypass) to conserve 
limited project resources for the flood professionals' scheme. The Environment 
Agency flood professionals were shown to 'focus on the means to accomplish the 
ends' (Fordham, 1998: 32). This research illustrated that this was also true of flood 
professionals in the councils with the goals focused on the progression of their 
proposed schemes. 
Flood professionals (and to some extent local councillors) were aware of, but did not 
fully understand, some of the residents' theories from the residents' perspective 
(Section 5.2.4). Residents, local councillors and flood professionals alike described 
highly emotional and confrontational meetings. This was perhaps not surprising with 
conflict fuelled by flood professionals' dismissal of residents' knowledge and 
experience in the context of the physical and emotional disruption residents had 
recently endured. Meetings were usually held *in community halls with the residents 
facing the flood professionals and other officials at the front of the hall, sometimes on 
a stage. Interestingly, local councillors commented that they usually sat amongst the 
195 
residents, perhaps creating a spatial representation 6f the different positions adopted 
and emphasising the differences encountered in the meetings. Some flood 
professionals commented that this seating arrangement was designed to create a 
certain distance from the public and provided a feeling of greater personal safety when 
confronted with residents' anger. Some of residents' concerns (e. g. watercourse 
maintenance) were dismissed in meetings but later tactically utilised by flood 
professionals to conduct work in order to protect their own credibility as well as to 
reduce residents' anxiety (Section 6.3.2). Again this reinstatement or action by flood 
professionals served to support residents' theories and more importantly, mistrust of 
the organisation. All of these issues question the management and purpose for the 
involvement of residents rather than saying that the means for residents to contact 
officials were not evident. 
7.3.4 A wider perspective offlood professionals' role 
In relation to Environment Agency engineers, Fordham (1998) suggests an 
androcentric explanation embedded in the engineering profession for the lack of 
inclusion of residents' views in flood mitigation decisions. She writes (1998: 27) that 
it is the 'the preponderance of top-down, expert, masculine models of decision making 
that, while slowly changing, still find difficulty in relinquishing control and 
acknowledging different voices and values. ' My research supports literature in 
relation to environmental engineers (Sewell, 1974; Fordham, 1998) of how the context 
of training and procedures of their profession informed the attribution of cause and 
development of a mitigation scheme. However, flood professionals' role was broader 
than their professional engineering expertise that involved economic and political 
decisions that operated within the confines of their institutions' procedures. 
My research upholds Fordham's (1998) earlier observations that the public were 
involved in a form of consultation rather than proactive discussion or participation. 
This research provides a further example of participation serving to facilitate the 
agendas of flood professionals and local councilors. This confirms Kasperson's (1986) 
suggestion that officials' perception of the role of public participation is to correct 
misperception, educate the public, reduce conflict, increase legitimacy and ease 
implementation. 
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Easing implementation dominated the actions of the flood professionals, supported by 
the local councillors, in the form of a tactical involvement with residents' issues. As a 
result participation from the point of view of residents was to put their points forward 
only to have them dismissed, rather than a continuous proactive involvement in a 
possible solution. Flood professionals in both the Enviroriment Agency and the 
councils commented that gaining residents' involvement was a relatively new aspect 
of their work supporting Fordham's (1998) observation that change was occurring. 
Flood professionals' focus and the demands of their roles necessitate a preoccupation 
with progression of their own solution to the flooding. 
It was clear that involvement of the public was aimed at a tactical level of consultation 
rather than shared decisions and participation. Since the observations of Fordham 
(1998), this had not changed in the two case studies of my research. What was 
apparent from my research was the manner in which residents were involved could 
generate conflict, entrench residents' concerns and possibly further alienate flood 
professionals' work from the residents it was conducted for. In Robertsbridge, the 
mitigation scheme has now been built and in Waltham Abbey a mitigation solution 
has been proposed for funding, all with little involvement of the residents in decisions. 
The goals of the flood professionals have been achieved but this may have left a 
legacy of unresolved residents' concerns after a long period of conflict with the flood 
professionals. This could have implications for the relationship between flood 
professionals and residents should further issues arise concerning the mitigation 
schemes or if they fail to prevent flooding in the future. There may also be 
implications for the resolution of conflict situations with regard to other non-flood 
related issues involving the residents, Environment Agency and councils that might 
arise in those localities in the future. While the Environment Agency may operate on a 
project basis, categorised in terms of hazard types (flooding, air quality, waste etc), 
from the residents' perspective, their experience was concerned with the Environment 
Agency as an organisation. 
7.4 Summary 
The thesis has illustrated that flooding was an on-going and prolonged social 
disruption that played a major role in the everyday lives of all those involved. For 
residents, it was a disruption to 'home', which was more pertinent than the physical 
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property and a basis for their everyday lives. Adopting a perspective of a disruption to 
the concept of 'home' widened the research focus and the concept of the effects of the 
hazard both temporally and spatially that reaches beyond the inundation of water. 
Temporally, it concerns an ongoing disruption that involved residents' attempts to re- 
establish 'home' and resolve future risk. Spatially it covers the disruption that extends 
beyond the boundaries of a house to encompass all aspects of residents' lives. 
For the two official groups - flood professionals and local councillors, their concerns 
were with the management of, and mitigation against, that disruption. In the case of 
the local councillors in the two localities, they volunteered to take on an additional 
commitment to their constituents on top of their other responsibilities as councillors. 
The risk of flooding maintains the careers of flood professionals and they are also 
brought into close association with the residents and local councillors of the localities. 
The difference for the flood professionals was that their responsibilities lay beyond a 
specific locality and so their relationship with residents lasted only for as long as a 
scheme was evaluated and sometimes progressed. The residents and local councillors 
remained in the locality, which was associated with the experience of flooding and the 
risk that it might happen again. This thesis provided insights into how the knowledge 
and experience particular to a group informed the perspectives of residents, local 
councillors and flood professionals. I also suggested how the actions of flood 
professionals could create barriers to communicating ideas which serve to fuel conflict 
through misunderstanding or tactically ignoring the perspectives of the other groups. 
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CHAPTER 8 
8.0 Rhetorical issues and policy implications 
The following chapter is split into two sections. The first section takes a reflexive 
view of the rhetorical issues pertaining to respondents' accounts. Through this 
discussion I highlight the rhetorical context of respondents' accounts and support my 
representation of the flooding experience. This creates a firm basis for the second 
section where I make practical recommendations that can contribute to the 
management of flood prone and flood-affected localities. 
8.1 Rhetorical issues 
I have illustrated the way in which residents' accounts convey flooding as a highly 
emotional and disruptive experience over a two-year period (for some residents, with 
previous experience of flooding, even longer) and for both localities this is an on- 
going experience. Equally, the lives of local councillors and flood professionals, 
through association with their localities and the residents and through attempting to 
elevate the risk of flooding became practically and emotionally involved in the 
residents' situation. For all the groups, their lives were deeply intertwined with the 
flood experience. This section will take a reflexive view of possible ways in which 
rhetoric played a part in the groups' accounts. For the purposes of this discussion, 
rhetoric is taken to mean intentional and persuasive communication. This section will 
discuss why certain responses may or may not have been given in residents accounts 
looking beyond those explanations provided from the officials' perspectives. The 
rhetorical context within which the interviews were conducted will be discussed, 
including respondents' possible motivations for taking part in the research. Finally, I 
will argue in support of my representation of the flood experience in the two localities. 
8.1.1 Actions of others, resignation and social consequences 
The actions and issues that surrounded how the groups attempted to establish the 
authority of their claims and persuade through their construction of the experience of 
flooding has been extensively discussed. Adopting a social constructionist approach 
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gave useful insights into the rhetorical devices employed by the groups. Rhetoric, 
however, is not only present in communication that is explicitly intended to be 
persuasive and argumentative but also in the way the groups interact and arrive at an 
understanding (Billig, 1987). What has not been discussed so far is the rhetorical 
context within which the groups' claims interacted. 
All of the groups resisted their theories being undermined by employing defensive and 
offensive rhetoric (Potter, 1996). The ways in which groups used their supporting 
evidence for claims could be viewed as defensive rhetoric. Alternatively, attempts at 
offensive rhetoric could be viewed as the actions of flood professionals to undermine 
residents' theories. Certainly, residents' theories were often dismissed by flood 
professionals and local councillors before I could ask about them in interviews. In the 
case of residents, an offensive strategy that could have been employed was an 
intentional ignorance of flood professionals' theories. This strategy might have been 
employed particularly in Robertsbridge where a flood professionals' solution was far 
more developed than in Waltham Abbey. 
As illustrated, the flood professionals' ideas received little mention in residents' 
accounts. However, residents would have had some exposure to flood professionals' 
ideas in formal meetings and other informal interaction between the residents and 
officials. I have already suggested (section 7.3.3) that this may have been due to a lack 
of communication between officials and the residents regarding official progress in 
achieving a mitigation solution, but this, perhaps, oversimplifies the situation. 
Ignorance may be employed as a device by the public to deny expert views if the 
expertise of the public is not recognised (Garvin, 2001). It might be the case that 
residents I ignorance of flood professionals' theories was a rejection of the officials' 
knowledge and theories because it did not resonate with the residents (that is, it did 
not focus on their houses) and because the residents' expertise was not recognised by 
the experts (via local knowledge and experience). Put another way, it was not so much 
the 'scientific' basis of the flood professionals' theories that led to public rejection, 
but issues of a lack of trust, irrelevancy and the social consequences of adopting that 
perspective (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). 
First with reference to the issue of trust, residents did allow the local councillors in 
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both localities to represent their interests. Drawing from informal conversations with 
residents, an independent residents, flood action group was only formed for a short 
time in Robertsbridge. This action group was quickly superseded by the local 
councillors' work. Although public meetings were well attended by residents 
immediately after the flood, subsequent meetings were not. Local councillors' 
expressed frustration with the lack of interest that was shown by residents in attending 
those meetings, and also in participating in flood professionals' and local councillors' 
attempts to work on their behalf In addition to the issues related to how relevant 
residents viewed those meetings, this might have been due to the trust that residents 
held in the ability of local councillors. 
It has been suggested that trust can indirectly discourage participation (Laurian, 2004). 
This could have been the case if residents felt that their concerns were adequately 
being catered for by the local councillors. Laurian (2004) refers to this as public 
ignorance, or more aptly resignation. He suggests that to counter this public 
indifference, due to gained trust, the value and extent of involvement needs to be 
communicated to the public to encourage participation. A lack of trust was, however, 
evident between the Environment Agency and these two groups (residents and local 
councillors), or at least the motivation behind the actions of the Envirom-nent Agency 
was continually questioned by the residents and local councillors. 
Issues of relevance have already been discussed in relation to residents' lack of 
appreciation of the focus of flood professionals' theories on the whole locality and, on 
the other hand, flood professionals' appreciation of residents' theories focused on 
their own houses. Issues of differences in flood professionals' and residents' focus, 
experience and knowledge, or use of knowledge, have been highlighted. The issue of 
the social consequences implies a slightly different rhetorical perspective. From the 
residents' point of view, a possible social consequence of adopting the official 
solution might have meant that they committed themselves to a less certain outcome 
than their own solutions that were relevant to their houses. The official theory 
required funding (which was uncertain), and time (which was critical for residents not 
wanting a reoccurrence of the flood experience). It may also be the case that the flood 
professionals' construction of cause in the form of severe weather required major 
defensive works. This put a resolution to future risk of flooding outside the control of 
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the residents and would have introduced uncertainty for residents that the flood 
professionals' solution would be achieved. In the case of the residents' solutions, for 
example of reinstating better watercourse maintenance, they worked within current 
systems and may have been perceived by residents to require less investment and time 
to put into operation. Residents' ignorance of flood professionals' theories or lack of 
discussion in their accounts might have been a rhetorical strategy on the part of 
residents rather than purely a lack of awareness. Even if a rhetorical tool, it was 
fuelled by the actions or inaction of the flood professionals. 
8.1.2 Rhetorical issues surrounding the interviews 
Moving on now to the structure and form of respondents' accounts, the context of the 
interviews has to be examined. In Chapter 3 it was described how hand-delivered 
introductory letters were used to target specific households in order to recruit residents 
for this research in each of the localities. I then visited the houses the following day to 
assess the suitability of the householders, secure cooperation in the research and 
arrange a time for an interview in the following weeks. The introductory letter 
(Appendix: B) informed the residents of my interest in conducting the research in 
relation to a Ph. D. thesis associated with University of Surrey but also the 
Environment Agency. In Robertsbridge, it was found that the letter was sufficient for 
all the residents approached to agree to participate in the research. In Waltham Abbey, 
however, residents complained that they had already been approached and taken part 
in a number of research surveys over the years in relation to their experiences of 
flooding. Such surveys included social research by another Ph. D. student only a 
month before. In Waltham Abbey residents were reticent about taking part in yet 
another survey about their experiences. In response to their concerns I gave additional 
assurances to residents that the research would benefit them directly in terms of 
widely promoting their situation in relation to their locality to an official body. 
There are a number of issues here that may have imbued residents' accounts in both 
localities with a certain rhetorical emphasis. In both localities, residents would have 
wanted to present a vivid account of their experience to convey the disruption they 
had endured. This would have been helped, rather than hindered, by the period of time 
that had elapsed since the inundation of water: not hindered in the sense that residents' 
accounts were viewed as a portrayal of their experience, but in that a forensic 
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retrospective would invite criticism of the durability of their memories over time 
(Wells and Loftus, 1984). About half of the residents across both localities were asked 
to just describe their experiences of flooding while the rest of the residents were 
directed to give more detail regarding their pursuit of a resolution to the flooding. 
Without much further prompting residents launched into lengthy accounts that were 
rich, dramatic and largely uninterrupted by periods of reflection of what to say next 
(commented on in Section 4.1 and illustrated in Appendix: H). This perhaps indicates 
that residents had rehearsed or refined their accounts over a period of time. Over two 
years there would have been many opportunities for multiple renditions by residents 
of their experience to other residents, relatives, officials and in Waltham Abbey, 
researchers. Over this period there develops a 'story that works' (Potter 1996: 40). A 
story that worked for residents would have been one that conveyed the extent of the 
disruption in their lives and supported their theories of cause and solution. 
I have argued how relevance through experience, in which proximity played a role, 
could lead to residents supporting a single theory of cause above other theories that 
might be circulating in a locality. Relevance might also have been closely associated 
with residents' interest in effecting action. Rather than supporting a number of 
theories, residents might have felt that singling out and supporting one theory, the 
most relevant to them, would be more persuasive in gaining action. In terms of 
persuasive effect, although residents may not have been aware of it, there is evidence 
that accounts regarding envirom-nental hazards are more successful or able to attract 
attention and action if they involve a monocausal explanation (Stallings, 1995). 
Residents were aware of the connections of my research with the Envirom-nent 
Agency, an organisation. that could possibly take action on their behalf In this respect, 
respondents, realising that they would be taking part in an interview, would have 
collected their thoughts before that interview. Few residents had the time to take part 
in the interview when I made my first visit to their house and a time was arranged 
later that day or later in the week. 
The association of my research with the Environment Agency undoubtedly influenced 
the accounts of the residents: however a combination of the relationship I developed 
with respondents during the interview (lasting over an hour) and the consistency of 
residents' responses indicates that I would not have had a completely different 
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account without the official association. Consistency was found in terms of the 
accounts of residents' experiences both within and between localities and between 
residents supporting different theories of cause. It is the manner and refinement of 
residents' accounts in relation to the official connections of my research that may have 
informed them with a certain rhetorical emphasis. 
It is clear that respondents' accounts were developed over time and not just for the 
benefit of my interviews. They were refined in relation to conveying their experience 
and theories with other residents and officials. Furnham (1988: 20), in discussing 
differences between lay and scientific theories, refers to a model by Hewstone (1983) 
that suggests lay theories fulfill three main functions: [1] control, ('to achieve some 
control through understanding of cause and effects in the physical and social world'), 
[2] self-esteem ('to protect, validate and enhance feelings of personal worth and 
effectiveness') and [3] self-presentation ('to gain public approval and avoid 
embarrassment'). Issues of residents attempting to gain control of issues surrounding 
the flooding risk has been illustrated throughout, and this is closely related to issues of 
self-esteem. Some residents took action through investigation and viewed the 
experience of flooding as a challenge to be overcome. 
Constructing a theory of cause, as proposed (Section 7.1.4), may have redefined the 
risk as controllable, thus enabling residents to move their lives 'off hold'. As much as 
residents' self-esteem would have been closely associated with their everyday lives, 
theories of cause enabled residents to regain some aspects of order that had been lost 
in their lives with the flooding. In relation to self-presentation, the supporting 
evidence used by residents, while testing their theories with other residents and with 
officials, gave residents' theories a certain robustness that enabled them to present 
them with confidence in this research and to others. 
It is apparent that similar rhetorical issues could be attributed to the accounts of both 
the local councillors and flood professionals. They were also aware of the research 
connections with the Envirom-nent Agency through my introductory conversations 
with them. Again it was apparent, as with the residents' interviews, that the officials' 
accounts were refined and well thought out particularly in relation to residents' 
theories. There would have been numerous occasions for the flood professionals and 
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local councillors to test their theories and refine their accounts with colleagues and 
residents. Furnham's (1988) model of lay theory fulfillment might equally be applied 
to the theories of the experts (local councillors and flood professionals). 
Gaining a sense of 'control' would have been a key focus in flood professionals' 
accounts and for local councillors in their voluntary role of representing the interests 
of the residents. Flood professionals' and local councillors' job roles would have 
provided a vehicle to gain 'self-esteem' either through the adoption of flood 
professionals' theories of cause and progression of their solutions or through local 
councillors reasons for becoming councillors in the first place. Attaining the function 
of 'self-presentation' through their theories was important for both official groups, not 
only with regard to the residents, but also in relation to colleagues within their 
organisations in terms of their careers. 
Outside their organizations, officials would also have been conscious that they were 
representing their organisations to other groups (DEFRA, councils and Environment 
Agency) as well as myself Even so, both flood professionals and local councillors not 
only described their successes, but also their failures and personal mistakes. One flood 
professional in Robertsbridge commented that it was long enough after events for the 
sensitivities of his comments to be no longer an issue as the mitigation scheme was 
underway. He felt that some of the motivations behind decisions he described would 
have been the basis of conflict with residents and local councillors in the past. Such 
open comment was not always offered, particularly by flood professionals in the 
councils, who sometimes requested that certain comments would not be included for 
publication. They were instead used to inform my analytical judgements and 
interpretation. As found in the case of residents' interviews, there was a consistency of 
issues raised between the officials interviewed which corroborated residents' 
accounts. It was the consistency of accounts from all the respondents' different 
perspectives that I feel gives support to my interpretation of the research. 
8.1.3 In support of my representation 
This thesis has explored the meanings of the disruption of flooding to different 
groups. It was not the experience of the residents with disruption of the flood that was 
contested by officials but residents' experience and knowledge, and their 
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interpretation. My focus was on the way in which people constructed their experiences 
of flooding 'as factual, and how others undermine those constructions' (Potter, 1996: 
6). 1 have attempted to represent the theories of all of the groups without judging one 
group's interpretation to be more important, or merit more serious consideration, than 
that of another group. Judgements and criticisms were drawn from respondents' 
accounts and so in this way, I hope I have represented their views as they would have 
themselves. Even so, I recognise that certain ideas would have been brought to the 
analysis from research literature, leading to an emphasis on some 
respondents'opinions more than others. Without these decisions, however, 
information distracting from the key issues I wanted to address would have detracted 
r__ - 
from the main focus of the thesis. 
I am confident that my representation in terms of the portrayal of the social 
consequences of flooding in the two localities of my research is robust - robust, in a 
sense that there is a consistency that runs through my interpretation that is derived 
from respondents' accounts. Atkinson (1990) refers to Roland Barthes (1967) who 
suggests that all writing is 'style' and 'white writing' cannot exist. No description or 
text can 'picture' the world, nor can there be a complete literal description of the 
world. My reflection here on the rhetorical issues acknowledges this. But it is the 
consistency of the accounts of others and acceptance of my account, if sometimes 
muted, by those actors that supports my representation. 
Residents, local councillors and flood professionals' accounts were found to tie 
together and the accounts of flood professionals were not just presenting their 
successes but also their failures. Further support for my interpretation arrived from 
outside my research in discussions with uninvolved members of each of the groups at 
conferences, meetings, presentations to the Environment Agency and specific UK 
flood-related academic research findings. In particular my interpretation was informed 
by the interviews included in this research. But they were also informed by the 
represenatives of organisations interviews (Section 3.3), conversations outside the 
interviews while in the localities, attendance of local meetings and the comments that 
were withheld at the request of flood professionals and local councillors. Throughout 
the research process, my preconceived ideas were more often undermined than 
confirmed, necessitating a reorientation in the analysis. That pushed me into the 
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unfamiliar rather than maintaining a familiarity that may have left certain aspects of 
the analysis unquestioned. With the commitment I made to the residents and local 
councillors of Waltham Abbey in mind, I decided not to protect the anonymity of the 
localities but instead attempted to protect the identities of respondents. In this sense, 
the thesis is not only an academic, theoretical document, it has also enabled me to 
promote the plight of the residents within those localities, to the Environment Agency. 
8.2 Policy implications 
In this section I will make reference to the key issues that arise from my research and 
their possible policy implications. ' It should be noted that these recommendations are 
based on the circumstances in which residents found themselves both at the time of a 
national flood disaster and with particular relevance to the context of their localities. 
However, I am confident that the implications that I indicated can be applied to most 
situations in which residents find themselves having experienced flooding. 
The implications fall into two areas: those related to reducing disruption to residents' 
everyday lives as a consequence of flooding; and those related to including residents 
in flood mitigation decisions. It should be remembered that both of these areas 
contribute to residents' experience of flooding and the disruption to their everyday 
lives. Adopting this focus, I am mindful that the recommendations are directed for the 
attention of flood professionals rather than flood-affected residents or local 
councillors. I feel that this perspective would be more fruitful in gaining action with 
respect to the implications, as it is apparent from this research that flood professionals 
are both the coordinators of, and have the expertise to gain funding for, flood 
mitigation activities. 
8.2.1 Reducing residents' disruption 
1. Provision of a single source of locally specific advice that follows residents through 
the whole flood experience. 
The extent of the flood experience brought residents into contact with a large number 
11 am aware that during the period of production of this thesis the Environment Agency has instigated a 
number of initiatives and social research projects that address some of the issues raised. 
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of disparate parties including the Envirom-nent Agency, councils, insurance assessors 
and companies, specialist companies for cleaning and drying houses and builders for 
refurbishment. In most cases this was a new experience for residents. All of these 
groups could have a role to play in reducing, or increasing, the degree of disruption 
experienced by residents. Residents expressed feelings of dealing with the unknown 
and a loss of control while they attempted to renovate their houses and reinstate their 
everyday lives. In relation to this, any form of locally specific advice that follows 
residents all the way through this sequential process from cleaning to returning to their 
houses has the potential to reduce disruption. 
With a focus on the risk, the remit of the Environinent Agency falls outside most of 
the issues raised in residents' accounts of the flood experience. The Environment 
Agency is mainly concerned with flood management, warning and encouraging flood 
preparation. Preparation is currently focused on the inundation of floodwater into 
residents' houses but there may be a role in preparation far beyond this period. The 
Environment Agency is not responsible for the social welfare of affected residents 
after the floodwater has receded but there is the opportunity to coordinate advice to 
councils and other government departments in a position and with responsibility to 
give practical help (Tapsell and Tunstall, 2001). A single source of contact, or a 
contact that can direct residents to locally specific information and requests for help, 
would probably be more effective in reducing residents' confusion and anxiety at a 
time of great disruption. This might include advice on cleaning and what possessions 
have to be disposed of, how some possessions such as photographs can be saved, lists 
of approved cleaning, drying and building contractors (coordinated with the insurance 
companies) and help with finding local temporary accommodation (FHRC, 1996) and 
storage. 
Local rather than generic advice is emphasised here. Within this are very specific 
practical localised issues of actual help with cleaning, providing refreshments, 
telephones, help with maintaining dehumidifiers, security for houses and businesses, 
and any initiatives that help to maintain the everyday routines of residents, for 
example, school runs and community commitments. Those residents who remain in 
the locality during the refurbishment of their houses should not be forgotten, with 
provision of support to overcome the isolation they feel and practical difficulties such 
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as creating temporary kitchens in the usable parts of their houses. It is important to 
remember that residents will still be at risk after a flood, and help at this point of 
residents' experience may present an opportunity to gain organisational credibility and 
trust with residents. Credibility and trust may later help both in the interaction with 
residents in resolving future risk and also in encouraging further adaptive flood 
preparation practices among residents. 
2. Advice should be provided that includes both the extent and possible time period of 
the disruption residents might expect. 
Reducing the 'unknown' for residents who may be at risk before they experience 
major flooding in terms of the extent and the time involved may help to reduce 
residents' expectations and enable people to plan ahead. There was consistency in the 
issues that residents' experienced between the two localities. This information might 
impart a greater sense of control to residents thereby helping them, if not to reduce 
their anxiety, at least to better manage it more effectively. This would involve not so 
much conveying the personal experiences of past flood-affected residents, but perhaps 
provide a practical, chronological timeline throughout which the issues that should be 
considered are indicated. Such issues might include not only practical issues related to 
the process of re-establishing their houses, but other issues emphasised in this research 
related to maintaining and re-establishing 'home'. Literature will more likely be 
studied in detail at the time of an incident rather than in advance (Thrush, 2004). With 
this in mind, advice should not be overwhelming but perhaps staged either in the 
design of a document or via personal contact through local representatives. Being 
informed of the extent and time of the disruption would at least give residents the 
opportunity to plan ahead in the short and long term. 
3. Adopt an approach that recognises the social and emotional disruption to residents' 
lives as well as the physical and financial damage. 
The possible physiological health effects of flooding are well documented (Tunstall et 
al., 1988; Tapsell et al., 1999; 2001; 2002; 2003; Tapsell, 2000) and work is underway 
to acknowledge the official assessment of impact on localities (Environment Agency, 
2003). The accounts of residents clearly illustrated that the impact of flooding was not 
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just material and financial but predominantly social and emotional. Disruption was to 
residents' 'home' and their everyday lives, of which their house or property was just 
part. Residents often gauged the severity of past flooding in these social and 
emotional terms rather than physical terms (Green, 1985). Sensitivity to this in 
communication with residents could be as simple as the careful use of wording e. g.: 
'home' instead of 'house' or 'property'. At another level, a disruption to everyday life 
approach could be adopted. This widens the focus of experience beyond floodwater 
inundation of houses into areas of residents' lives over a longer period of time. As the 
central focus of communication, from the point of view of the residents who may have 
experience of flooding, this approach could impart a sense of the relevance of the 
information to them. It also has the potential of improving the credibility of the source 
of the information in terms of demonstrating an understanding of the situation that 
residents are (or, for at risk residents with no experience, could be) in. . 
4. Awareness of differences in residents' experience, local knowledge and social 
vulnerabilities within localitlies as well as socio-economic heterogeneity. 
The research illustrated the degree of heterogeneity that exists among residents (and 
local councillors) within localities, not only in the theories of cause they support 
(informed by experience and local knowledge) but also in residents' vulnerability to 
the experience. The disruption of flooding emphasised other disruptions and 
vulnerabilities unrelated to flooding that residents were experiencing in their lives. 
Vulnerabilities included issues of health, caring for others and financial issues that 
contributed to residents' ability to re-establish their homes. For those residents who 
had already experienced flooding there were indications that the preparations they had 
undertaken in response to the risk of future flooding were partly informed by their 
past experience and perceived ability to reduce loss (emotional and financial). This 
may be unrelated to the physical severity of the flooding in the locality or 
characteristics of the floodwater that entered their home. Awareness of this level and 
the nature of heterogeneity that exists between and within at risk localities can 
potentially improve communication with, and the preparation of plans for, residents. 
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possible standard for public involvement in flood mitigation decisions (Fordham, 
1998). 1, however, leave this open to discussion and will outline two basic opposing 
arguments. 
Set in the context of a consultation approach to public involvement are issues of time 
and the safety of the public. It should be noted that I do not argue here that the public 
is not sufficiently knowledgeable or capable to participate because I believe there is 
the more fundamental issue of the purpose of participation that needs to be clarified. 
Currently the process of achieving a flood mitigation scheme for a locality takes years 
rather than months. The process of involving resident deliberation in decisions would 
probably add to the current time frame throughout which the residents would be left 
unprotected. Hence the period of risk and lack of safety for residents would probably 
be extended. The level of involvement of residents in decisions might be to the extent 
that residents could reject a proposed scheme outright. This would again have public 
safety implications with the residents left unprotected for a significantly extended time 
as new proposals are devised. This argument, however, underestimates the ability of 
residents to appreciate the consequences of their decisions but could lead to a conflict 
with Environment Agency responsibilities of protecting the public. There are also 
more general issues that relate to public participation such as the number of residents 
who could be involved, whether those involved are representative of all the residents 
(flood-affected and unaffected) and the type and number of meetings (Abelson et al., 
2003). This calls in to question whether the participatory process is truly 
representative of the residents. 
The importance of a locality in residents' everyday lives was shown to infonn 
residents' decisions to endure the risk of further flooding and remain in an area to 
attempt to resolve that risk. In this, the importance of the residents' environment 
(social and physical) in their everyday lives was indicated. Taking a democratic rather 
than guardianship (Section 7.3) approach to flood mitigation decisions supports an 
inclusive decision-making process. The inclusion of residents' knowledge, experience 
and decisions may possibly strengthen the relationship between the organisation and 
the public. There are indications in the work of Tunstall et al. (1999) that residents 
value a scheme following its introduction irrespective of whether they gave it 
complete support beforehand. This may improve the safety and aesthetic aspects of an 
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agreed scheme (assuming the flood professionals' assessments are not infallible). In 
the longer term this may possibly save time in terms of conflict and dispute should 
there be problems with that scheme or some other non flood-related issues. Different 
criteria of influence in decisions might be set for different mitigation situations but 
communicating precisely what those criteria are to residents is what is important. 
3. Involving residents in flood management decisions would require promoting an 
attitudinal change among flood professionals with regard to the value of lay 
knowledge and input. 
It is noted by Cosgrove and Petts (1990: 11) that 'when practical decisions are needed 
open debate can rapidly yield place to authoritarian rule. In this respect the link 
between water management and power remains unbroken'. My research showed that 
flood professionals were in a powerful position, able to suggest and pursue their own 
assessments and mitigation proposals with the tactical inclusion of residents' views. In 
public view, the flood professionals supported their decisions with the status of their 
knowledge grounded in science and to the apparent exclusion of political influence. 
Flood professionals' accounts, however, illustrated how political issues did in fact 
inforin decisions. With respect to how they present their decisions to residents, the 
flood professionals followed the rational actor paradigm where knowledge is superior 
to politics in policy development. In the management and control of potential 
problems, flood professionals' decisions appeared to place trust in the ability of 
science. Their decisions informed by political issues did not go as far as the concept of 
(muddling through' (Lindblom, 1959). Here power can be viewed as more important 
than knowledge where knowledge is 'acquired, adapted and applied in a highly 
political context' (Garvin, 2001: 448). Flood professionals were not found to use 
knowledge purely for political ends acting only in self-interest. Arguably both 
knowledge and politics were acting equally (Torgerson, 1996) in flood professionals' 
decisions. With this perspective, knowledge within society must be taken into account 
and is a perspective that 'incorporates diversity of views and has a more participatory 
nature' (Garvin, 2001: 448). Flood professionals' knowledge, however, dominated the 
decisions that were taken with the tactical inclusion and dismissal of residents' 
knowledge. Moving away from a consultative approach to public involvement in 
decisions would also require a change among all flood professionals in attitude 
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towards the value of residents' knowledge and theories. 
4. The local knowledge, historic concerns and views of residents at the time should be 
documented to inform current and future interaction with residents in a locality. 
Residents formed their own theories of the causes of the flooding focused on their 
own houses. The solutions they favoured required the actions of others (council, 
Environment Agency and government). Such theories were grounded in local 
knowledge based on residents' personal and sometimes repeated experience of 
flooding, historical issues in the locality and knowledge closely associated with the 
locality. Throughout a locality, residents supported different theories of cause. It is 
clear that the collection and understanding of the historical background of any flood 
related issues would usefully inform those interacting with residents and should be 
sought. Prior investigation with residents (rather than third parties such as local 
councillors) may also help with a better understanding and with interaction. 
Understanding and demonstrating a respect for the personal nature of local knowledge 
in residents' lives can not but help build trust between the groups. This, however, all 
takes time and commitment to a locality and not just at the time of a flood or the 
duration of a flood scheme. It requires work during the dry period. This may not be 
achievable at all levels of an organisation but the introduction of a primary contact for 
a particular locality within the organisation or within the locality may develop such 
knowledge and relationships. 
5. Flood professionals need to be supported by the organisation with additional 
resources, including the skills required, for the level of involvement expected of 
residents. 
Should greater influence be given to residents in flood management decisions and 
involvement be promoted to those involved, it was indicated that such a change would 
need to be matched by a change in flood professionals' ability and resources to 
undertake the task. As a group, resource managers are identified as rarely possessing 
the skills necessary to implement effective participation (Sewell and O'Riordan, 1976; 
Fordham, 1998). It was illustrated in flood professionals' accounts that their actions, 
other than gathering residents together, did not encourage deliberation among 
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residents with the current consultative approach. Flood professionals supported this 
view commenting that including the public was a new and uncertain role in their 
positions either within the Environment Agency or the councils. The flood 
professionals argued that their organisations failed to recognize that their enhanced 
role required increased support in terms of resources and training. 
Perhaps the involvement of specialist practitioners in public participation and social 
research working closely with the flood professionals would resolve this issue. This 
would alleviate the additional burden on flood professionals' project commitments. 
On the other hand, by separating the roles may also lead to public involvement 
remaining a secondary consideration. It is when the purpose of participatory practice 
is not clearly communicated that problems can arise (Glicken, 2000). Additional 
resources would, not on their own, be enough to encourage residents to become, and 
remain involved without an agreement within organisations of what participation 
means in relation to the outcome of a project. The purpose of participation and the 
value of those decisions would have to be promoted to residents and local councillors. 
In addition, recognition and inclusion of participation within procedures would not 
perhaps guarantee that the approach would be adopted evenly across that organisation. 
As indicated in the accounts of flood professionals, individual flood professionals' 
views of participatory decision making and motivation towards undertaking it varies 
across organisations. 
6. Forms of resident involvement other than formal meetings should be investigated in 
terms of appropriateness for the level of involvement required by residents. 
Formal meetings are not the only way that members of the public involve themselves 
in participatory practices (Laurian, 2004). Smaller groups of residents were found to 
meet together and have meetings with individual officials. Residents wrote letters, 
telephoned officials and visited sites where there were concerns that the sites had 
contributed to the flooding. Flood professionals need to find appropriate means of 
involving affected residents dependent upon the goals and degree of involvement 
expected from residents. In the two localities, the role of local councillors as 
organising and representing residents' concerns was illustrated (Tapsell and Tunstall, 
2001). This relationship with residents may not occur in all flooded localities but 
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instead may depend on the status of the relationship that existed between residents and 
local councillors before the flooding. It was also apparent that representing the 
residents was a personal decision on the part of some local councillors within each 
council. This additional role had to be juggled with their other council responsibilities. 
As such, reliance on local councillors to assist mediation with residents will be 
dependent on the specific locality and councillors' abilities to undertake the role. 
Furthermore, local councillors will have their own personal perspectives on the 
flooding informed by their role as councillors. The Flood Defence Committees 
received no acknowledgement among the residents and little among the local 
councillors. As a body representing public interest and local democratic involvement 
in flood management decisions, their role and ongoing activities may need to be 
promoted more aggressively to the public. 
This research suggests that the inclusion of residents' Views by flood professionals is 
currently at a level of progressing flood professionals' projects. This can leave 
residents feeling alienated and. dissatisfied with the efforts of flood professionals. 
Without a change in flood professionals' approach, any efforts to better understand 
and record residents' perspectives may not result in greater involvement of residents 
in decisions. There is a risk that any such new initiatives will merely continue to 
support the current consultative manner of resident involvement that was shown to 
include discrediting and dismissing lay knowledge and theories. On the other hand, 
such activities, rather than an additional aspect of their project, could be viewed by 
flood professionals as an opportunity to infonn through discussion with residents. 
Building on the suggestions of Wachtendorf (2000) (Section 1.3.1) this alternative 
approach may have the advantage of building trust, easing communication with 
residents and contributing to the enhancement of flood management. 
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0 Appendix: A 
Sample Structure - Officials 
Number of respondents interviewed: 
Local Councillors Flood Professionals 
Council Enviromnent Agency 
Robertsbridge 2 1 1 
Waltham Abbey 2 1 1 (Also Council role) 
Informant Interviews 
Number of respondents interviewed: 
3x National Flood Warning Centre: 
Departments for Flood Warnings / Flood Defence / Social Research 
1x Association of British insurers 
1x National Flood Forum 
Ix Police: Association of Chief Police Officers 
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e Appendix: B 
Simon S. McCarthy 
Department of Sociology 
Tel: (Mobile) 0797 969 4813 
Tel: (Department) 01483 689365 
Email: s. mccarthy@surrey. ac. uk 
The Occupier 
Waltham Abbey 
EN9 *** 
1" August 2002 
Dear householder, 
I am a doctorate research student at the University of Surrey and conducting research 
into the social effects of flooding on communities in the UK. Much of the research 
into flooding in the past has focused on the physical damage on communities often 
neglecting the social effects. Hence this research will take a unique look at flooding. 
The research is partly funded by the Environment Agency and largely by an academic 
research fund. It is hoped that resultant publications will inform key government 
bodies on the social aspects of the impact of flooding. 
In consultatio 11 .n . vith your Ilocal Aggency Area (DIffice I air sending thd 
IL Ls 
introductory letter to a selected number of households in Waltham Abbey to inform 
you of my research. 
It is my intention that during August I will call at your house to see if you would like 
to participate in an interview. I will call during the daytime and early evening in case 
you are at work. If you are happy to participate then the interview can take place then 
or we can arrange a suitable day and time. Where two household members are 
available either one can participate but the interview will be just with that one person. 
It will involve an interview lasting no more than 45 minutes. It will take the form of a 
conversation about your experiences of flooding and its impact on you, your 
household and the community at large. Your identity and connection to your 
responses will be kept confidential. 
If you have any concerns or if you do not wish to participate my contact details are 
given above. Alternatively I will be visiting Waltham Abbey next week and we can 
discuss concerns or you can inform me when I visit. Otherwise you don't need to take 
any further action. 
I hope you will be able to participate and I hope to see you soon. 
Regards 
Simon McCarthy 
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Sample Structure - Residents 
Waltham Abbey 
Identity Approx. 
Age 
Years 
Gender Household Time in 
Property 
Years 
Prior 
Experience 
to 2000 
Flooding 
RWa6 40s Female Couple 5 None 
RWa7 50s Female Family 8 None 
RWa2 18 Female Family 10 None 
RWal 30s Female Family 4.5 None 
RWa9 70s Male Couple 46 Second 
RWa4 70s Male Couple 40 Multiple 
RWa5* 70s Female Sole 45 Second 
RWa8* 60s Female Couple 32 Second 
RWa3 92 Female Sole 37+ Multiple 
Robertsbridge 
Identity Approx. 
Age 
Years 
Gender Household Time in 
Property 
Years 
Prior 
Experience 
to 2000 
Flooding 
RRol6 50s Male Family 6.5 None 
RRol8 30s Female Family 4 None 
RRo20 40s Female Family 3 None 
RRol7 50s Male Family 2 None 
RRol5* 40s Female + Daughter 20+ Grounds 
RRol2 70s Female Sole 7 Grounds 
RRol9 70s Female Sole 8 Kitchen 
RRoll 40s Female Family Grounds 
RRol4 50s Male Family 12+ Multiple 
RRolO 50s Female Family 11 Multiple 
* Other family members present in the interview 
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Residents Interview Guide 
Introduction 
An idea of you and your fan-filies connection with X and the area and idea 
of your life and connects with X 
M how long you / family have lived here, 
M why moved here, 
0 attachment to the village / other relatives etc 
m work and leisure 
m lifestage 
0 use of the village and surrounding area 
The Experience 
Talk through your experience of flooding? 
e Before major event - experience / awareness here and nationally / 
action taken 
During - describe 
After - recovery and mitigation periods - current coping and 
involvement in group or individual action. 
Issues 
Awareness - How? 
Perceptions - Why? 
Frustrations / treatment 
Construction of future 
View of others unaffected and authorities and why 
How do you think officials view you and why 
Effects on community as a whole - positive and negative 
How see the future with regard to flooding 
Is the community stronger or divided into victims and non 
End 
Summary 
How would you explain what has happened to you to those who have 
never experienced it before - if only I knew what I know now. 
Anything to add? 
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Informants / Local Councillors/ Flood Professionals 
Interview Guide 
Introduction 
Describe your role in the organization? 
What responsibilities and goals your / organization? 
How long organization / position? 
Reýpondent perspective 
Origins and development of the organization 
What is the current strategy? 
Who are the main external organizations / groups have contact with: 
- personal 
-letters/reports/re search 
-informal 
Relationship with (incl. Their view) 
Adversarial or partnership 
- Victims - describe experience 
Flood action goups / 
Committees / NFF 
Levels of Council 
mps 
LVJLJL a 
Water Authorities 
Developers 
Insurance 
Emergency Services 
Rest of EA 
- DEFRA / Govemment 
- Famiing 
- Media 
Floating issues 
Means of contact with residents 
Improvements / Barriers 
Cause(s) of flooding - origin, increasing / decreasing in what ways 
Positioning 'You can't prevent it, you can prepare for it' - origin and 
opinion of positioning (new / relevant and credible) 
Future of flood management - improvements and barriers 
Changes in organisation to facilitate 
End 
Summary / Anything else? 
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Simon S. McCarthy 
Department of Sociology 
Tel: (Department) 01483 689365 
Email: s. mccarthy@surrey. ac. uk 
Thank you for taking part in this research interview. As I have already stated your 
comments made during the interview will not be connected with information that will 
enable a third party to identify you specifically. Your comments may be used 
anonymously to illustrate points in subsequent publications resulting from the 
research. 
It is hoped that this research on completion in October 2003 will influence decisions 
made by key government agencies with regard to flooding and its social effects. 
There is a chance, with your agreement, that I might recontact you in the next six 
months to clarify or expand on comments that you made. I can also send you a copy of 
a transcript of the interview once it has been typed up which you might like to make 
further conim. ents on. 
If you have any further thoughts that you feel might help in the research or questions 
regarding the research, I can be contacted, or a message can be left, via any of the 
contact details given above. 
Again thank you for your time and patience. 
Regards 
Simon McCarthy 
PhD Research Student, 
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Simon S. McCarthy 
Department of Sociology 
Tel: (Mobile) 0797 969 4813 
Tel: (Department) 01483 689365 
Email: s. mccarthy@surrey. ac. uk 
A. Smith 
Councillor 
** ** 2002 
Dear A., 
Again thank you for taking part in my research in September. I have enclosed a 
transcript of the interview we undertook. Also, as we agreed, I have also enclosed the 
materials you gave to me on the day which are proving very useful. 
Feel free to make further comments or clarify issues, which you made in the 
interview. If you would like to do this I have enclosed a postage free envelope or I can 
be contacted on my email address given above. 
My research does not stop with this interview and 1 would be interested if the situation 
in Robertsbridge changes. Also if there are any specific issues, events or presentations 
in relation to the flooding situation in Robertsbridge I would be interested to hear 
about them. 
Again I stress your comments made during the interview will not be connected with 
information that will enable a third party to identify you. Your comments may be used 
anoMqjjously to illustrate points in subsequent publications resulting from the 
research. 
I hope everything moves forward successfully for Robertsbridge. 
Best wishes 
Simon McCarthy 
Research Site: 
www. geocities. com/lobster35uk 
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Extract from an interview with a Robertsbridge resident 
21" June 2002 (R. Rol2). 
1: Interviewer 
R: Respondent (Elderly lady) 
(START at reference 26) 
1: So what happened? 
R: Well, yes, it had been gathering for some time and the river had flooded the 
meadow at the back, you can see the back later if you want to, um, but the river is 
really rather low down, it's about, I suppose 12 to 15 feet, so you've got to stand and 
look down, and of course it's all overgrown again now, but at the time I didn't worry 
too much about the river but at least three times during the run up to the October 2000 
the meadow became a huge pond, we used to have birds flying in all over the place, 
they loved it, and it went as far as the first bridge, along the road the A21, where you 
go up to meet the A21. As far as along there and to the cricket pavilion, and it was 
water as far as you could see, but it wasn't that deep and it didn't really worry us. 
Well we kept, we got, at the time, the environment agency phoned us up and told us 
there was a chance of flood and whenever there was a chance of a flood we got them 
and they phoned us up at every conceivable moment and they warned us and that was 
fine and you got used to it. It was in those days done in colours, yellow, and red, we 
never got a red, and so we felt secure with it. And then they changed it at the last 
moment, a couple of months or something like that before October, and then it all 
th 
went to pieces, in that week, it was a Thursday morning, 12 October, and we hadn't, 
I hadn't actually had any phone calls telling me that there was a flood warning, 
because usually the Rother floods up at Mayfield and we're lower than Mayfield, so 
of. course it comes rushing down to us and I hadn't had a warning so I felt reasonably 
safe. But apparently, according to my insurance company they'd been trying to get me 
in the evening before and with my daughter and I both being on the phone, and when 
they phoned we just happened to be on the phone so they didn't do any more, then 
about ten past one in the morning I got a phone call and it was exactly an ordinary 
warning, there was nothing special about it at all, it didn't make me feel that I was 
about to be flooded, there was no urgency, it was just the same, "tell you neighbours, 
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keep an eye out", and when we got up in the morning we did, we kept an eye out, had 
an early breakfast about eight o'clock and er, I looked in the garden, couldn't see 
anything, didn't go down, I said to my daughter I'll go up and have a look from the 
attic, because we've got an attic bedroom and it's very high up there, and I saw a little 
line just in front of the, about three feet in front of the bed down in that comer and I 
thought I wonder what that is, I wonder if that's anything, and I said to my daughter, 
keep an eye out won't you, because there is a little mark down there and I don't know 
what it is, and I didn't go down, I wasn't terribly worried because we hadn't heard 
from the environment agency and that means everything. So anyway, she suddenly 
said "Mum! It's coming up the garden! " And it was just like hot chocolate coming up 
the garden, rippling away like that, but it wasn't very deep, it was only about that 
deep, so I said, "Oh it won't come over. Just keep an eye on it while I do this job. 91) 
And we didn't get much in there, but then suddenly I was on the phone, and I'd got 
Chelsea boots on, and suddenly water started coming in and I looked down and I was 
standing in a pool of water and it had been coming in from the door silently while I 
was on the phone, I was standing in a pool of water. And then of course it started, it 
started from about two foot down on the opening side, and it gushed, literally gushed. 
And it was just like somebody turning the tap on, we had that noise all the time. And I 
said to Viv "Quick, come, let's get some stuff up! " So we did. We had about seven 
minutes to do it and we didn't get very much up because most of it's too heavy 
anyway for two women. We got the small things like small tables and those sort of 
things, television, video, anything that was on the floor, we did very well, and I went 
back upstairs and I said we've got to go and get the files, because all the files were in 
the bottom drawer, that was exactly there, so I came downstairs, I stepped off the 
bottom step, and it was over my boots, and this noise was still going on, I went to the 
drawer, I grabbed them all, picked them up and went upstairs. By that time it was up 
to my knees, and I went upstairs and I stayed there for the rest of the day. And we 
opened the bedroom window in the front, and we had the police coming up and 
talking to us, and they said they were just going round to see who's what and where, 
and we'll be back for you. And we saw them again at six o'clock at night and I 
remember standing up there on the top of the staircase, it was dark because we had no 
lights and he came to the door and he said "We've decided that we would like to take 
you out" and we had said we wouldn't be going out, but after all when there was five 
feet of water up to here... I said I don't think I could sleep up here with all that water 
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down because it is so damp. And we watched it go down and it started to go down at 
quarter past three and it was six stairs up. 
1: Was that in the morning or... 
R: Quarter to three in the afternoon. And it just went down one step, and then stopped. 
And that was incredible because we'd sort of had a bit of hope then, but of course by 
six o'clock it hadn't done anything else, and as I say the policeman came and he said 
"we would like to take you out and we think it's better for you because these are very 
old cottages and we don't really know what they're going to do", because all of them 
were filled, up to about that line, so he said, "what do you think", and I said "I think 
we'd better go with you", so we all got taken out, I went on the back of a policeman 
and my daughter went on the back of an RNLI man because they had a boat down the 
high street but they couldn't get it down here because the alley was too narrow, and 
they were very good to us, they really were. They took us up to the reception centre. I 
honestly felt totally abandoned, it was a very peculiar feeling, I felt as if I was 
homeless. It was horrible actually, but they were so sweet to us, Sue Prochack's 
lovely, she'd made some lovely soup and we had some tea and things to eat, and a 
lady walked in, a tall lady with lots of brown frizzy hair and glasses and she walked in 
and sat down beside us and I remember feeling, god all I've got is a plastic bag, and 
all I've got in there is a nightdress and toothbrush, that's all we could take really, 
because you panic when you realise you've got to do this and you think, oh gosh what 
shall I take, I think we had a flannel, you know, and things like that, probably a towel 
from the bathroom because the bathroom's upstairs, but there wasn't very much there, 
and you sort of feel, well, you know, this is all I've got, that I can take. And we sat 
down and this lady next to us said "Well I've come to take you to my house" which 
was absolutely wonderful, because we didn't even know her, she lives further up the 
road, and they were wonderful! We lived there for six weeks, we weren't supposed to 
live there for six weeks, but they kept saying "Oh no, you don't have to go yet" and he 
was a university professor and he's absol-ately gorgeous and she's beautiful too, and 
we had such fun! It was wonderful, wonderful! I mean we're great friends now. I met 
her the other day, she's a horticultural painter, she paints rare species at Kew and 
places like that, and he has his, he's got a big house up there and they had a flat at the 
top so we were really very, very lucky. But it was a horrible feeling I must admit, 
because you thought, well, is anything going to be done. 
(END: at reference 3 1) 
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